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 This dissertation examines the role played by German educational administrators in the 
states of Hesse and Thuringia immediately after World War II, both within the educational 
system and the wider context of the occupation government.  This was a key transitional period 
in German history, one that stretched from the final agonies of Nazi Germany to the 
establishment of the two-state system that prevailed throughout the Cold War.  These 
administrators, while not involved at the classroom level in the educational systems that they 
operated within, helped shape how that system would be reformed and what it would look like in 
the future.  Furthermore, they filled a key role as intermediaries between the German public and 
the Allied Control Council and foreign military officers who were in ultimate control of the 
government and had their own, sometimes competing, visions for what German education after 
National Socialism should look like.  Finally, the administrators and the bureaucratic posts that 
they occupied became politically contested sites in and of themselves, in large part due to the 
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CHAPTER 1: RETHINKING THE ROLE OF ADMINISTRATION  
 
Education is a weapon the effect of which is determined by the 
hands that wield it, by who is to be struck down. 
   -Joseph Stalin, 19341 
 
There can be no revolution without a radical change in the 
educational system.  It is sufficient to quote . . . the example of the 
German Republic, which did not touch the old educational system, 
and therefore never became a republic.  
     -H.G. Wells, 19342 
 
 In the fall of 1945 schools in the German city of Wiesbaden faced a fearful array of crises 
and challenges.  The immediate problems included the lack of basic school supplies, bombed out 
or otherwise damaged classrooms, a dearth of qualified teachers in the wake of denazification 
purges, want of politically suitable textbooks and teaching aids, and shortages of heating coal in 
the face of the approaching winter.  Even though the city, now capital of the newly formed state 
of Greater Hesse, was plagued by all of these problems and more, when the Lord Mayor of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 H.G. Wells, “Marxism vs. liberalism: an interview [between] Joseph Stalin [and] H.G. Wells.”  
(New York: New Century Publishers, 1945)        
2 Ibid.        
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Wiesbaden wrote to the state government on October 19, 1945 he did not ask for teachers, books, 
classroom space, or coal.  Instead, he asked for a school inspector.3 
 This was not a case of replacing an existing inspector, filling a vacancy created by the 
war or denazification, or resuming services that had been suspended in the chaos of the final 
years of Hitler’s Reich.  Wiesbaden already had an inspector and by every report he was both 
active and competent.  What the city needed was a second school inspector to ease the burden on 
the man who already held the position and ensure that nothing was overlooked.  In his letter 
requesting the immediate creation of a second inspector position, the Mayor was very clear about 
how important the job had become in light of the reforms, rebuilding, and expansion that were 
sweeping German education after the peace.  He wrote that, “The reconstruction [of the schools] 
in the new spirit demands ever more extensive and responsible work of the school inspectors.4”  
 He went on to enumerate a number of the specific duties that the inspectors were 
responsible for, and which were proving so vital to educational reconstruction.  These included 
communication with the occupation authorities, overseeing the selection and training of new 
teachers, institution of new curriculums, and preparing new teaching materials.  All of this was in 
addition to the usual tasks of inspecting school facilities and certifying instructor competency, 
which was deemed a full time job in and of itself under normal circumstances.  Many of the new 
tasks that they were burdened with fell far outside of their professional routine.  What was the 
nature of this activity, and what made it so vital that the mayor of a city in crisis would prioritize 
acquiring a second school inspector?  What was the role of educational administrators in !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 “Der Oberbürgermeister der Stadt Wiesbaden an den Herrn Regierungspräsidenten, Abteilung 
II; Betr: Berufung eines zweiten Schulrats für die Volksschulen in Wiesbaden,“ 19. October, 
1945, Abt. 650 B Nr. 2920 – Personal Akte – Heinrich Schaab, HHStAW 
4 Ibid. 
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rebuilding German education after World War 2?  How did this fit into broader reconstruction 
agendas, and how did this in turn affect the educational systems that they oversaw?   In addition 
to molding the form that a new, non-fascist German educational system would take and 
overseeing the resumption of the educational routine, school inspectors were acting as key 
intermediaries between Allied occupation authorities and the teachers who formed the working 
core of the schools.  In doing so they were making a major contribution to the nation building 
enterprise that lay at the core of Europe’s recovery from World War 2.   
  The school inspectorate in Hesse was not alone in assuming these tasks.  Throughout 
Germany, both under Western and Soviet occupation, educational administrators of all levels 
helped, from the earliest days of the occupation, to articulate and shape precisely what the 
educational mission of the systems they worked within would be and how it would be carried 
out.  Furthermore, they served as intermediaries between German schools that, as part of the 
German government, were subject to the oversight and final authority of the Allied Control 
Council and the foreign military officers who had their own visions for what German education 
after National Socialism should look like, agendas that were sometimes at odds with the level of 
reform that was desired by the Germans themselves.  Their complex existence at the intersection 
of military, civilian, state, and national influences and demands made them both the wielders of 
significant political agency, and simultaneously the targets of other politically active groups 
seeking to further their own agendas.   
 For the victors of World War II, denazification and the demilitarization of Germany were 
the overriding concerns of the immediate post-war period, although the exact form of a post-Nazi 
Germany was a point of strong contention.  It was widely agreed, however, that resuming the 
education of German youth in a productive manner was key to the nation-building project.  It 
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was also vital in order to undo some of the excesses of the recent past and hopefully salvage a 
generation of young Germans that many feared were irredeemably tainted by more than a decade 
of Nazi education.  Selection of the Germans who would staff this new educational system, both 
on the classroom and administrative levels, was highly politicized.  Serving in a public capacity 
was also dependent upon being certified through the denazification process as not being 
implicated in any National Socialist organizations or activities.  Due to the ways that Nazi 
organizations insinuated themselves into almost every level of German society and the specific 
ways in which they targeted professionals via organizations such as the National Socialist 
Teachers’ League (NSLB), men and women with such clean political bills of health were not 
easy to find.  While these requirements were eased somewhat in subsequent years, the people 
chosen to work in German civil services immediately after the war were exceptional in many 
ways.  
 Frequently returning from years of exile abroad, often emerging from a self-imposed 
‘inner-exile’ of non-engagement with the Nazi state, and sometimes coming directly from 
political prisons and concentration camps, these men and women brought with them a wartime 
experience that was wholly different from most of their fellow countrymen. Some shared the 
most radical goals of the occupiers and viewed defeat as an opportunity to build a truly new 
society.  Others preferred a return to the norms of the democratic Weimar Republic or even older 
models such as the glory days of the Second Reich, a time when German education was hailed as 
an international model and emulated by developing nations such as the United States.  In most 
cases they had pre-war experience as educators. Some had already risen to the ranks of the local 
educational administrative corps by the time of the Nazi takeover and had their careers cut short 
! 5!
due to the political purges of 1933.  They not only carried out the policies of the occupation 
authorities, but articulated their own set of uniquely German educational goals. 
 German educational administration serves as an excellent case study of the interactions 
between occupiers, local populations, and those among the occupied tasked with rebuilding and 
reforming their own systems. Examining these issues allows us to see how Germans themselves 
were, for better or worse, partially responsible for the course that their country – or perhaps more 
appropriately countries – took in the years after World War II and were not simply the passive 
objects of the Cold War international politics of the superpowers.  It also illuminates the nature 
of occupational administration in general and the roles played by both occupiers and occupied in 
reshaping recently destabilized nations.     
 Rather than focus on the policies of the occupiers, this study highlights the ways in which 
German education was reshaped by the people for whom it was being reformed and puts German 
policy makers and the concerns, needs, and desires of the citizens they served back into the 
discussion of how two radically different yet distinctly German educational systems emerged 
from the chaos of postwar Europe. It is, however, more than just a story of educational reform. 
By examining areas in what would eventually become parts of both East and West Germany it 
challenges earlier views of East/West divides that were impermeable even at this early stage and 
describes the evolution of two systems that, while not developing together in the same direction, 
were still part of a common German educational tradition that had not yet wholly broken down 
or been superseded by newer structures operating on purely Cold War lines.  This is not intended 
to claim that they were operating in tandem or without reference to the ever-solidifying 
institutional boundaries that resulted from the escalating international tensions, but to show that 
! 6!
the divides that evolved were grounded just as much in German political traditions and 




 Much of the recent scholarship on post-war German education focuses on how far reform 
and denazification efforts progressed and to what degree the new school systems represented a 
break with both the Nazi and pre-Nazi past.  In the West German context the issue is framed as 
an attempt to explain the ultimate success of the transformation – Germany today is a stable 
democracy with an educational system that, while not without internal criticism and frictions, is 
generally well regarded and produces relatively well educated citizens.  The key questions 
surround the degree to which this is due to occupation-era reforms, and how much of it is the 
result of later initiatives in the 50s and 60s.   There is also the issue of what role Weimar and 
Imperial-era policies and practices played, and whether the rebuilding of German education 
created a break with these older forms, or if the reforms were ultimately defeated by an older 
generation of teachers invested in pre-Nazi structures and traditions.5  
 Many earlier analyses emerged from the context of criticisms originating from West 
German educational reformers. They frequently argued that during the occupation the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 For an example of arguments centered on occupation policy see James F. Tent, Mission on the 
Rhine: Reeducation and denazification in American-occupied Germany, (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1982).  For a more recent study that focuses on the importance of 
post-occupation grass roots reform, see Brian M. Puaca, Learning Democracy: education reform 
in West Germany, 1945-1965, (New York: Berghahn Books, 2009).  For a recent study that, 
while it focuses on the Soviet occupied east, argues for the presence of a strong continuity in 
classroom-level education via consistently retained or rehired teaching staffs see Benita Blessing, 
The Antifascist Classroom: Denazification in Soviet-occupied Germany 1945-1949, (New York: 
Palmgrave, 2006)  
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educational system entered a period of stagnation in which few substantial reforms were made 
and practices largely reverted to structures and patterns dating from before the Nazi takeover.6   
This is closely related to a literature on the Western occupation of Germany in general that 
claimed it was ill run, did not successfully introduce substantial change into German culture or 
politics beyond the initial destruction of National Socialism, and gained its most notable 
successes by increasingly removing itself from the day to day governance of the country.7  Later 
writers such as Mitter and Hearnden have reinforced this view by highlighting the resistance of 
German educators to British and American reforms and their tendency to fall back on the 
systems with which had the most familiarity, namely those of the Weimar Republic and the 
Kaiserreich.  Where significant deviation from these older structures was evident the changes 
were not portrayed as innovations by young teachers or dictates from the occupation authorities, 
but as National Socialist measures that were never purged from the laws governing West German 
education.8  This literature borrows heavily from critiques of West German higher education that 
were popular in the late 60s and 70s.  While the student radicals of 1968 railed against “the 
mildew of thousands of years” under the academic gowns of their professors, critics of West 
German primary and secondary education deplored what they saw as distasteful remnants of the 
most troubling periods of German history.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 Saul Robinsohn and J. Caspart Kuhlmann, “Two decades of non-reform in West German 
education” Comparative Education Review vol. 11 no. 3 (October 1963): 311-330, and Tent, 
Mission on the Rhine 
7 Edward N. Peterson, The American Occupation of Germany: Retreat to Victory, (Detroit: 
Wayne State University Press, 1977) 
8 Arthur Hearnden, Education in the two Germanies, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1974); Arthur 
Hearnden, “Problems in German secondary education [1985],” in Education in Germany: 
Tradition and reform in historical context, David Phillips, ed., (London: Routledge, 1995);  
Wolfgang Mitter, “Continuity and Change: A basic question for German education,” in 
Education, vol. 33 (1995): 7-23 
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 More recent scholarship has shifted towards a more charitable assessment of the changes 
made in German education after the war.  In one study Brian Puaca argues that grassroots efforts 
significantly reformed the school system despite official neglect, and explores the ways in which 
the foundations of successful German democracy were formed through day-to-day educational 
interactions between students and teachers in the 40s and 50s.9 Beate Rosenzweig argues 
similarly in a comparative study of post-war Germany and Japan.  She asserts that even though 
German politicians and educational planners resisted structural changes far more vigorously and 
successfully than their Japanese counterparts it was the German system that experienced more 
meaningful institutional, structural, and pedagogical reform.10  Like Puaca, she argues that this 
comparative German success was due largely to a greater over-all familiarity with and 
acceptance of basic democratic principles.  This in turn is part of a larger trend towards 
recognizing a slow pattern of democratization and the development of every-day democratic 
practices and traditions in Germany stretching back into the Imperial era.11 
 Literature on East Germany inverts these assessments.  The radical political changes 
demanded by the occupying Soviets and the complete restructuring of most aspects of German 
politics allow historians to take for granted a clean break with previous traditions while 
questioning the ultimate success of a process that led to yet another single party German 
dictatorship.  Historians writing about East Germany also tend to put much more stock in the 
influence of the occupying power and, in the context of East German education, concentrate on !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9 Puaca, Learning Democracy 
10 Beate Rosenzweig, Erziehung zur Demokratie? : amerikanische Besatzungs- und 
Schulreformpolitik in Deutschland und Japan. (Stuttgart: F. Steiner, 1998) 
11 Margaret Anderson, Practicing Democracy: Elections and Political Culture in Imperial 
Germany (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000) 
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the needs, concerns, and dictates of the Soviets while portraying German educators as passive 
recipients of this change. Treatments of Soviet cultural policies towards education in Eastern 
Europe in general, and Germany in particular, emphasize the political nature of the instruction 
and the ulterior motivations of the “reformers.”  John Connelly has focused on the nation 
building aspirations of the Soviets as the root cause for what is portrayed as a Stalinization of 
Eastern European higher education,12 while John Rodden describes the primary school system as 
a mechanism for conscious political indoctrination and Stalinization that simply shifted the 
ideological focus from fascism to communism while leaving the most repressive aspects intact.13   
 More recent scholarship has begun to address in part some of the issues surrounding 
German administrators and their relationships to central authority in the Soviet Zones.  Benitia 
Blessing, for example, notes that educational theorists and administrators in the Soviet Zone 
were not part of the inner circles of SED elites such as the Moscow-trained “Ulbricht Group.”  
She credits this with reining in the impact of politics on their decisions and policies, ascribing 
party concerns an “integral” rather than a “leading” role, but she does not explore any other 
impacts that isolation from the most powerful political cadres may have had on their work.14  In 
almost all cases the focus is upon the needs and political wishes of the occupying powers and the 
ways in which the educational system was mobilized as a means to these ends.  Most recently, 
Charles Lansing has examined the occupation period and the early history of East Germany to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
12 John Connelly, Captive University: The sovietization of East German, Czech, and Polish 
higher education, 1945-1956, (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2000) 
13 John Rodden, Repainting the Little Red Schoolhouse: A history of Eastern German education, 
1945-1995, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), John Rodden, Textbook Reds: 
Schoolbooks, Ideology, and Eastern German Identity,  (University Park: Pennsylvania State 
University Press, 2006) 
14 Blessing, The Antifascist Classroom  
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probe how the German teaching profession changed during the transition from Nazism to 
Communism.  Based on research on the town of Brandenburg an der Havel, he maintains that 
rather than a clean break with a Nazi past there was significantly more continuity in the teaching 
corps between the National Socialist years and the Communist years than other researchers have 
seen, but emphasizes gradual perceptual change on the part of the staff as the region underwent 
ideological reeducation under the Soviets.15   In contrast to the previously widely accepted Cold 
War narrative of an East German educational system that broke strongly with earlier traditions as 
part of the process of becoming the ideological mouthpiece of a second German dictatorship, 
Lansing describes a system where the under-performance of ill-trained replacements and 
ongoing shortages forced the rehiring of many older teachers, while those poorly-prepared 
replacements dropped out of the profession at much higher than normal rates after a few years.  
He is far from the first to recognize any of these particular trends, however his approach is 
notable in recognizing institutional continuities and ideological shifts due to broader changes in 
German society.16       
 There exists a more recent strain of literature - particularly in the German language 
historiography - that is concerned with re-evaluating education in the former east without the 
ingrained political agendas of either the Cold War or the post-unification decade.  Scholars such 
as Emanuel Droit attempt to remove themselves from both the triumphalist narrative of the 
former West and the rose-tinted nostalgia of the former East in order to more objectively assess !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
15 Charles B. Lansing, From Nazism to Communism: German Schoolteachers under Two 
Dictatorships, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010) 
16 For another, earlier study that recognizes some of the institutional continuities and relatively 
short-lived duration of many replacement teachers without drawing some of the ideological 
conclusions of Lansing, see Brigitte Hohlfeld, Die Neulehrer in der SBZ/DDR 1945-1953: Ihre 
Rolle bei der Umgestaltung von Gesellschaft und Staat (Weinheim: Deutscher Studien Verlag, 
1992) 
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the successes, failures, and ultimate legacy of an East German educational project that shaped the 
lives and culture of a major portion of the German speaking world for half a century.  This 
literature largely steers clear of the debates surrounding denazification and attempts to place East 
Germany’s educational system in its proper historical context.  Droit in particular takes seriously 
the GDR system’s attempts at social engineering as a means for regime stabilization and attempts 
an assessment of how successful this was over the nation’s 50 year life span.17  
 Finally, there is a more recent trend to attempt to address the German experience of the 
Cold War not as two separate histories, but as a shared event with two different vantage points.  
This is an approach that attempts to acknowledge the ways in which the events of the 20th 
century profoundly divided Germans, yet at the same time left them far more connected than is 
normal for neighboring countries, even those with strong linguistic and cultural ties.  For 
example, after the collapse of the Third Reich only the most radical pan-Germanist would speak 
of a ‘Greater Germany’ encompassing Austria, much less Switzerland and Lichtenstein, yet even 
after half a century of division the political collapse of East German socialism led very rapidly to 
a seemingly inevitable reunification.  This cannot simply be ascribed to ancient cultural tradition 
or a long-standing political identity; the first unified German state scarcely lasted three-quarters 
of a century before its partition.      
 The issue of how to address this complex relationship and create histories of 20th century 
Germany that present both sides of the Iron Curtain as two halves of a shared whole has begun to 
be taken up in the English language historiography in the past decade, although scattered 
attempts to do so go back in the German literature as far as the early 80s.  Konrad H. Jarausch 
has traced the unsatisfactory manner in which this issue has been taken up in an essay published !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
17 Emmanuel Droit. Vorwärts zum neuen Menschen?: Die sozialistische Erziehung in der DDR 
(1949-1989).  (Cologne: Böhlau Verlag, 2014) 
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on the online discussion forum H-German in 2011,18 and used such a “cross cutting” approach in 
discussing the post-Nazi cultural renewal of Germany in After Hitler.19   While the realities of 
the post-war occupation and the establishment of multiple occupation zones each with their own 
bureaucratic and administrative framework prevents the examination of post-war Germany in a 
fully integrated manner, this work examines both the Soviet administration in Thuringia and the 
American administration in Hesse in order to show how similar backgrounds and circumstances 
led ultimately to different outcomes and to generate some insight into why this was so.      
 In both Eastern and Western contexts, the current scholarship largely fails to address the 
issues surrounding the German administrators who served as intermediaries between Allied 
policy makers and the educators in the classrooms.  Previous studies have concentrated either on 
the highest levels of occupation planning and military administration20 or on the local levels of 
individual schools, teachers, and classrooms.21  Both of these approaches successfully 
demonstrate what kinds of issues were of importance to the occupying powers and how the 
experience of the German classroom changed over this time.  What is currently lacking, 
however, is a close examination of the intervening layer of administrators, school inspectors, and 
educational theorists who mediated between the high politics of occupation policy and the every 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
18 Konrad H. Jarausch, “Divided, Yet Reunited - The Challenge of Integrating German Post-War 
Histories,” posted on H-German@H-Net.msu.edu, 1 February 2011. 
19 Konrad H. Jarausch, After Hitler: Recivilizing Germans 1945-1995, (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2005) 
20 for example: Tent, Mission on the Rhine; Peterson, The American Occupation of Germany; 
and Norman M. Naimark, The Russians in Germany: A history of the Soviet zone of occupation, 
1945-1949.  (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1995) 
21 for example: Puaca, Learning Democracy; and Lansing, From Nazism to Communism  
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day realities of teaching.  This project intends to fill that gap by examining the role of state 
administrators in the rebuilding of the educational system.   
 
The role of administration 
 
 That this work is situated between many existing literatures -  bridging both political and 
professional histories as well examining events under both American and Soviet occupation -  is 
fitting given the intermediary role played by the educational administrators who are its major 
subjects.  The problems and challenges of education in post-war Germany loom large, and play a 
major role in the events and circumstances that are discussed, but this is not a purely educational 
history.  In the process of doing their jobs these administrators played a substantive but 
underappreciated intermediary role in the broader project of reconstructing German politics and 
society after the war.   This complex contribution to the post-war order provides an excellent 
platform for examining the occupation as a whole, and the way that occupiers and occupied 
interacted within it.   
 First, education was widely acknowledged to be a key component to any meaningful 
rehabilitation of the German nation, both by the Allied occupiers and by the Germans 
themselves.  Much ink was spilled during the war, both by military professionals planning the 
eventual occupation and by expatriates attempting to envision the form of a post-Hitler German 
national community, on questions of how to best reform and rehabilitate what had once been one 
of Europe’s proudest educational traditions.  Among the Germans the authors were varied and 
represented a broad cross section of those who had found themselves unwelcome in Hitler’s 
Reich and had the means to leave before the war.  This was a group that simultaneously included 
! 14!
both Erika Mann - actress, author, war correspondent, cabaret proprietor, and daughter of 
novelist Thomas Mann - a woman who was well known in German language literary and cultural 
circles for her outspoken politics and non-traditional lifestyles and Dr. Werner Richter, a former 
undersecretary of education in the state of Prussia who was deeply concerned with the 
connection between state culture and public education.22  If anything binds the German voices on 
this issue together, it is the shared antipathy towards the fascist project that motivated them to 
flee abroad, and a sense of mission grounded in a shared early 20th century appreciation for the 
power of public education as a tool for social engineering.  In their understanding public schools 
were where new generations learned what it was to be German and the stakes involved in 
rebuilding that system were no less than the future soul of their nation.   
 Second, education was (and remains) a core government service that touched upon 
virtually all members of the community in some way or another, whether directly through school 
aged children of their own or indirectly via the children of friends and relatives.  As such, it 
engendered a great deal of community participation and attention, both positive and negative.  
Administrators therefore faced pressures and demands not only from occupation authorities to 
whom they were responsible, but also from German citizens in the areas under their purview.  
This came both directly via letters and other personal correspondence between individual citizens 
and educational officials and indirectly via elected governmental representatives.  The officials 
themselves must be taken into account as well as they had personal political agendas and beliefs 
and inevitably became entangled in the needs of the political parties that they affiliated 
themselves with. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
22 Erika Mann, School For Barbarians.  (New York: Modern Age Books, 1938) and Werner 
Richter, Re-Educating Germany (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1945) are both excellent 
examples of this that were widely published.  
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 Finally, the administrative layer of the German educational system was simultaneously 
one of the areas in German civil administration most damaged by Nazi ideologies and one of the 
more successful denazification stories.  It is also a story that largely remains to be told.  The 
specific numbers of administrators who lost their positions in the post-war purging of Nazi 
sympathizers has not been determined, however a close examination of the personnel files of the 
Thuringian and Hessian educational ministries indicates a much cleaner break with the recent 
past than other studies have found in comparable teaching corps.23  While far from a 
comprehensive study, an examination of 40 Thuringian and 63 Hessian administrators employed 
immediately after the war shows only one that worked at the administrative level under the 
previous regime, and that single case was an elderly man who took his pension before the new 
year.  All instances of senior ministerial staff had exceptionally clean wartime records, with exile 
or imprisonment being de rigeur.24  The reasons for this success probably lie in a combination of 
the higher amounts of power and authority vested in these positions and the relatively lower 
number of positions to be filled.  This was not a case of changing over tens of thousands of 
teachers but of finding replacements for a few hundred bureaucrats.    
 The consequence of this is that the Germans who were eventually selected to participate 
in reconstruction not only had a clear and relatively well-defined task to accomplish, but it was 
also much more likely that they were generally unsympathetic to what was being replaced.  For 
the researcher this means that rather than bogging down in the questions and concerns of a !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
23 See Lansing, From Nazism to Communism and Puaca, Learning Democracy for recent 
examples of this.  Both studies found a striking continuity between the teaching staffs in 
localities on both sides of the Iron Curtain in the years following the war, despite a nation-wide 
denazification program that should have eliminated many of them.   
24 Hessisches Hauptstaatsarchiv, Wiesbaden (HHStA-W), Abt. 650 B - Personalakten, HHStAW 
and Personalakten aus dem Bereich Volksbildung, THStA-W 
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National Socialist past, attention may instead be focused on how the surviving remnants of pre-
1933 anti-Nazi political forces within Germany worked to build a postwar future.  This stands in 
marked contrast to aspects of civil administration like the West German judiciary, where lofty 
pre-surrender ideals of completely purging and rebuilding the system were soon abandoned as 
impractical due to the requirements of maintaining law and order, and men within the system 
who were complicit in all manner of Nazi crimes continued their professional careers.25  
 At the same time, the fact that these administrators almost always had some degree of 
pre-Nazi employment history or other professional contact with the German school system - 
sometimes as Weimar-era administrators or inspectors, frequently as classroom teachers -  meant 
that they did not have questions of their competency hanging over them, unlike their colleagues 
in the classrooms.  Post-war teacher shortages, the immediate need to rapidly reopen schools, 
and the short-term ravages of denazification on the ranks of teaching staffs meant that 
replacements had to be found and trained in extremely short time and in large numbers.  The 
immediate consequence was that these Neulehrer - “new teachers” - were simultaneously 
heralded by champions of post-Nazi reform as the vanguard of a new era in education while 
constantly dogged by allegations of incompetence and indifference that undercut their 
relationships with the communities that they served in.  The administrative ranks, again due 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
25 For a good examination of this process in the West German judicial context, see Andrew 
Szanajda, The Restoration of Justice in Postwar Hesse, 1945-1949, (Plymouth: Lexington 
Books, 2007).  For a more general approach to the subject and the difficulties faced in 
denazifying German institutions see: Armin Schuster, Die Entnazifizierung in Hessen, 1945-
1954: Vergangenheitspolitik in der Nachkriegszeit (Wiesbaden: Historische Kommission für 
Nassau, 1999). 
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largely to the vastly smaller numbers of people who had to be replaced, largely escaped this 
complication.26 
 Recently, some historians have argued for the importance of evaluating educational 
reform at the level of the classroom due to questions surrounding the relationship between state-
level policy and the individual school.  In doing so Brian Puaca emphasizes the “process of 
negotiation that occurred as postwar German educators adopted and adapted some American 
educational ideas and methods while rejecting others,”27 as a way of highlighting just how much 
agency rested in the hands of local teachers.  While this is a valid point, I argue that the nature of 
a military occupation and the unequal power relationships between occupier and occupied 
magnify the importance of the local administrators on whose shoulders fell the tasks of 
interpreting policies from above and ensuring at least a minimum level of compliance from those 
below them. These administrators had a unique position within the German educational system, 
straddling the worlds of the Western and Soviet occupiers who were setting policy on the 
broadest levels and the German educators who were implementing them on the local level.   
 While native Germans themselves, many of these men and women were – although not 
always – highly familiar and comfortable with the language, culture, and political views of the 
occupiers.  This was in large part due to the selection process used by the occupation forces in 
the first years after the war, which placed a high value on anti-fascist political views dating from 
before 1933, or at the very least non-participation in overtly Nazi organizations.  A large number !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
26 For more on the Neulehrer in general, their role in the rebuilding of German Education after 
the war, and the specific meanings that various groups ascribed to them see Petra Gruner, Die 
Neulehrer, ein Schlüsselsymbol der DDR-Gesellschaft: Biographische Konstruktionen von 
Lehrern zwischen Erfahrungen und gesellschaftlichen Erwartungen. (Weinheim: Deutscher 
Studien Verlag, 2000) 
27 See Puaca, Learning Democracy: 9 
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of these politically acceptable Germans displayed a high degree of intellectual hybridism, 
operating on a multi-national level far more than was common at that time.  Examples of this 
included educators who, before the war, had contributed to international educational journals, 
participated in foreign exchange programs, spent time in Moscow due to communist convictions, 
or who retreated into exile abroad as the political situation in Germany worsened throughout the 
early and mid 30s.  Their ability to function in both sets of political and social networks made 
them invaluable intermediaries between the occupiers and the occupied. 
 It should be acknowledged that many of the men and women examined in this work were 
members of state-level ministries of education, and count among their numbers the ministers 
themselves.  It may seem curious to include such relatively lofty positions in a discussion of mid-
level bureaucrats, however Germany during the years of the Allied occupation is not a normal 
society operating under the usual set of power relationships.  Normally people in top-level 
offices such as these are policy makers, men and women with an extreme amount of independent 
authority.  In the unusual circumstance of total governmental collapse followed by military 
occupation, however, those offices assume an unusually subordinate role.  As will be discussed 
in subsequent chapters, the existence of a civilian administration answerable to a foreign military 
occupation structure meant that these high ministerial officials did not have the ability to craft 
and direct top-level policy that they would have under normal circumstances, but still had 
considerable ability to shape directives from above in ways that matched their own priorities and 
world-views.  In this way they functioned much more as mid-level administrators of policies 




The Case Studies: Thuringia and Hesse 
 
 The decision to conduct this study at the level of state government rather than on a 
national or zonal level was made due to the political uncertainty within Germany during this 
period and the results that it had on how the occupation was structured.  From the beginning the 
question of how, exactly, a final political reorganization of central Europe was to be undertaken 
was highly contested.  In the wake of the Yalta Conference the question was left open whether 
Germany was to be broken up, and if so into how many separate states, or whether it would be 
allowed to remain whole.  In the end the ad-hoc arrangement of occupation zones solidified into 
two distinct political entities as early Cold War animosities drove an increasingly large wedge 
between the Western Allies and the Soviets, beginning with economic and travel restrictions 
between zones in the West and culminating in the creation of two politically independent 
German states in 1949.28   
 Between the dismemberment of Nazi Germany and the foundation of its successor states 
there was little in the way of a centralized political authority.  Unable to come to an agreement 
on how to organize a single state, and not wishing to totally abandon the future possibility of one 
in favor of the de facto multi state arrangement that grew out of the occupation, both the Soviets 
and the Western Allies avoided creating robust national-level administrative apparatuses, 
defaulting to a federal model where civil government on the state level handled most of the day 
to day administrative needs of the region.  While a joint occupation administrative framework for 
the entire nation existed, its inherently cooperative framework meant that it became less 
powerful and less influential as time passed and Cold War animosities deepened and solidified.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
28 For broad looks at the occupation of both the American and Soviet Zones of Germany see 
Tent, Mission on the Rhine and Naimark, The Russians in Germany  
! 20!
Meanwhile, local structures and government became increasingly responsible and influential due 
to this power vacuum.29     
 In the West this process continued via the foundation of the Federal Republic of Germany 
as a federally organized state.  In the Eastern German Democratic Republic the national 
ministries in Berlin quickly reasserted their power, culminating in the official dissolution of the 
East German states in 1952.  In the interim between surrender and the foundation of East and 
West Germany the level of state administration and bureaucracy being investigated here 
represents not only the key level of German government, but one of the defining attributes which 
sets it apart from both what came before and after and argues for handling the region as a single 
entity rather than two.   
 The temporal boundaries of this project were also determined by two other factors, one 
originating in the reconstruction politics of the East and the other in the personnel policies of the 
West.  In what eventually became the German Democratic Republic the formation of a 
centralized state was accompanied by a shift of educational policies and decisions being made on 
the level of the individual Länder to a centralized ministry in Berlin where the SED could exert 
more direct control.  This represents a basic change in the pressures and influences that policy 
makers were working under, moving away from local needs and issues and to questions of 
national policy and politics.  Eventually this culminated in the 1952 dissolution of federal states 
in East Germany in favor of direct administration of districts from the national capital.  The shift 
in power from the regional to the national level began a couple of years before that, however, so 
that by the time of their official dissolution the states were little more than administrative fictions !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
29 For an in-depth examination of the administrative structure of the Soviet occupation of 
Germany, see Jan Foitzik, Sowjetische Militäradministration in Deutschland (SMAD) 1945-
1949: Struktur und Funktion, (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1999).  For the American sectors Tent 
covers much the same ground in Mission on the Rhine.  
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bearing little resemblance to the assertive local governments visible in the five years after the 
war. 
 In the West this shift was far less jarring, as the state as a whole and education in 
particular continued to be organized along a federal model. But the period from 1949 to the early 
1950s marks another kind of break, namely a shift in administrative cohorts.  Due to the politics 
of denazification a large number of the men and women drawn into the administrative ranks in 
the years immediately after the war were educators whose careers had been prematurely cut short 
by the Gleichschaltung of 1933, most of whom were born in the 1880s.  Once re-hired their 
pensions and retirement dates were calculated as if they had never been terminated in the 30s.  
The mandatory retirement age for Hessian government workers, including both teachers and 
administrators, at this time was 65.  The over-all result of this was that there was a massive wave 
of retirements in 1949 and 1950.  This picture is further complicated by the legal rehabilitation of 
many former Nazis in the early 50s, leading many to resume to their former occupations.  By and 
large the administrators who oversaw the early years of Hessian education in the 1950s FRG 
were a different group than those who had taken on the task of rebuilding and reforming the 
system during the interim, occupation years. 
 The period between 1945 and 1949 is not simply the epilogue to Nazi Germany and 
World War 2, nor is it merely the prologue to Germany’s fractured Cold War history.  It is a 
moment in time that, brief though it may have been, featured radically different organizing 
principles and political potentials than the eras that immediately preceded and followed it. This 
study is not, of course, unique in embracing this periodization nor does it argue that these 
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temporal boundaries form hard conceptual boarders that preclude any other approaches.30  If 
nothing else history as a scholarly discipline highlights both continuities and caesuras across any 
event or point in time, no matter how natural or arbitrary it may seem.  As deeply transitional 
Germany’s post-war it may have been, however, this need not affect the analysis of it as a 
distinct period in its history any more than our knowledge of what follows 1933 should constrain 
the study of the Weimar Republic on its own merits.     
 The unique character of this era demanded a comparative approach that integrated both 
the Soviet and Western zones of occupation.  The Cold War tensions that would divide the 
German-speaking world had not yet fully solidified, yet were still visible in almost every aspect 
of daily life. It was necessary to select regions for this study that would represent historical 
pathways that led both to the socialist GDR and the capitalist BRD, yet not be so dissimilar that 
meaningful comparison would be impossible.  In the end I settled on the neighboring regions of 
Hesse and Thuringia because they were geographically close and yet ideologically distinctive.     
 Hesse was chosen for three main reasons:  First, it was under American occupation.  As 
the occupation matured Anglo-American cooperation and coordination in their duties and 
policies drew their respective zones together, eventually culminating in their effective merger 
into a single economic and political body in 1947, with Bizonia forming the core of what would 
eventually become the Federal Republic of Germany.  While the areas in the Southwest under 
French occupation would join a year later, this early and close cooperation makes the experience 
of the American and British sectors far more typical of a generalized ‘West German experience.’  
Within this bi-zonal region Hesse has a number of other characteristics that made it stand out.  Its !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
30 For two other studies that utilized similar periodization, albeit without arguing as explicitly for 
the recognition of post-war Germany as its own distinctly unique moment in time, see Tent, 
Mission on the Rhine and Naimark, The Russians in Germany. 
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geographical and cultural identity, while certainly unique, is not so strongly articulated that it 
must be constantly corrected for, something which would be a constant issue in the far south or 
the far north.  Confessionally, in 1947 it was almost perfectly split along the same lines as 
Germany as a whole, with roughly a 2 to 1 ratio of Protestants to Catholics. 
 Thuringia was chosen for many of the same reasons as exemplar of the nascent GDR.  As 
a neighboring state it shares many cultural similarities with its western neighbor.  Before half a 
century of communist rule decimated religious observance it had a confessional makeup very 
similar to Hesse’s, with a Lutheran majority that lived with a very large Catholic minority.  Like 
Hesse its regional cultural identity is not so strongly articulated as to make it unrepresentative of 
larger trends.  As with the case of Hesse, this confessional mixing left religion and its 
relationships to the schools as a major issue that post-war occupiers and educational reformers 
had to contend with, but did not completely dominate the discourse as it did in Catholic Bavaria. 
Thuringia was also attractive from a research perspective, as there were large, readily available 
archival holdings on many prominent Thuringian educational administrators, both in Thuringia’s 
own state archives and in the Berlin-based Research Library for the History of Education, part of 
the German Institute for International Educational Research.31   
 These files, coupled with the relevant ministerial holdings and personnel files held at the 
Hessian State Archive in Wiesbaden and the Thuringian State Archive in Weimar provided the 
archival backbone for this study; smaller sections depended on a diverse array of published 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
31 For example: Personalakten aus dem Bereich Volksbildung, THStAW; Nachlass Walter Wolf, 
THStAW; Nachlass Walter Wolf, BBF-DIPF; Nachlass Marie Torhorst, BBF-DIPF, among 
others.  See the bibliography for a full listing of archival and published primary sources. 
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literature from the period and American occupation documents published as microfiche sets.32  
Linguistic difficulties precluded the inclusion of sources directly from Russian or ex-Soviet 
archives, however the most important edicts, orders, and other acts of military governance were 
available in translation. 
 It must be acknowledged that Thuringia is somewhat of an outlier in that it was a hotbed 
of very early National Socialist activity.  National Socialists entered the government there in 
1930, and Wilhelm Frick - a prominent Nazi who would become the Minister of the Interior in 
Hitler’s cabinet in 1933 - was given the position of Thuringian Minister of the Interior and 
Education, the first ministerial level position held by the NSDAP.33  This very early acquaintance 
with National Socialism does not seem to have stifled pre-war protests against the government or 
led to a particularly deep uniformity of Nazi thought.  If anything, judging purely from the post-
war denazification papers of numerous officials in Thuringia’s educational ministry, it seems to 
have had a higher than average rate of overt resistance to National Socialism, perhaps born of the 
antipathy that only prolonged, close contact can create.  Regardless, the by the late 40s Thuringia 
does not appear to have been remarkable one way or the other in the amount of zeal its citizens 
displayed for a return to fascism.   
 Finally, both regions were attractive in that they were not complicated by the presence of 
military administration before the end of the war or the territorial concessions made after the 
war.  This is an issue that greatly complicates the occupation history of much of the Rhineland, 
where large areas were under an early form of occupation administration as early as the fall of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
32 For example: The U.S. Occupation of Germany: Educational Reform, 1945-1949 Microfiche 
Collection, (Congressional Information Service, Inc., 1991).  See the bibliography for a full 
listing of archival and published primary sources 
33!Bernhard!Fulda,!Press and Politics in the Weimar Republic (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2009): 152 !
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1944.  For the sake of simplicity it was desirable to avoid the need to consider the wide array of 
ad-hoc wartime arrangements that this entailed.  So to the more eastern reaches of the eventual 
GDR were complicated by the internationally unsettled nature of border between Germany and 
Poland during this era.  As neighboring regions at the geographic center of Germany, both Hesse 
and Thuringia avoided these issues that, while important in any understanding of occupation-era 
Germany as a whole, could be gainfully avoided in a more narrow discussion of the relationship 
between civil administration, military occupation, and how it affected educational reconstruction. 
 Given these criteria it might seem strange that Berlin has not been included as a point of 
comparison.  While Berlin does share many of the characteristics that made Thuringia and Hesse 
attractive, its story is greatly complicated by its unique position in German Cold War history.  As 
a single city jointly under the direct administration of the Allied Control Council it was not yet 
neatly - and notoriously - divided between east and west as it would be after 1961.  Other 
scholars have identified it as a ideological and pedagogical “hot spot” - an area that was at the 
forefront of educational experimentation during the reconstruction period and later, due precisely 
to the high-profile enclave nature of half of the city.34  Its post-war educational history is unique 






34 Puaca, Learning Democracy: 6, Robert F. Lawson, “Education in Postwar Berlin: a 
comparative laboratory ,” in Compare: A Journal of Comparative and International Education, 
Vol. 18, Issue 2, 1988 
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Administrators as intermediaries 
 
 This study is also deeply indebted to other work that has been done on the concept of 
administrative intermediaries, and borrows heavily from this conceptual framework to 
understand how German educational administrators functioned under the unique circumstances 
of military occupation. Intermediaries or ‘go-betweens’ are those people who enable or facilitate 
some form of contact or communication between two groups that would otherwise be more 
difficult, if not impossible, due to local conditions.   The concept is used frequently in studying 
the relations between indigenous peoples and Europeans during the colonization of North 
America.  In that context historians have analyzed the importance of native converts to 
Christianity, European missionaries and shipwreck survivors, and others who had a degree of 
both linguistic and cultural familiarity with the indigenous people and their European 
colonizers.35  While post-war Germany did not experience anything as extreme or profound as 
the collision of worlds that took place in the 15th Century Americas, the dominance of foreign 
military governments presented a need for men and women who could understand and 
communicate the priorities, needs, and cultural backgrounds of both the occupiers and the 
occupied.  In this regard this work also owes a debt to the work done by David Pike on German 
authors who went into exile in the Soviet Union during the Nazi regime, and the ways in which !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
35 For four relatively recent examples see: Alida C. Metcalf, Go-betweens and the Colonization 
of Brazil: 1500-1600, (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2005); Yanna Yannakakis, The Art of 
Being In-between: Native intermediaries, Indian Identity, and Local Rule in Colonial Oaxaca 
(Durham: Duke University Press, 2008); Benjamin N. Lawrance, Emily Lynn Osborn, and 
Richard L. Roberts, eds., Intermediaries: Interpreters, and Clerks: African employees in the 
making of colonial Africa (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2006); and Danna Agmon, 
An Uneasy Alliance: Traders, Missionaries and Tamil Intermediaries in Eighteenth-Century 
French India. Dissertation, University of Michigan. Ann Arbor: ProQuest/UMI, 2011. 
(Publication No. 918695367).   I am particularly indebted to Metcalf for her model of the three 
different sorts of intermediaries and understanding of how each functioned. 
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they functioned as cultural intermediaries in both the pre-war and wartime battles against 
German fascism, as well as to the work done by Arnd Bauerkämper, Konrad H. Jarausch, and 
Marcus M. Payk on trans-Atlantic intermediaries in the post-war cultural integration of West 
Germany.36   
 There are multiple recognized forms of intermediary relationships.  At their simplest and 
most direct even a plant, animal, disease, or object can function as a physical intermediary by 
creating a shared point of reference or contact for two otherwise dissimilar or remote cultures. 
German educational administrators served, for the most part, as what are described as 
transactional intermediaries: “those who facilitate social interaction between worlds.37”  
Translators, diplomats, cultural brokers, negotiators, all of these are examples of the transactional 
intermediary.  Many of those roles could describe the varied and multi-faceted jobs that 
educational administrators filled in post-war Germany.   
 Transactional intermediaries are distinguished from other types of intermediaries by 
being a third party that facilitates otherwise difficult or inconvenient communication between 
two others.  In order to do so they must be familiar with, trusted by, and capable of 
communicating with both of the others.  This third party is frequently at least nominally neutral, 
although this is not a requirement and in practice they are often observed working more closely 
with one side than the other.  In such situations they sometimes come promote the interests of 
one over the other. There also remains the issue of what the interests of the intermediary are, and 
whether these are injected into the communications at any time.  The men and women examined !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
36 David Pike, German Writers in Soviet Exile, 1933-1945 (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 2012); Arnd Bauerkämper, Konrad H. Jarausch, and Marcus M. Payk, 
Demokratiewunder: Transatlantische Mittler und die kulturelle Öffnung Westdeutschlands 1945-
1970. (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2005) 
37 Metcalf, Go-betweens and the Colonization of Brazil: 12 
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in this work behaved as transactional intermediaries while maintaining their own personal 
agendas, as well as remaining mindful of the needs of their political parties or any other 
constituencies they felt themselves responsible to.  Such considerations could, of course, affect 
how they approached to their positions and the decisions they made in office.    
 The educational administrators who either kept their positions through the first wave of 
denazification or who were appointed in the first days of the occupation tended to be well-
positioned to serve as transactional intermediaries.  Many of them, whether through deliberate 
choice by the occupation authorities during the selection process or because of previous 
engagement with international professional networks, were bilingual. They frequently had 
political convictions that were in line with the Allied power occupying the zone that they lived 
in.  Some of them had spent the Nazi years as political refugees and were already used to serving 
in some intermediary capacity due to their wartime experiences. 
 Finally, intermediaries not only enhance communication, and thereby enable governance 
and dialogue where it might not otherwise be tenable, but they also wield a significant amount of 
autonomous agency in how they choose to relay the messages they are entrusted with, and 
whether they choose to do so at all.    Individuals may choose to block, degrade, and obfuscate 
communication as easily as they may choose to faithfully transmit it.  Transactional 
intermediaries not only connect groups that might otherwise have difficulty communicating, they 
also serve as informational gatekeepers.  There is a significant amount of power present in such a 
relationship and the altering or selective transmission of data can be incredibly effective for 
furthering one’s own goals or affecting a desired change in a situation.  Serving as an 
intermediary is ultimately as much about deciding what information gets passed on as it is 
enabling that activity in the first place.    
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The structure of the argument 
 
 It would be impossible to fully understand the various aspects of these intermediary 
relationships without a sufficient background in the educational histories and backgrounds of the 
key players in them.  The goal of the second chapter is to situate the reader in the historical and 
educational context that these relationships emerged from and examines intertwined pre-war 
histories of the German, American, and Russian educational systems.  The late 19th and early 20th 
century histories of these three systems and ways that their development related to one another 
had profound implications for the reconstruction of German education after the war.  Not only 
did they provide the ideological and pedagogical backgrounds that would shape German, Soviet, 
and American educational policies and expectations in the mid-20th century, but the men and 
women who were tasked with rebuilding German education were themselves products of these 
systems.   
 Chapter three explores how these histories shaped wartime planning for post-war German 
educational reconstruction and what the various expectations and priorities of each nation were.  
It also goes into detail on the precise challenges facing German education after the collapse of 
the government in May of 1945 and the imposition of military occupation.  Many of the 
challenges that faced educational administrators between the war’s end and the foundation of the 
post-war successor states can be directly traced to the material difficulties presented by 
Germany’s devastation, while wartime planning - or lack thereof - did much to dictate what the 
immediate shape of civil administration in a peace-time Germany would be. 
 Chapter four continues with this theme by concentrating on the initial measures and 
restructuring that took place in the immediate aftermath of the war.  From the restructuring of the 
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administrative layout of the German interior to the enactment of sweeping denazification 
policies, the reorganization that was carried out by the occupation militaries was quick, decisive, 
and had long-lasting implications for how educational reforms could be carried out.  It also 
explores the denazification efforts of the occupation governments and what the implications were 
for what kind of person ended up staffing the civil administrative framework of the new 
educational systems.  This phase of very early reform represents the high water mark of direct 
military influence; after this moment the presence of an established German bureaucracy meant 
that there was some space for resisting or at least tempering Allied initiatives, whether they 
chose to use it or not. 
 Chapter five focuses on how German educational administrators functioned as 
intermediaries between the occupation powers and the larger population.   By providing an easily 
accessible contact point for both individual citizens seeking to address grievances or voice 
opinions about educational reform and occupation authorities who needed a means of rapidly 
carrying out large-scale policies, these administrators acted as both information conduits and 
gatekeepers.  This gatekeeper function was especially valuable in that it allowed them to mediate 
internal tensions within the educational system in such a way that the intervention of occupation 
authorities who might not be aware of the nuances of specific issues was not always necessary, 
usually to the benefit of all involved.     
 Chapter six examines the ways in which this intermediary position granted educational 
administrators a significant amount of agency over the precise ways in which reform was carried 
out.  While they still lacked the ability to unilaterally decide the largest issues in how the German 
educational system would be reformed, they retained the ability to shape how it was 
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implemented and what aspects of the agendas prescribed by the occupation powers were 
emphasized.   
 Finally, chapter seven shows the various ways that this limited agency made the 
administrators themselves as well as the positions they occupied targets for other political actors 
in post-war Germany.  This became increasingly important towards the end of the occupation as 
domestic German political life began to reassert itself and native political parties grew in both 
strength and confidence.  In the case of the east this was mostly a process of the consolidation of 
power under the SED as a precursor to the single-party dictatorship that would follow, while in 
the west it involved the reemergence of pre-war political parties and divisions or the 
reestablishment of older political constituencies under new party structures better suited to the 
political realities of a post-fascism Germany. 
  One of the more common metaphors of political scientists, pundits, leaders, and 
historians when describing the role of leadership in shaping the fate of men and nations has long 
been the ‘ship of state.’  The importance of the decision making power wielded by world leaders 
and statesmen has long been evident to even the most casual of observers and these ‘helmsmen’ 
the subsequent subject of both paeans and polemics.  More recently our understanding has 
expanded to include how the ‘ship’ itself - the nation of individuals who are lead - participates in 
the metaphorical voyage and how events have been shaped by all manner of cultural, social, 
economic, and political considerations emanating from every possible corner of society.  To 
extend this already over-wrought metaphor one step further, however, there is still significant 
work to be done on what role the ‘crew’ plays in all of this.  The men and women who are not 
operating at the high level of the leadership elite, yet whose daily toil is specifically directed at 
maintaining the state and ensuring its smooth operation.  Whether called administrators, 
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bureaucrats, Beamten, or by some other name they exert a significant amount of quiet influence 
on the world around them, and nowhere is this more visible than in those rare moments of 
extremity when, faced by total governmental collapse, they must participate not only in the 





CHAPTER 2:  THREE CONVERGING HISTORIES 
 
There are many excellent features of the Prussian school system; 
there are many things which we would do well to study carefully.  
The Prussian king’s conception of education for the lower classes, 
however, is directly opposed to everything American. 
   -Thomas Alexander, 191938 
 
At all costs we must break the old, absurd, savage, despicable and 
disgusting prejudice that only the so-called “upper classes" - only 
the rich, and those who have gone through the school of the rich - 
are capable of administering the state and directing the 
organizational development of socialist society. 
   -Vladimir Lenin, 191739 
 
In 1919, Thomas Alexander, a professor of elementary education at a teacher’s college in 
Tennessee, published an account of his recent tour of Prussia.  He traveled there shortly before !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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World War I to study the public elementary school system and learn how they had achieved their 
remarkable successes, in the hopes of bringing some of these techniques back to the United 
States.  Professor Alexander’s ‘educational tourism’ was far from an exceptional act.  He was the 
latest in a long tradition of educators from countries with developing educational systems 
traveling to Europe in order to observe, report, and hopefully integrate the most modern practices 
upon their return home. 
Writing after the war, however, Alexander was highly ambivalent about what he had 
seen.  While broadly laudatory when describing literacy rates, school attendance, the quality of 
instruction teachers received, and the hygiene of the pupils he met, he was deeply troubled by 
what he regarded as an underlying state agenda.  He wrote that, “the Prussian is to a large 
measure enslaved through the medium of his school; . . . the whole scheme of Prussian 
elementary education is shaped with the express purpose of making ninety-five out of every 
hundred citizens subservient to the ruling house and to the state.”  In the tracked divisions of the 
Prussian educational system he perceived a scheme “fashioned so as to make spiritual and 
intellectual slaves of the lower classes. . . [and] to establish more firmly the Hohenzollern upon 
his throne.”  Opportunities for social and economic mobility existed, but were largely reserved 
for pupils from families that already had the means to take advantage of them.  The rest were 
educated to be content with their station in life and loyalty to the state was heavily emphasized.  
“The Prussian elementary school is the best in the world from the point of view of the upper 
classes of Germany, . . . [but for] the lower classes it is the worst system, for it takes from them 
all hope of improving their condition in life.”  He acknowledged that there was much the 
American elementary school system could learn from Prussia, but stridently emphasized that the 
model could not be copied directly.  “There are many excellent features of the Prussian school 
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system; there are many things which we would do well to study carefully.  The Prussian king’s 
conception of education for the lower classes, however, is directly opposed to everything 
American.40” 
 It is tempting to dismiss Alexander’s pessimism regarding what he saw in Prussia as the 
product of wartime anti-German sentiment. His comments, however, are a product of 
fundamental differences in the ways that American and German education had developed in the 
previous fifty years and the fundamental goals and educational priorities that underpinned them.  
They also presage many of the tensions that would emerge a quarter century later as another 
generation of American educators prepared for their roll in the occupation of Germany following 
World War II.   
 For over a century educators from across the globe had held up Germany (and, earlier, 
Prussia) as a model for how a public, free, mass school system should function.  This was part of 
a broader industrial-era realization that the shift from agrarian to industrial economies meant that 
it was now necessary to impart a basic level of education onto the entire population. 41  
Germany’s literacy rate in the years before World War I was among the highest in the world, and 
its university system was broadly regarded as one of the most advanced and fruitful.  Even the 
most cursory glance at the lists of Nobel Prize recipients in the late 19th and early 20th centuries 
reveals a telling proportion of awardees from institutions inside the Kaiserreich.  The high 
volume of educational tourism directed at Germany is a further testament of the high esteem in 
which foreign governments and educational theorists held its school system.  From the 1830s to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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the 1930s Germany was considered a top destination for both privileged students seeking a 
superior quality of education and educators in search of the latest and most effective models and 
techniques.  Many nations sent delegations to Germany with the express purpose of learning how 
to reproduce some of its educational successes within their own developing school systems, 
including both the US and Russia. 
 This professional admiration was later complicated by a widespread conviction that the 
schools of Imperial Germany bore significant responsibility for the tragic European experience 
of the first half of the twentieth century. This belief went back to the years immediately 
following World War I and crystalized in the aftermath of World War II.  Beyond the well 
publicized abuses and excesses of the Nazi period, German schools were seen as heirs to a highly 
problematic, decades-long tradition of raising extreme militarism, unthinking loyalty to the state, 
and blind obedience to the level of civic virtues and implanting them deep into the minds of the 
children under their care.  The victorious Allied powers did not perceive the extreme forms of 
indoctrination and propagandizing seen under National Socialism as an aberration in German 
educational traditions, but a continuation of policies and patterns which could be observed, albeit 
in a more cultivated form, in the classrooms of the Kaiserreich as well.  In the wake of World 
War II many believed that Germany had somehow deviated from the ‘normal’ path of Western 
Civilization.  It stood to reason that its schools, as the institutions that had shaped generation 
after generation of German citizens, must bear some of the responsibility for that tragic 
waywardness. 
 Meanwhile, American and Russian education had come of age.  By the mid 1930s both 
nations had public primary and secondary educational systems that rivaled any other 
industrialized nation on the planet, and which had developed their own unique educational 
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philosophies.  Rather than frontier societies looking to a more highly developed Western Europe 
in search of instruction and inspiration, they were now global political, military, and economic 
powerhouses with school systems that they felt promoted their own visions of a healthy, 
egalitarian society in ways that the German model did not and never had.  Both the Russian and 
American school systems were represented by their champions as creating opportunities and 
mobility for all children, regardless of their background, rather than systematically reproducing 
and entrenching inequalities, as they charged that the German system had.  
 This was of course an idealized vision and ignored many barriers, inequities, and 
injustices within the schools of both the USA and USSR.  However, these idealizations of what 
Russian and American education embodied formed the basis of what occupation planners felt 
German education should be capable of and should aspire to.  It also provided a measure against 
which they believed it had fallen short, however much they may have previously admired and in 
many cases emulated its 19th century accomplishments. These idealized models of their own 
educational systems also provided a starting point for what became an ongoing dialogue between 
occupation forces that wanted to fundamentally reform and renew German schools, and German 




 The German educational system inherited by the Nazi Party was the result of a century of 
institutional development between the Napoleonic Wars and the outbreak of World War I.   
While the political fragmentation of Central Europe at the beginning of the 19th century meant 
that regional variations were abundant and would continue to be important well into the 20th 
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century, German speaking educational theorists were part of an intellectual community that 
worked across many of these international boundaries as early as the 18th century.  Furthermore, 
the ever-increasing political domination of Prussia during the 19th century, culminating in 
German unification under the Hohenzollern crown, meant that other regions and states adopted 
many Prussian models.  Modern Prussian public education began with post-Napoleonic reforms 
designed to reproduce some of the patriotic spirit of France’s revolutionary armies absent their 
republican ideals.  As the 19th century progressed Prussian education developed to meet the 
workforce needs of an industrializing society, the cultural needs of a collection of independent 
states that were slowly coalescing into a single nation, and the political needs of an older 
aristocratic class that did not want to give up their increasingly tenuous grip on power.  In the 
decades that followed a combination of pressures rising out of contemporary politics, the 
growing professionalization of teaching, and social tensions within the German Empire led to a 
number of attempts at reform, although results were mixed. 
 At its most basic, the system that emerged by the end of the 19th century can be described 
as organized along three tracks.  At the top, both in terms of social prestige and educational 
attainment, was an upper-level consisting of the Gymnasium and other secondary schools that 
granted the Abitur.  The Abitur was a certification required for matriculation to a university or 
employment in many white-collar and low-level civil administrative jobs and, for the growing 
middle class, a sine qua non for social mobility.  The middle-level consisted of various forms of 
Realschule, secondary schools that did not grant the Abitur but prepared students for entrance 
into a trade via technical instruction and apprenticeships.  Finally there was an elementary-level 
Volks- or Hauptschule aimed at providing for the basic educational needs of an industrial 
workforce.  It was mandatory for all school aged children and it imparted the basic literacy and 
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numeracy that was required for employment in a modern economy.  It also served as an early 
contact point between the state and individual and marked the beginning of a lifetime of 
exposure to nationalistic propaganda aimed at producing loyal subjects to the crown.   Attached 
to this network of formal instruction, there was also an extensive apprenticeship framework.  
While graduates of the Realschule entered training for white collar occupations, Volksschule 
graduates would go on to apprenticeships in skilled positions, respectively, while continuing to 
receive limited training at one day a week trade schools.  This combination of scholastic 
education with occupational training resulted in a very tightly structured system that was highly 
dependent upon both social position and educational performance early in life to determine what 
the professional outcome would be for any given child.   
 One of the legacies of Germany’s relatively late political unification was a federal 
framework in which individual states, the remnants of the independent kingdoms that were 
bound together to form the Empire, had significant room to tailor their educational systems as 
they wished.  Even so, much as in the federal American system which was developing along 
similarly fractured lines, there was a national dialogue on education in which certain theorists 
and states came to dominate, setting standards and practices that spread to the rest of the nation.  
This ultimately led to a model that was broadly similar from state to state, while still enjoying a 
strong regional character.  In the German case the political domination of Prussia during the 
unification process, together with its disproportionately large size and the increasing importance 
of Imperial funds to finance local schools, meant that it frequently set the standards that other 
states followed.  This was true to an extent even before the advent of the Empire, as the Prussian 
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government made reforms and pushed forward with educational development in a way that 
quickly became a model for others to follow. 42 
 During the eighteenth and the early part of the nineteenth century medieval forms of 
education present in what became Germany developed into recognizable antecedents of modern 
structures.43 In German-speaking territories there was a tradition of basic schooling through local 
churches going back to the Protestant reformation and related literacy campaigns aimed at 
preparing children to participate in their religious communities.44  Beginning in the early 18th 
century local governments began to make the first moves towards making schools state 
institutions.  This began a slow process of secularization that would extend through the 19th 
century.  Although education would ultimately come to be seen as the purview of the state, 
religious authorities always maintained a foothold via in-school religious instruction and 
ecclesiastical schools.  Church and secular authorities would continue to have a very close and 
complex relationship over educational matters well into the 20th century. 
Starting with Frederick William I and continuing under his son Frederick the Great, the 
Prussian government enacted a series of laws that had the cumulative effect of creating a 
compulsory primary school, the Volksschule.  They also set forth a common, nation-wide !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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curriculum concentrating on both basic academic skills as well as moral and religious lessons.  
State inspection and certification of all schools was required and delegated to local pastors.  
Eventually this oversight was transferred to appointed government inspectors, creating a pattern 
of local administration and supervision that endures to this day.45  In 1794 another law, the 
Preußischen Allgemeinen Landrechts, made the education of the youth of Prussia an explicitly 
governmental concern. It reserved for the state the right to determine specifics of instruction and 
required the licensing and oversight of all public and private schools and universities.46     
The embarrassing military defeats at the hands of Napoleon in 1806-07 and the harsh 
peace settlement that followed resulted in a sweeping campaign of reform, reorganization, and 
modernization within the Prussian government and military.  The school system was specifically 
targeted as part of this process, and the combination of educational and professional reform that 
emerged in the first half of the 19th century created the broad institutional framework that was 
largely still in place at the end of World War II.  
During this time period the neohumanistic ideal of self-cultivation or Bildung 
championed by Wilhelm von Humboldt emerged as a major component of a new pedagogical 
outlook in the universities and Gymnasien.47  Usually translated as either “cultivation” or 
“education,” Bildung referred to both the process and the final result of intellectual development.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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For early theorists like Humboldt there was a heavy emphasis on the individual’s freedom to 
develop his own talents to the greatest possible extent, which lead to a general antipathy for 
training for a specific career or trade.  Once a student’s Bildung was complete he would be 
broadly prepared to engage with educated society as a whole and could receive any additional, 
specific training required for his chosen profession either through his own initiative or at the 
behest of his employer.       
This lent an internal tension to Bildung with regards to social mobility.  In applying a 
measure for social position and prestige that was based on educational achievement rather than 
hereditary status it had a significant democratic component. However, the reality of early 19th 
century German education meant that there was also an inherent bias towards those who had the 
free time and financial resources to pursue the cultivation of purely intellectual talents.48  
Juxtaposed against the more utilitarian concept of practical instruction, or Erziehung, and the 
frivolity of courtly dilettantism, Bildung managed to provide grounds upon which a growing 
body of professionals and civil servants could lay claim to a measure of social prestige above the 
traditional trades and commercial classes and put themselves on more even footing with 
established social elites.  Simultaneously it provided a way for those same elites to further justify 
their position in society through extensive, and expensive, education aimed at personal 
refinement.49  Finally, it presented a socially acceptable way for the ruling elites to employ and 
seek council from educated specialists.  While certainly not elevating doctors, lawyers, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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engineers, and tutors to the level of the aristocracy, this model of intellectual refinement allowed 
for the possibility of discourse between them and the nobility that sought their professional 
expertise based on intellectual, if not social, equality.   
While in some ways the ideal of the gebildite man provided a means to promote oneself 
above the rest of the growing bourgeois middle class, the financial and institutional barriers to 
entry meant that only a very narrow section of German society was able to take advantage of it.  
As early as 1779 Frederick the Great, concerned with the impact that universal education might 
have on his agrarian economic base, wrote that rural farmers “must be taught in such a way that 
they will not run away from the villages but remain there contentedly. . .”50  While not always as 
explicit as this,  the growing state oversight over educational matters and increasingly inflexible 
admittance requirements for universities served to restrict the ways in which education could be 
used as a tool for social advancement.   
One of those barriers was the Abitur, the final examination given upon completion of the 
course of studies at a Gymnasium.  By 1812 it was theoretically the mandatory pre-requisite for 
matriculation at a university. In reality universities continued to wave this requirement and offer 
separate entrance examinations for nobles or other socially connected students well into the 
1830s.51  For the average student it was an effective barrier from the outset.  Admittance policies 
for Abitur-awarding schools and the near requirement that pupils hoping to attend one pay for 
expensive, private preparatory academies served to limit the degree to which a socially or 
economically disadvantaged student, no matter how clever, could depend on education as a !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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means for social promotion within his lifetime.  The best that could generally be hoped for was 
marginal advancement compounded over generations.    
At the same time as the neohumanistic shift was re-aligning the aims of secondary and 
university education, governmental reforms and an ongoing process of professionalization were 
altering how teachers viewed themselves and their position in society.  The reforms of the 
Vormärz and the growth of governmental certification and inspection fundamentally altered 
teaching as a career.  It shifted away from being a temporary job performed mostly by aspiring 
young clerics who had not yet found a permanent position to a distinct calling in its own right.52  
At the same time, increasing state regulation via the introduction of certification exams was 
increasing governmental control over the teaching corps.  Choosing local teachers had previously 
been both the responsibility and prerogative of local rulers, whether they were nobles, mayors, or 
church officials.  With the advent of state certification in 1810 and the administration of 
standardized exams to obtain those certificates, local officials were forced to choose from a 
much narrower field of potential candidates, all of them previously vetted by the state.53    
As the size of the Prussian civil service grew the social prestige enjoyed by its members 
increased as well. The increasing state involvement in selecting and certifying teachers led them 
to agitate for recognition as civil servants, or Beamte.  Among those directly associated with 
education only school inspectors and superintendents were initially included in this category, but 
it quickly expanded to include secondary school teachers as well.  This created a significant 
social, economic, and professional divide between secondary and primary school teachers, who 
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were not recognized as Beamte.54  This was further reinforced by certification requirements that 
required instructors in secondary schools to have a university degree, while mandating that 
elementary school teachers only needed to hold a certificate from a teaching academy.  Teaching 
academies were far less restrictive in their admissions practices than universities, frequently not 
requiring an Abitur and generally far more open to applicants from lower social orders.  The 
result was two entirely separate bodies of Prussian teachers with very different professional 
needs and, due to the degree of selection in Gymnasium and university admissions, equally 
distinct social backgrounds.  It also severely limited the ability of primary school teachers to 
advance into positions in secondary schools.  An ambitious secondary school teacher could seek 
additional certifications and pursue appointment as the rector of a school or a regional school 
inspector, with additional prospects to advance further in the administrative hierarchy.  As a 
university educated individual relatively high government office was not outside their reach.  
Such opportunities were rare for the primary school teacher, and effectively capped how far they 
could expect to rise in their career.   
The institutional and professional divides present in the pre-Unification Prussian 
educational system were certainly less than ideal from the standpoint of social mobility, both 
from the perspective of those who wished to advance via a teaching career and those who sought 
to offer pathways for advancement via education to the population as a whole.   Be that as it 
may, however, the end result of a widely available form of basic, elementary education was 
impressive in and of itself.  Not only were schools accessible both in cities and rural districts, but 
they were also highly effective at instilling basic skills in the majority of the population. As early !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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as 1849 81% of school aged children in Prussia were attending school for at least part of the 
year.  Expansion, both in terms of the number of children attending primary school and the 
number of school days attended by each child per year, happened so rapidly through the 1850s 
and 1860s that there was a critical shortage of teachers and a concerted effort had to be made to 
both raise teaching salaries and open additional Lehrseminare (teaching academies) in order to 
quickly fill vacant positions.55  When it came to providing the basic skills that were necessary for 
an industrial workforce the Prussian educational system excelled, and generations of working 
and lower-middle class Prussians - and eventually Germans - directly benefited.   
 One measure of the success of the 19th century Prussian and Imperial German school 
systems is the proportion of the population that was literate.  On the eve of Unification only 
3.42% of the population of the Kingdom of Prussia as a whole was illiterate, although regional 
unevenness somewhat marred these accomplishments.  In more economically developed areas 
such as Brandenburg, Hannover, and Hesse this rate was much lower, roughly half of a percent.  
At the same time 9.28% of people in East Prussia and 15.59% of those in Posen could not read or 
write.  Within a generation this economic unevenness would be somewhat addressed and 
illiteracy would largely be stamped out.  In 1902 the Kingdom of Prussia, now a state in the 
German Empire, could boast of a general illiteracy rate of only .02%, and even in previously 
troubled Posen only .06% of the population was officially deemed illiterate.56  It is worth noting 
that Posen in particular was challenged by the presence of a large natively Polish-speaking 
population as “literacy” was defined by the ability to read and write in German.  The successes in 
raising that figure can also be read not only in purely educational terms, but also as a success in !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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using public education as a tool for integrating – although not fully assimilating – the Polish 
population in that region.57 
  The period immediately proceeding and following Germany’s unification saw the spread 
of Prussian educational laws and models throughout the rest of the Kaiserreich, as well as the 
rapid industrialization of large areas of the new nation.  The resulting economic pressures were 
in part responsible for the rise of a new series of technical subjects that challenged the 
neohumanist monopoly of the Gymnasium.  The demand for modern subjects, or Realien, was 
fueled by rapidly expanding vocational opportunities in industry, trade, engineering, and civil 
administration.  These were fields where a firm grasp Latin or familiarity with Greek classics 
were of little use, but where technical training in specific areas of science and math was vital and 
a working understanding of modern foreign languages very useful.  The final component of the 
tripartite German educational system, the Realschule, arose in the 1850s as an alternative form of 
secondary school to meet these demands.58  As more and more technical subjects began to 
require a depth of training only available through concentrated university study the need for 
some form of Abitur-granting technical preparatory school grew.  The reach of the Realschule 
also ratcheted upwards with the foundation of numerous technical institutes, institutions that 
generally had much lower entrance requirements than the classical universities.59      
 The role and position of the Realschulen with regards to the Gymnasien was highly 
controversial and a hotly contested issue.  At the core of the debate was the fact that initially 
Realschulen did not award the Abitur, and therefore a certificate from one did not suffice for !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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matriculation at a university.  For many who had questions about the utility of the older models 
this was not entirely a bad thing.  Critics of the neohumanistic Bildung of the Gymnasium and 
university claimed that the courses of study pursued there did not prepare students for gainful, 
worthwhile employment in the modern workforce, but simply served as a form of social 
refinement for established elites. For these individuals eventual career paths had more to do with 
family connections and personal ties than credentials.60  They held that this kind of education 
was a waste of time for students embarking upon a career in a technical field.  The issue of 
language training was frequently singled out as an example of what some considered outdated 
curricula in these institutions. English, for example, was considered vital for a budding engineer 
and any time spent studying Greek or Latin needlessly delayed its mastery.61  Critics also 
claimed that by perpetuating the dominance of the Gymnasium and its privileged status in 
German society young, talented men were squandered on professions that held limited social or 
economic utility.  Modern subjects were complex enough to require courses of study that were 
just as rigorous and time-intensive as their neoclassical counterparts, and to expect a full mastery 
of both was unrealistic.  This was the core criticism articulated by Friedrich Paulsen when he 
wrote that it “is impossible to demand of the average student both the classically learned Bildung 
and modern, scientific training.62” 
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 Other criticisms were rooted firmly in social and political considerations. German 
nationalists claimed that the Gymnasium unjustly raised dead languages above the German 
tongue and led to a gebildete class that was steeped in neither German culture nor patriotic 
ideals.  Kaiser Wilhelm II opined in an 1890 speech before a national conference on schools that 
they “should raise young Germans, not young Greeks and Romans.63” Other criticisms from less 
nationalistic quarters emphasized the ways in which Bildung created a social divide between 
those privileged enough to pursue it and those who lacked the opportunity or means to do so.64  
This was not just the traditional divide between social classes, but part of the newer divisions 
between economic classes.  Proponents of this view attacked the preparatory academies that 
equipped students for the Gymnasium and the Abitur in general on the grounds that they posed a 
nearly insurmountable economic hurdle for the majority of the population.65   
 There was also a counter-charge from conservative quarters concerned with maintaining 
the social status quo.  They contended that the availability of alternate ways to achieve a status 
that was increasingly perceived as the social equal of the traditional Gebildeten was leading to a 
critical over-enrollment at universities and advanced secondary schools.  They charged that this 
diluted the quality of education, produced a glut of unemployable professionals, and destroyed 
social order.66  
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An eventual resolution, although perhaps not a solution, was reached through curricular 
shifts in both Gymnasien and Realschulen. By the early 1880s some Realschulen were 
incorporating increasing amounts of Latin and other classical subjects in their curricula in an 
attempt to become Abitur-awarding institutions in their own right.67  At the same time there was 
a general reduction of the number of hours spent on classical languages within the Gymnasium 
and an increasing emphasis on modern foreign languages, mathematics, physics, natural science, 
and other more contemporary subjects.68  By 1901 a patchwork of such measures and a network 
of compromises and Imperial decrees over the previous 20 years broke the absolute monopoly of 
the classical Gymnasium on university entrance.  The Royal Decree of November 26, 1900 
stipulated that the right to enter a university be extended to holders of certificates from 
Gymnasium, Realgymnasium, and, Oberrealschule, effectively encompassing the upper end of 
the spectrum of Realschulen.69  While this did not completely dismantle the cultural 
differentiation between the graduates of the Gymnasien and universities and those emerging from 
Realschulen and technical institutes, it did somewhat blur and complicate these distinctions 
moving into the 20th century.  
 It is important to note that these debates over secondary school education never became 
major sources of contention for the political parties of this era.  Religious and ideological sources 
of confrontation, such as can be seen in the contemporaneous battles over religious education !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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and related issues connected to the Kulturkampf, were largely absent.  The debates remained 
largely restricted to issues of educational and social prestige and the importance of Bildung in 
establishing it, and how this would affect the social status of various professions.  Proponents of 
maintaining Greek and Latin training for physicians, for example, maintained that without a 
classical Bildung it would be impossible for the medical profession to maintain its current social 
and cultural prestige, and that without this social respectability it would be difficult to effectively 
advise and care for members of the social elite.  Advocates for both views could be found in all 
of the major parties in the Reichstag.  Furthermore, the Social Democrats – who until 1908 were 
not represented in the Reichstag at all – had long identified primary education as their chosen 
field for confronting educational inequalities, and largely absented themselves from debates 
concerning the higher schools.70  
 In comparison to the debates over secondary education, primary education had been 
slowly politicized along party lines since the first reforms in teacher education following 
Prussia’s Napoleonic humiliation.  In 1806 training for elementary teachers began to be 
improved and regulated with the establishment of teacher’s academies (Lehrerseminare), 
examinations, and state certification.  Critically, however, the Lehrerseminare did not require an 
Abitur for attendance and their graduates were recognized neither as gebildete professionals nor 
as Beamte.  Elementary schools remained primarily under the supervision of local parishes, and 
teachers were frequently required to engage in church-related duties such as playing the organ at 
services.  The result was a population of well-regulated, competent educators that was 
developing a growing professional awareness and increasingly advocating for a separation of 
education and religious matters.  Direct state supervision and administration of schools was !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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demanded not only to relieve them of clerical interference and parochial duties, but also in the 
hopes of achieving the salaries, pensions, and status that attended recognition as civil servants.  
Part of this growing professional awareness was the founding of politically active teachers’ 
associations that lobbied directly for these reforms.71      
 This political action intensified during the 1848 revolutions. Teachers associations 
organized their members for political action related to both educational and governmental 
questions, and educational reformers published general calls for restructuring the primary school 
system.  In particular, they lobbied for a common primary school, secular school inspectors, and 
folding the Lehrerseminare into the existing university system.  These were radical reforms that, 
at a stroke, would have eliminated many of the social barriers inherent in the Prussian 
educational system, both for students and educators.  While this reform movement was 
ultimately quashed in the wake of the political restoration that followed the revolutions, it 
significantly politicized the issue of primary education in the eyes of both politicians and the 
greater public.  In particular the language demanding state supervision and control of elementary 
education proved highly incendiary and durable.  Democrats within the National Assembly 
latched onto it as a way of extending state power at the expense of traditional elites, principally 
the clergy, while religious constituencies, especially Catholic ones, opposed it on spiritual and 
moral grounds and out of fear that it would further cultural integration or marginalization of 
Catholics.  It was also opposed by educational traditionalists who feared that it would provoke 
the wide-spread establishment of private parochial schools that would further fracture primary 
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education and disrupt the professional progress and development that had already been 
achieved.72 
 In the decades that followed liberal political factions within the Prussian government 
increasingly took up primary school reform.  Members of both the Progressive and National 
Liberal parties desired a religiously neutral state and pursued policies, such as interconfessional 
schools, that would further this agenda.  Following German unification in 1870 educational 
policy and reform were swept up in Bismarck’s larger Kulturkampf against political Catholicism.  
As part of their attempt to extend the authority of the state at the expense of local Catholic power 
centers, Bismarck and his Minister of Education, Adalbert Falk, introduced measures to appoint 
full-time government school inspectors (Schulräte) in place of the parish priests who had 
previously discharged those duties.  They sought to introduce an interconfessional framework as 
well, as part of a larger post-unification nation-building exercise in promoting cultural 
integration and eroding religious particularism.   
Interconfessional schools never received widespread public support and remained the 
exception, rather than the rule, in German education into the early 20th century.  The 
administrative reforms proved far more durable, and oversight of public education was firmly 
established as a duty of the state.  Importantly, this also contributed to a political legacy of 
suspicion of the motives behind any future reform efforts among German Catholics.   Later 
attempts to introduce a common school or remove religious education from the state curriculum 
would be viewed with suspicion and interpreted not as a purely educational matter, but as an 
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indication of a renewed Kulturkampf.73  This would prove to be a perpetual challenge and 
sticking point for future reformers, who had to contend with opposition based in fears of 
religious and cultural marginalization that might not have existed otherwise. 
At the turn of the 20th Century, Imperial Germany retreated from some of Bismarck’s 
more contentious social policies and moderated the official stance on a number of major issues. 
Along with relaxing older prohibitions on Marxist and socialist political activism that had all but 
banned mass working class political parties, this era saw the emergence of a distinctly 
politicalized drive for reform from within the ranks of the primary school teachers, both on 
professional and pedagogical grounds.  There was a spectrum of pedagogically reform-oriented 
teachers who broadly supported the goals of political democratization.   They generally aligned 
themselves on educational issues with the Social Democratic Party (SPD), the mass socialist 
party that eventually emerged as the main voice for socialist and working class politics at the 
opening of the 20th century.  They ranged from older National Liberals who supported SPD 
measures that were related to educational reform to more moderate SPD members whose 
political views favored a form of democratic socialism and desired a more socially equitable 
education system.74  
 This was not an entirely tranquil or uniform alignment of interests, and was put on hold 
at times as other political priorities overrode educational concerns.   In the past, elements from 
the National Liberals and other parties of the educated middle class had feared that the 
Lehrerseminare were hotbeds of socialist activism and indoctrination.  No matter how they may !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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have felt about specific educational issues they were still concerned with the threat that they 
perceived from more radical working class political organizations.  This fear that elementary 
educators were becoming radicalized by the institutions that trained them led many to question 
the increasingly politicized ways that activist primary school educators pushed for professional 
and pedagogical change.75  Nonetheless, during the Kulturkampf many of them had supported a 
reform of the primary school system on anti-clerical and nationalist grounds, and would continue 
to ally themselves with the SPD on many educational policies.76   
 One of the more noteworthy campaigns at this time was the push against the preparatory 
Volkschulen, private preparatory academies that were virtual pre-requisites completion of the 
Abitur and an advantage mostly reserved for the more privileged ranks of society.  The push to 
abolish these preparatory schools was one of the catalysts that led reformist elementary school 
teachers to establish the League for School Reform in 1908 and the contemporaneous creation of 
an office within the German Teachers’ League (DLV) for the promotion of progressive 
pedagogical techniques.77  1908 was also the year that the SPD finally achieved full recognition 
as a political party and was allowed to send delegates into the Reichstag, permitting it, and by 
extension those who voted for it, to have a voice in national educational policy and debates.  
The reform initiatives of the early 20th century diverged from earlier attempts to reform, 
restructure, or improve German education in key ways.  These were the frequent ties to socialist 
and social democratic political movements, the increased emphasis upon schools and education 
as a vehicle for social reform, and the specific challenges it made to established professional and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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pedagogical models. The growing emphasis on social activism was grounded in the cultural 
milieu that many of its adherents emerged from.  Many of them were the gifted sons and 
daughters of small farmers, artisans, shopkeepers, and lower tier civil servants who entered the 
Lehreminare in pursuit of what social mobility was available.  While many of these groups 
exhibited a surprising degree of social conservatism, especially with regards to religious 
questions, the concrete limits placed on their own mobility within the German educational 
system sensitized them to the larger, pervasive inequalities that ran throughout it.  Daily 
experience with the realities of a system in which university-trained educators at the Gymnasium 
were held in higher social standing and received greater pay than Lehrerseminare-trained 
Volksschule teachers sensitized them to the professional realities of their situation.  Institutions 
and traditions like the Vorschule and non-standardized admittance criteria for Abitur-granting 
secondary schools highlighted the challenges facing their students in a system with little regard 
for talent but an emphasis on social standing.  Inequalities such as these presented a professional 
and educational challenge that was imbued by many with moral characteristics. As a 
consequence many young primary teachers of this era gravitated towards left-liberal and socialist 
political parties and activism.78  
 Advocates for major pedagogical or professional change, especially those within the 
ranks of the primary school teachers, had limited successes in the waning years of Imperial 
Germany.  However, the political collapse following World War I provided a rare opportunity 
for lasting institutional reform, and would bring about the final major revisions in the 
organization of German education before the end of World War II.   The key to this 
transformation was the political tendencies of the educators most dedicated to reform.  With the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
78 For more on this see Lamberti, The Politics of Education and Herrmann, “Pädagogisches 
Denken und Anfänge der Reformpädagogik.”  
! 57!
collapse of the Kaiserreich, the November Revolution, and the general increase in political space 
for left-of-center politics many reform-minded educators saw room to push for changes that they 
had been unable to realize in previous years.   
 The politics of the Weimar Republic were dominated by the highly visible clashes 
between conservative elements seeking to buttress older forms of privilege and repair the 
damage to the previous system that had been incurred by the collapse of the Second Empire and 
those seeking liberalizing social, political, and cultural reforms.  The politics of state education 
during this period mirrored these trends.  Otto Boelitz and Carl Becker, the two Prussian 
ministers for Education between 1921 and 1930, best represent the conservative stance.  They 
both shared an assumption that it was the role of the public school system to renew Germany’s 
sense of national pride and unity after the defeat, and opposed major structural or pedagogical 
reform.79  These views remained influential, as Prussia remained highly influential throughout 
the Weimar Republic by the simple fact of being by far the single largest German state.  At the 
same time, the major governmental disruptions that Germany suffered at the end of World War 1 
and into the early 20s, coupled with the very unsettled political scene, created a great deal of 
space for educational reformers to found all manner of experimental educational institutions and 
lobby for change within both the public school systems and the professional structures of the 
teaching profession.80   
 Building upon groundwork laid by the DLV during the war years, the key demand of the 
post-war reformers was the abolition of tracked primary school instruction.  Up until this point 
the three-fold division of the German educational system had penetrated down into the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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elementary years, with Vorschulen, private academies, and specific public primary schools 
linked directly to secondary educational paths.  This served to track children towards a specific 
educational goal as early as their third year of schooling.  Delays in voting and the rallying of 
traditionalist and conservative organizations and the subsequent surge in reactionary political 
movements meant that the most radical aspirations for a single, unified secondary school 
(Gesamtschule) was never fully realized.  There was a limited success, however, with the 
consolidation of primary education under a single set of elementary schools which all children 
were theoretically obliged to attend and the gradual elimination of the Vorschulen by the mid-
1920s.81  Reforms such as these did much to eliminate the worst social excesses of tracked 
education as practiced under the Kaiserreich and make higher education more accessible to a 
broader cross section of society, however little was done to address the pedagogical problems 
that many perceived in determining a student’s educational pathway as early as primary school.  
In addition, many of the professional grievances of primary school teachers remained, 
particularly social inequality between them and their secondary school colleagues. 
 A major component of the reformist policies advocated by many individual instructors 
and a key element of many of the independent, experimental schools that were founded during 
this period was an attempt to refocus educational goals on the needs of individual children rather 
than the objectives of the state.  Informal organizations such as the League of Uncompromising 
School Reformers (Bund entschiedener Schulreformer) and professional organizations such as 
the DLV helped to link together the independently operating experimental educators and agitated !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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for broader reforms in the state educational system.  Their successes were limited, although they 
did much to stir educational debates that could have resulted in significant, long-lasting reform 
had the Weimar Republic remained viable for longer.  Much as it is difficult to assess a lasting 
institutional legacy for National Socialism due to how short lived it was and the immediate, 
radical departure from its initiatives after it fell from power, so too it is difficult to assess the 
ultimate viability of what the Weimar-era reformers proposed.  Some of them would be taken up 
again in the post-war era, however the intervening time and events renders even that an 
incomplete legacy.82     
 The study of educational policies under the Nazis is similarly confused by the nature of 
the Party’s rise to power and the subsequent difficulties of the war years.  Throughout most of 
the mid-30s the NSDAP was busy consolidating its power base within the government itself and 
didn’t focus too much on concrete changes to the structure of German education.  By 1943 the 
war had turned decisively against it and those changes that the schools experienced were usually 
couched in terms of being wartime expediencies designed to remove children from the danger 
posed by indiscriminate urban bombardment or the acceleration of the final years of schooling to 
help alleviate manpower shortages at the front.  The changes that did happen can broadly be 
separated into curricular revisions, professional disruptions, and structural reforms. 
 The curricular revisions that took place were by far the most visible and the most 
controversial.   Major curricular changes were made to subjects such as history, biology to 
emphasize Nazi Party racial and political views.  Even less obviously ideological subjects like !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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mathematics and physics had their textbooks rewritten, presenting children with militarized 
problem sets in order to maintain a consistent political tone throughout the school day.  These 
changes and others posed significant challenges to post-war educators.  They were left without 
politically acceptable teaching materials and had to face the educational legacy of a generation of 
children that had been fed a steady diet of political indoctrination and propaganda for more than 
a decade.  This was also part of a broader attempt to inject the state and the Party itself more and 
more into the raising of the individual child and to separate the children from any conflicting 
sources of information and ideology, such as church or parents.83  This was done largely through 
attempting to monopolize the children’s time through all manner of extra-curricular youth 
organizations and party-directed clubs. 84   The Hitler Youth and its accompanying League of 
German Girls are by far the most notorious examples of this, however there were also Party-
affiliated clubs for activities as diverse as glider flying and the agricultural efforts of the Young 
Farmer’s League.85   
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 The structural changes that took place were more limited and were mostly aimed at 
eliminating the legacy of the experimental reformers of the Weimar era.  Individual experimental 
academies were taken over by the state and either integrated into the general system or placed 
under direct Party supervision.  It is only possible to speculate about what the eventual fate of 
most of these institutions would have been, as many of them continued to operate throughout the 
war years and whatever long term plans may have been in store for them dissipated with the 
National Socialist state itself.86  The most significant structural shift under the Nazi regime was 
the dramatic pairing down in the number of different types of secondary institutions to a single 
Gymnasium and two types of Oberschulen.  Other structural changes were made to the way that 
girls were educated, focused primarily on restricting their education to the skills that were felt 
appropriate for the state-sanctioned roles for them in the household and community.  Options for 
higher education were restricted to the point that University enrolment of young women plunged 
to less than 10% of the total student body.87  Finally, elite political academies were established 
for the training of future leadership cadres, although their impact was limited by the short 
amount of time that they were active.  These “Napolas” were among the first state institutions 
targeted for immediate termination by the Allies after the surrender.88          
 The professional disruptions under National Socialism were mostly the product of the 
wide-ranging political purges that took place in 1932-1933 as part of the broader !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Gleichschaltung of the civil service as the Nazi Party consolidated its power within the German 
state in the early 30s.  The 1933 Law for the Restoration of the Civil Service forbade non-Aryans 
or anyone who had politically opposed the NSDAP from holding civil service jobs, including 
those involved in education.  The politicization of educational policy that had accelerated late in 
the Empire and during the inter-war years left a significant number of teachers and 
administrators facing summary termination on the grounds membership and activism with the 
SPD or the German Communist Party (KPD).  A further toll was taken as Jews and, later, those 
married to Jews were hounded from their positions.  Ironically, many elementary school teachers 
who had unsuccessfully campaigned for decades in search of recognition as Beamte now found 
themselves subject to a civil service law that demanded their dismissal. 
 The Law for the Restoration of the Civil Service was a short term disaster for German 
education as it forced many talented individuals out of their careers, a personal tragedy for 
thousands who quickly found themselves out of work and without pensions, and a national 
shame for a country that had not enacted anti-Semitic legislation since Jewish emancipation in 
1871.  Ironically, however, the dismissal of these individuals at the outset of the Nazi regime 
also served to preserve their reputations and political integrity in the eyes of the victorious allies 
in 1945.  This preserved a professional core around which the educational system could be 
rebuilt following the initial waves of denazification purges after the war.  This was especially 
true of the administrative ranks, which after the war were extensively purged due to the very 
high incidence of Nazi Party membership but could be restored very quickly due in no small part 
to the forcible exclusion of many men and women in the 1930s.  Their replacements were drawn 
in large numbers from men and women who had been experienced educators before the Law for 
the Restoration of the Civil Service put their careers on hold and who were now among the few 
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considered politically reliable enough to be trusted with overseeing the post-war rehabilitation of 
German education.  
 
The United States 
   
 The American educational system in 1945 was one marked by strong tensions between 
the significant advances and accomplishments of the past 100 years, aspirations for continued 
progress, and the realities of the many shortcomings that still existed within it.  The educators 
who helped articulate America’s response to the challenge of rehabilitating Germany tended 
towards progressive educational ideals grounded in the educational movements and reforms 
originating in the northeastern states in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. It cannot be ignored, 
however, that American education at this time was equally characterized by immense regional 
unevenness and, even in relatively developed parts of the country, additional deep divides rooted 
in race and class.  Alongside the celebrated public school systems of highly developed New 
England states stood the example of entire regions that were only a generation or two removed 
from being frontier societies with little formal public educational infrastructure.  Simultaneously, 
education in many states remained racially segregated at the turn of the 20th century, and the 
practice continued in the South with little sign of abating for decades after World War II.  
Additionally, the means by which public schools were financed depended heavily on local 
governments.  This combined with economic and social clustering within communities to 
produce a system where the quality of education received in public schools very strongly 
correlated with the economic background of the community, which in turn had strong racial 
components.  Despite these inequalities, American educators at the outbreak of World War II 
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generally believed that theirs was a system designed to promote social leveling and meritocratic 
promotion, and directly compared it to a German system that they interpreted as opposed to these 
values.  Regardless of what the reality might have been, these notions and attitudes were carried 
with them into the project of rehabilitating education in Germany and helped shape the specific 
reforms that they would demand.   
 One of the key characteristics of the American school system was, and remains, its 
regional nature.  Ultimate authority over educational policies and practices resides with 
individual states rather than the federal government, although the latter is not completely without 
influence.  The ultimate root of this arrangement can be found in the Constitution. The reserved 
powers clause of the Tenth Amendment delegates all powers not specifically allocated to the 
federal government to the individual states. Since the issue of education is not directly addressed 
anywhere in the document authority over it devolves to state governments.  While the 
prominence of the federal government in educational policy matters increased significantly in the 
second half of the 20th century through the influence of federal funding for state education, to 
this day it remains at its core a regionally organized system comprised of individual state 
educational systems that are coordinated with one another, rather than a centrally administrated 
one.   
 There was also a marked unevenness in institutional and economic maturity resulting 
from the United States’ rapid 19th century territorial expansion.  This combined with the 
constitutional legacy to produce a pattern of educational development where a shared national 
dialogue with strong roots in the Northeast was overlaid on regional implementation.  Generally, 
specific movements or practices would originate and gain prominence in areas, most often in the 
Northeast, with a high degree of economic development and educational traditions dating back to 
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the Colonial period.  From there they would move to the still developing Midwest and South, and 
onward from there to the far more recently settled Western fringes.  This trend was exacerbated 
by the uneven industrial development in the United States during the 19th century.  Modern 
public education has evolved in many ways to respond to the needs for a literate, numerate 
workforce in an industrial economy, and the uneven distribution of American industry in the 19th 
century was mirrored by uneven educational development.    
 Despite this highly regional implementation and the disproportionate influence of 
Northeastern traditions in particular, there was a national dialogue of educators, theorists, and 
administrators that helped to coordinate the individual state and territorial systems.  Alongside 
this existed various attempts by the federal government to guide educational policy, usually 
through the targeted funding of specific programs or endeavors.  These measures were 
sporadically implemented and relatively limited in scope during the 19th and early 20th centuries. 
As late as 1930 81% of total funding for education still came from state or local coffers, and 
federal influence remained a secondary concern.89  Ultimately this lead to an American 
educational system that developed along common lines with regards to major structures and 
policies while retaining local administration and strong regional characteristics in specific 
details.   
 One of the most significant of these shared backgrounds is the Common School 
Movement.  While there is an educational tradition in the United States dating back to the 
earliest European settlers to land in the Americas, modern American public education has its 
clearest antecedent in the Common School movement of the early 19th century.  At the end of the 
18th century formal education remained a phenomenon mostly reserved for either social elites or !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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as part of charitable or rehabilitative establishments such as orphanages, poor houses, or reform 
institutes for delinquent children.  In a society that was still on firmly agrarian footing with only 
modest urban pockets that were beginning to industrialize, extensive formal education was 
generally not seen as a requirement for success in public life.  Agrarian and early industrial 
workers were trained in the family or on the job and tradesmen learned via apprenticeships.  
Those destined for careers such as law and medicine that required significant formal education 
generally came from backgrounds that permitted either private tutoring within the household or 
attendance at a boarding school or academy.    
 Beginning with theorists such as James G. Carter and Horace Mann in the early 19th 
century, this mixture of private and charitable schools, on the job training, and private tutorage 
came under attack in favor of public schools supported by local governments.  A component of 
this drive was the desire for a common baseline of education for all voting citizens.  Carter 
argued as early as the 1820s that the uneducated strata of a population did not actively and 
voluntarily seek education for their children and, through their susceptibility to demagoguery and 
political manipulation, posed a revolutionary threat to the Republic.90  While serving as secretary 
of the Massachusetts Board of Education in the 1830s and 40s, Mann advocated for and 
developed a system of public primary schools that could be attended by all children in the state, 
theoretically regardless of social or economic position.  Like Carter, he held that a literate, 
broadly educated, and civically aware population was a prerequisite for the proper functioning of 
a democracy and a bulwark against the excesses of populism and demagoguery. He expressed an 
almost utopian belief in the power of universal education to act as both a social and political 
glue.  In his view education could play the role usually filled by a shared culture, language, or !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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religion to bind what was rapidly becoming a diverse republic of immigrants from many national 
backgrounds into one, while simultaneously providing the necessary intellectual tools to 
constructively participate in the political life of the community.91  Significantly, he rejected the 
idea of a tracked system, such as the Germans and many other continental Europeans favored, 
and advocated for a common school specifically in order to foster a sense of understanding 
between children of different economic classes and avoid intractable social divisions that he 
argued could lead to political unrest. 92     
 Alongside calls for a common education to ensure that citizens understood the 
responsibilities of republican citizenship, some began to articulate a concern with the increasing 
foreign immigration that the United States experienced in the decades before and after the Civil 
War.  Increasingly from non-English speaking countries, or countries and regions that spoke a 
dialect of English markedly different from what was then the American norm, these immigrants 
were seen by many as a pernicious foreign influence and a threat to the existence of a single, 
homogenous body politic.  Many educators began to see public education as a way to prevent the 
establishment of long-term ethnic enclaves and speed the assimilation of those that already 
existed.  Calvin Stowe, a proponent of the Common School Movement and husband of 
abolitionist and author Harriet Beecher Stowe, addressed this issue in 1835 at the annual 
convention of the Western College of Teachers when he asserted that, “It is altogether essential 
to our national strength and peace, if not even to our national existence, that the foreigners who 
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settle on our soil, should cease to be Europeans and become Americans. . . 93”  This trend 
towards viewing education as a tool for integrating immigrant groups that were seen as 
culturally, socially, politically problematic would increase throughout the latter 19th century and 
reach a fever pitch in the years before World War I as anti-foreigner and anti-immigrant 
sentiments peaked in the late 19th and early 20th centuries.  
 The impact of these motivations was evident in the content of the classes themselves.  
The curriculum was designed not only with academic subjects in mind, but also with regard for 
the day to day needs of the vast majority of students who would not go on to secondary schools, 
much less universities.  Literacy and basic math skills were emphasized, as were moral, 
religious, and civic lessons designed to produce students of good character.        
 By the outbreak of the Civil War this model for public education had spread throughout 
much of the US.  This can partially be explained through the same set of industrial and 
governmental needs that accompanied the rise of public education in Europe.  The 
industrialization and subsequent urbanization of wide swaths of American society made some 
form of basic, readily accessible education not only desirable for increasingly large segments of 
the population, but also far easier to deliver to an ever-increasing number of citizens. The 
changing nature of the American economy also made some form of primary education both a 
requirement and an expectation.  As the nation as a whole industrialized the nature of the work 
being done required basic literacy and numeracy in ways that an agrarian economy never had, 
and employers began to expect some minimum level of education among their employees.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Those areas that lagged the furthest behind the rest of the nation, specifically the South and the 
less populous parts of the frontier, were precisely those where industrialization had yet to take 
root, where the population were still largely rural, and population centers were poorly linked 
together.94   
 It is for this reason that the Common School Movement that emerged as the dominant 
push for educational development is best attributed to the relatively large numbers of colleges, 
universities, and teaching academies that were established in New England, where the model had 
already firmly taken root.  From there it spread to the rest of the country as educators who were 
trained in those institutions spread to other regions.  Large numbers of teachers who were 
eventually employed in other parts of the United States received their basic training in a region 
highly influenced by Common School philosophies and methodologies, and this showed through 
in their later work.95  
 The rapidity with which organized, public education spread across the US and the uneven 
way in which it did can be best seen in the number of students who were attending some form of 
school for at least part of the year.  In 1837 only one third of school aged children in 
Massachusetts, one of the first states to embrace a universal primary school system and a hotbed 
of early Common School sentiment, attended any educational institution at any time in the 
school year.96  The number of children regularly attending classes was likely significantly lower, 
especially during key agricultural seasons.  By 1910, with some form of primary education !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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compulsory in most of the country, the national average stood at 81% of school-aged children 
and most of those were at least semi-regular students.  This figure can be misleading, however, 
as there were major regional variations.  In the Pacific and western mountain regions attendance 
stood near the national average, while in the South it was a relatively paltry 70%.  In the New 
England, the area of the nation that had the longest standing tradition of community schools paid 
for with public funds, the figure was nearly 90 percent.  Attendance at Midwestern and Mid-
Atlantic schools was nearly that of New England.97  Compulsory education laws were certainly 
part of the reason for this surge in attendance; by 1918 every state had a law mandating 
education in one form or another.  Other factors included the rapidly industrializing economy, 
increasing legislation against child labor, and the growing recognition within the general 
population that some form of basic literacy and skill with mathematics at the bare minimum was 
necessary for economic success. 
 Following in the footsteps of the common elementary school, the public high school as a 
common secondary institution emerged in the years following the Civil War.  Its main 
competition at the time was the earlier network of academies and private boarding preparatory 
schools built along the English model.  Although these institutions continued to exist in one form 
or another well into the early 20th century, the public high school eventually overtook them as the 
predominant model for American education.  Initially public high schools were restricted to 
urban areas with high concentrations of middle-class families who wanted more than a basic 
primary school education for their children, but either did not have the means or the desire to 
send them to a private boarding school.  Later, child labor laws were strengthened, the number of 
years of compulsory education steadily increased, and economic conditions in the US shifted !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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such that increasing amounts of fundamental education were required for all but the most simple 
employment.  As a result, the public high school came to be seen as a finishing stage in the 
education of the average citizen, a necessary final step in the transition from childhood to 
adulthood.    
 In the latter half of the 19th century educators at major American universities also became 
involved in debates over educational policy, primarily due to the fact that the students they 
instructed were the products of the diverse network of private academies and public secondary 
schools that was developing at this time.  These involvements, and the desire to coordinate and 
standardize admissions requirements between universities, ultimately lead to regional and 
national accrediting bodies that helped ensure that schools in different states provided broadly 
comparable educational experiences. Various regional associations eventually merged into the 
National Educational Association (NEA) in 1870.98 
 The end of the 19th century and beginning of the 20th was a key moment in American 
educational history that established the core elements that would define it in the early 20th 
century.  Beginning with the NEA’s 1892 “Report of the Committee on Secondary Studies” 
(frequently referred to as the Committee of Ten Report) the recommendation was made that 
American secondary education should be designed to be accessible and useful for the general 
population.  The Committee was emphatic that secondary schools should not serve purely, or 
even primarily, as preparatory institutions for university-bound students.  The report went so far 
as to state that its chief interest lay “in the school children who have no expectation of going to 
college” and heavily advocated as general and practical an education as possible.99  The !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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reasoning behind this was twofold.  There were a number of claims, similar to those articulated 
by the Common School Movement, that an educated population was required for the smooth 
running of a democracy.  There was also the acknowledgment that a modern industrial workforce 
needed to be both reasonably well educated and accustomed to the regimented timetables and 
patterns of behavior required in modern industry.  The same broad patterns of political and 
industrial concerns that had driven the push for public primary schools now pressed for public 
secondary education.   
 26 years later another NEA-issued report - the “Cardinal Rules of Secondary Education” 
established by the Commission on the Reorganization of Secondary Education - made this case 
even more strongly. Influenced in part by the concerns of the Progressive Movement, 
particularly in the realms of public health and welfare, it proposed seven cardinal principles for 
organizing American education.  These were health, command of fundamental processes, worthy 
home-membership, vocation, civic education, worthy use of leisure, and ethical character.  Most 
of these principles focused on non-academic aspects of the pupil’s life and were directed towards 
social engineering.  They hoped that public schools could, through influencing successive 
generations of students, produce healthier, more able workers who would be active and 
cognizant participants in the democratic process.  While advancement to some form of post-
secondary education was a possibility for exceptional individual students, it was a distant 
secondary priority. 100   
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 The report also maintained that in order to achieve these results secondary education 
must not remain an upper and middle class luxury, and that part-time secondary schooling must 
be a compulsory minimum across the nation.101  The high school was not conceived of as a 
means to an end or a checkpoint on the way to a trade or university education, but an end in and 
of itself, a ‘college of the people’ that would ensure a productive society in a vibrant democracy 
moving forward into the 20th century. The effect of measures and recommendations such as 
these, as well as legislation aimed at removing children from the work force once and for all, was 
enormous.  Between 1900 and 1930 the percentage of American children aged 14-17 enrolled in 
some form of secondary institution rose from 11.4% to 51.4%.102 
 The combined primary and secondary educational system that coalesced in the last half of 
the 19th century was one that expressly attempted to provide a universal, consistent experience 
for every student in the nation regardless of social or economic standing and which did so with 
the self-conscious goal of cultivating civic ideals and the ability to participate actively in a 
democracy.  Inherent in this was a wide-spread conviction that education should be equally 
accessible and not overly privilege students based on their background, unlike continental 
European models that tracked students based at least partially on economic and social criteria 
and which served to limit, rather than promote, social mobility.  What social mobility existed in 
the European models was frequently based on patronage, while the American model that was 
emerging at this time emphasized meritocratic advancement.103  As early as the Committee of 
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Ten’s Report it was insisted that secondary schools be accessible to all precisely because this 
opened the possibility for a university education to gifted students from working class families.  
They maintained that many parents who had not received a college education themselves would 
not see the utility of sending their children to a special preparatory school and that it would be 
unjust for such children to be barred from the possibility of a college education if they 
demonstrated the desire and ability.104 
 This egalitarian model was, of course, not the lived reality of public education in the 
United States.  It assumed a level playing field that, due to the varied social and economic 
circumstances from which children come, was never present regardless of the accessibility of 
secondary education. The greatest source of inequality between theoretically equal, neighboring 
school districts – at least in those regions that were not explicitly segregated by race – was 
financial.  Throughout the latter part of the 19th century and on into the early 20th century schools 
in many areas were chronically under-funded by state and local governments.  In wealthier 
communities this shortage was alleviated by charitable donations from prominent citizens, local 
businesses, and philanthropic associations.  Schools in poorer communities did as well as they 
could without the benefit of such largesse, resulting in a pattern of educational achievement that 
very closely mapped to the social and economic makeup of the communities that schools were 
situated in.  Despite all attempts to design a more egalitarian system, it remained so only in 
theory and was nearly as prone to reproducing existing social orders as the more openly tracked 
European models that were specifically designed to limit social mobility.  The continued 
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existence of private schools, parochial schools, and elite academies only furthered wealth-based 
disparities.105 
 The greatest disparities that existed in the American educational system were, of course, 
those based in race.  Whether in the officially segregated south or in industrialized urban centers 
in the north where economic clustering lead to extreme disparities in racial makeup between 
different individual institutions, the educational experience of the average Caucasian student 
remained of a significantly higher quality than that enjoyed by his minority counterparts.  This 
was a situation that had deep roots in the complex legacies of the Civil War and which would 
continue to blemish American education throughout the 20th century.  Indeed, it remains an 
important issue within elementary and primary education to this day, although significant 
improvement has been made over the past fifty years.106 
 Native American education was of a similarly shameful quality, an issue that was 
exacerbated by the self-conscious use that missionaries and public authorities made of it in order 
to “civilize” Native American children away from the cultural practices of their parents.  In a 
process that has been rightfully described as a form of cultural genocide, publicly maintained 
schools on Native reservations made a concerted effort to strip their wards of native languages, 
religious practices, and other cultural markers while instructing them in English, Christianity, 
and patriotic loyalty to the United States.  In many ways this was the darker side of the logic 
behind the Common School Movement, the ultimate expression of an educational model that !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
105 Graham, Community and Class in American Education 1865-1918: 6-16 
106 For a well-written general examination of African American education in the United States 
during this period, see Charles L. Glenn, African-American / Afro-Canadian Schooling: From 
the Colonial Period to the Present, (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2011).  For a good account 
specifically of the problems of segregation and early 20th century Northern desegregation, see 
Davison M. Douglas, Jim Crow Moves North: The Battle over Northern School Segregation, 
1865-1954, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). 
! 76!
argued for universal education on the basis of its utility for assimilating immigrants and raising 
citizens capable of political participation in a republican democracy.  This model for Native 
American education was doubly tragic as it usually emphasized cultural assimilation over 
academic instruction, leaving generations of children robbed of their Native identities yet 
without the formal education to succeed economically outside the reservation.107    
 Without diminishing or minimizing the significance of these unsightly blemishes on the 
edifice of American education, they did not inform the vision for German educational 
reconstruction and reform that the American occupation forces carried across the Rhine in 1945.  
The American educators who followed in the wake of the US Army, both as officers in that army 
and as civilian advisors to the occupation government, were far more concerned with an 
idealized vision of primary and secondary education as they understood it, one grounded far 
more in theory and aspirations than a reality that all too frequently failed to live up to them.  
When judging the shortcomings of a German educational system that was in many ways still 
grounded in Wilhelmine practices and policies they did not articulate their own criticisms of its 
inequalities and perceived undemocratic nature with an eye towards the reforms that had yet to 
be made in the United States, but with an emphasis on the successes that had already been 
achieved.  Theirs might have been a somewhat Utopian view of American education and the 
possibilities that it held, but it was one that they believed was worthy of emulation.  The notion !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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that public education was a key component in creating a new, democratic Germany and shaping 
future generations of responsible voters as a bulwark against revanchist authoritarianism was 
firmly rooted in an idealized vision of America’s own public school system and the role that it 
played in shaping an equally idealized vision of American society. 
 
The Soviet Union 
 
Pre-Revolutionary Russian education was, like many other aspects of its economic and 
political development during the 19th century, spotty at best.  It was characterized by notable 
local developments that stood out against a backdrop of largely ineffective campaigns to 
modernize a vast countryside mired in antiquated practices. Earlier Tsarist efforts to spur Russian 
achievements in the arts and sciences had been devoted almost entirely to developing a post-
secondary educational system, which led to a very top-heavy structure.108  By the late 19th 
century Russian scientific, engineering, and artistic achievements matched those of many 
Western European nations, however the vast majority of the population was unable to secure 
even a rudimentary education from the state.109  Additionally, as in many of its other 
modernizing endeavors during this period, there was significant tension between efforts to 
introduce reforms and reactionary repression caused by fears of revolution brought about by the 
social changes that accompanied them. 
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 The tenures of two Ministers of Education who dominated the latter 19th Century, Count 
D. A. Tolstoi (1866-1880) and Count T. D. Delyanov (1882-1897) exemplify this.  Under their 
combined oversight total enrollment in educational institutions of all levels - primary schools 
through advanced university studies - was raised significantly, standing at 16.2% 1880 and 
expanding very quickly to 22.6% by 1885.110  At the same time as they attempted to expand 
participation in these institutions, mostly through growing urban access, academic freedoms at 
the more advanced levels of instruction were restricted in favor of strongly centralized imperial 
control. Fears of revolution lead to strong police oversight of students, their behavior, and 
contacts both in class and outside of it.  Additionally, universities were required to seek 
ministerial approval for any major decisions, including hiring faculty.  Meanwhile, the church 
gained increasing influence in the lower levels of education.  Parochial primary and secondary 
schools grew in both number and influence, especially in rural districts.  This tension between 
the desire for educational reform in pursuit of technical and technological competence as part of 
a long-term modernization campaign and the fear of the revolutionary potential of an educated 
middle class was a major characteristic of Tsarist education in the late 19th and early 20th 
centuries.      
 By the outbreak of World War I some efforts towards reform and standardization were 
under way.  The Universal Primary Education Law of 1908, which would have come into full 
power in 1922 had the Revolution not intervened, called for universal, free, and compulsory 
primary education for children between eight and eleven years old.  It also mandated that an 
accompanying network of secondary schools would be developed simultaneously.111  Despite !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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these planned reforms, education in Tsarist Russia remained a profoundly elite phenomenon 
before the Revolution.  For the majority of the population formal, secular education was entirely 
unavailable.  Classroom-based primary education of the sort that a late 19th Century German or 
American would have recognized was reserved for the urban middle and upper classes, while 
both urban and rural aristocratic elites relied mostly on individual household tutors or sending 
their children away to private - and frequently foreign - boarding academies.112 
 Finally, pre-Soviet education in Russia was above all else highly regional in nature, more 
so even than in the contemporary United States.  According to the 1897 census, 13% of the 125.6 
million subjects of Imperial Russia lived in urban centers.  45% of city-dwellers were literate.  In 
the rural areas of European Russia 17% were literate, while in the Asian territories rates ranged 
between 0.6% and 1.6%.  Progress was evident, however.  Among children aged 7-14 the over-
all literacy rate was 25%, compared to an empire-wide 21%.113  In comparison, literacy rates in 
the US and Germany at the end of the 19th century were 93.3% and 99.97% respectively.114 
 With the advent of the Revolution the new leaders of Russia faced a dual dilemma with 
regards to education.  Most members of the burgeoning intelligentsia that had been cultivated 
under the Tsarist system sided against the Bolsheviks either during the Revolution or the 
subsequent civil war and were therefore categorized as class enemies of the proletariat.  
However, a certain level of specialized, educated expertise was required for technical and 
administrative tasks.  No matter how genuinely eager, willing, and politically reliable a decorated 
peasant-soldier of the Revolution might be, he was a sorry replacement for even the most !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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aristocratic of university-educated engineers when it came to matters such as building factories 
or maintaining rail networks.  Some form of ‘proletarian intelligentsia’ drawn from the 
previously repressed classes seemed necessary on this basis alone, but it was hard to justify on 
purely Marxist principles that did not recognize the possibility of a class of non-exploitive 
elites.115   
 This tension was eventually allayed – but never fully resolved – by the system of 
vydvizhenie (promotion) of workers and peasants into higher education and administrative posts. 
One major component of this was the virtual elimination of admittance standards for universities, 
which were thenceforth required to admit anyone over 16 who wished to study.116 This led to 
complications including lowered professional standards, inefficiencies, and created a de facto 
new elite class within a single generation. However, it did so via a process of conspicuous social 
mobility that permitted the pretense that these new administrators and professionals were still 
reliable members of the proletariat firmly rooted in their backgrounds as workers and peasants.117  
In this regard, at least, these measures proved successful:  by 1923 14% of students in 
universities were officially categorized as workers or peasants, and by 1933 it had climbed to 
50%.118  The precise numbers should probably be taken with a healthy dose of skeptical 
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appreciation for the reality of statistical reporting in the early Soviet Union, and the quality of 
instruction in the universities was almost certainly not uplifted by the revolution, however it 
remains hard to deny that Lenin’s followers managed to significantly broaden the backgrounds 
represented in the student body and opened up the universities to many who would not otherwise 
have attended them. 
 The second major issue was the highly underdeveloped nature of public education across 
much of the Soviet Union.  It was widely accepted that a workers’ and peasants’ state should 
provide basic education to the people that it claimed to represent, and steps were taken in this 
direction almost immediately after Lenin returned from exile in 1917.  He issued an educational 
program that called for a secular, unified, trade-oriented, and polytechnical national educational 
system.   This was soon elaborated on by the Commissar of Education, A.V. Lunacharskii, who 
called for a national network of schools with broadly defined curricular goals but significant 
local autonomy within those bounds.  While progress remained slow due to the ongoing demands 
of the Revolution and subsequent Civil War, by 1920 education was theoretically compulsory 
and by the mid-20s approximately half of primary-aged children in Russia were attending some 
form of school.119  Given the conditions that the reforms were taking place under and the legacy 
of Tsarist neglect in this area such progress is remarkable.   
 This pre-Stalinist phase of Soviet education was marked by widespread pedagogical 
experimentation and an interest at both ministerial and local levels with foreign models that 
emphasized active learning and teaching techniques.  The works of foreign educators such as 
Dewey, Kilpatrick, Kerschensteiner, and Montessori were widely read and discussed in 
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educational circles and many of their models and methods were pressed into service.120 A key 
example of this was the 1923 promotion by Lunacharskii’s Education Commissariat of the 
“Complex Method”, a pedagogical approach highly influenced by Kilpatrick’s “Project Method.” 
This educational theory rejected traditional academic subjects and structured classroom lessons 
according to broad themes such as nature, labor, and society with the ultimate goal of seamlessly 
and organically demonstrating the interconnected nature of all subjects that the pupils were 
required to master.121   
 Experimentation such as this came at a price.  Rapid shifts in educational policy and 
ministerial re-shuffling led to a great deal of curricular instability; between 1919 and 1927 three 
completely different programs for primary and secondary education were introduced and the 
schools required to abruptly transition with no regard to the classroom, administrative, or 
scheduling disruptions that resulted.  The eager embracing of experimental models also 
encouraged rapid abandonment of projects and policies without enough time passing to 
effectively evaluate their results, for good or ill.  The Complex Method was abandoned only 
three years after its adaptation, ironically at the very moment when foreign translations of its 
materials were leading educational progressives in France to proclaim it one of the greatest and 
most promising accomplishments of the new Soviet government.122 
 Stalin’s consolidation of power in the late 20s and early 30s coincided with increasing 
restlessness within the Soviet educational community.  Many were dismayed by what they !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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perceived as chaos and a lack of direction.  In 1929 A.S. Bubnov, a staunch political ally of 
Stalin and vocal critic of experimental education, replaced Lunacharskii.  This change in 
leadership, coupled with the renewed emphasis on industrial development in the 30s and an 
increasingly repressive political atmosphere, combined to re-cast Soviet educational practices in 
a much more traditional mold.  It also ushered in an era that saw some of the most impressive 
gains in the areas of infrastructure development, meaningful compulsory attendance, and 
establishment of a consistent national curriculum.  Much as in Germany and the United States 
before it, much of this new educational drive was spurred by the demands of rapid 
industrialization and the need to transition from an agrarian workforce to one that was fit for 
factory labor. 
 As part of the First and Second Five Year Plans and the general emphasis on economic 
development within the Soviet Union, Stalin and other Party officials made the rapid expansion 
of primary and secondary education a major state priority.  In addition to expanding primary 
education to ensure a basic level of universal literacy and numeracy, one of the key components 
of the new direction was a renewed emphasis on polytechnical education.  With an eye 
specifically towards training the engineers, administrators, and technocrats that would be 
required to successfully industrialize the nation on the desired timetables, Soviet education now 
emphasized a common curriculum for all students through secondary school and placed a heavy 
emphasis on preparing them for further technical training.  This training primarily took place on 
the job site, through work programs and apprenticeships, although more specialized and 
advanced training continued at technical academies.  In many ways this can be understood as an 
inversion of the older system that had privileged classical academic subjects above all others.  It 
also stands in stark contrast to the German secondary school reforms of the late 19th century.  In 
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that case the Gymnasium and Realschule had emerged on somewhat more equal footing, but 
there was no real question of the socially superior position still enjoyed by the Gymnasium and 
its graduates.  In the Stalinist Soviet Union government praise and accolades were most 
conspicuously lavished on projects and individuals who had a visible impact on the national 
crusade for industrialization within a single generation.       
As a result of this previously unimaginable level of material and political support, the 
immediate results for Soviet education were dramatic.  During the First Five Year Plan 
enrollment in schools by children 8 to 11 years old rose from 51% to 97%.  By 1934 Soviet 
officials claimed to have achieved full enrollment of all the nation’s youth.123  This rapid rise in 
attendance, both in terms of the number of pupils and amount of time each one spent in the 
classroom, greatly exacerbated an existing teacher shortage and necessitated a drive to speedily 
train as many new educators as possible. The Commissariat for Education estimated that the 
nation as a whole lacked 250,000 classroom instructors in 1926.124   From 1928 to 1934 the 
number of teachers in the USSR roughly doubled, increasing from approximately 365,000 to 
710,000.  This emphasis on teacher training continued after the achievement of full enrollment of 
school-aged children as the state sought to reduce classroom sizes, and by the outbreak of war in 
1941 the total number of teachers in the USSR was just over 1.2 million, with an annual rate of 
growth that averaged 10.1%.125  Statistics such as these must be questioned, and what constituted 
‘literacy’ is an open question.  Regardless of whether one adopts a charitable or cynical reading 
of the numbers, however, the fact remains that tens of millions gained at least some basic form of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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literacy and began having regular contact with some form of state-run education.  This was a 
remarkable achievement and represented a genuinely radical improvement in the quality of life 
for tens of millions of Soviet citizens within the span of a couple decades. 
 At the same time major purges were undertaken within the Ministry of Education.  Many 
of the most vocal proponents of the experimental models that had dominated in previous years 
were removed and replaced by advocates of more traditional pedagogical practices based around 
highly disciplined classroom environments, centrally orchestrated common curricula, and yet 
another renewed emphasis on specialty occupational training in secondary schools.126  Classroom 
discipline was reintroduced as a core element of Soviet pedagogy at the expense of experimental 
approaches emphasizing self-directed learning and a new emphasis was placed on political, in 
addition to technical, instruction for all students.  These moves coincided with larger 
contemporary trends in Soviet politics and society.127  Measures were also taken to monitor 
individual student progress and ensure that standardized prerequisites were met before they 
advanced to the next level of instruction.  The ultimate expression of this was the re-introduction 
in the mid-30s of concrete and meaningful admissions standards for universities and advanced 
technical schools.  While these changes robbed Soviet education of some of its appeal to Western 
pedagogical theorists, they did much to re-establish a logical system of dependable technical 
certifications.   
 The progress made by the Soviets before World War 2 is remarkable.  They succeeded in 
building a comprehensive educational system theoretically open to all members of society that 
met the immediate needs of rapid industrialization and, with the exception of a number of  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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universities, did so almost from scratch.  The results stand for themselves.  Where only 21% of 
the population of Imperial Russia had been deemed literate in the 1897 census, the 1939 census 
recorded a general literacy rate of 81.2% and a rate of 89.1% for people between nine and 49 
years old.128  These accomplishments not only represented the true modernization of Russia and 
its emergence as a major world power, but also laid important groundwork for future efforts in 
Soviet-occupied Germany.  Soviet education as it existed in 1945 was a highly centralized 
system that was self-consciously organized along strongly polytechnical lines for the express 
purpose of speeding industrial and agricultural development.  While there was no guarantee that 
the Germans would embrace such a model for themselves, the implications and opportunities that 
it presented for a nation that was faced with almost completely rebuilding a profoundly shattered 
economy and utterly discredited political system were plain to see.   
 
A collision of reformist visions 
 
 When American and Soviet soldiers clasped hands over the Elbe in the spring of 1945 it 
was not only two armies that met, or even two nations, but two cultures with vastly different 
political, institutional, and educational histories.  While many celebrated and commemorated that 
act as a symbolic end to five years of bloodshed and war, in many ways it was the beginning of a 
new period of struggle and hardship as both groups sought to rebuild a ruined German nation in 
their own image.  What is more, the Germans themselves would not be passive observers for 
long, but would quickly emerge as active, willing, and eager participants in their own 
rehabilitation.   !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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 From the point of view of their educational histories, there were similarities that united 
all three of these traditions despite the different patterns of development rising from their unique 
histories and circumstances: all three developed universal, compulsory education in the late 19th 
and early 20th centuries as a response to industrialization and the needs of the modern industrial 
state.  In each of them there was a progressive, reformist attempt to humanize the educational 
apparatus and to make it a venue in which the welfare of the child could be addressed in addition 
to purely academic goals.  In all three universal primary education became the norm as the 
economy developed and the demands of industry for skilled and semi-skilled labor outstripped 
what a traditional agrarian society could provide.  
 All three systems also developed with a social engineering mission as a core component:  
in the United States this emerges from a political tradition that sought to ensure the smooth 
running of a democratic republic that was increasingly forced to assimilate foreign immigrants.  
In the Soviet context it was demanded by the need of the state to politically educate people 
towards communist doctrine and models, and through a desire born out of Marxist-Leninist 
philosophy to artificially level society and erase the vast inequalities of previous eras.  In 
Germany it began with early Prussian attempts to re-create and harness the mass patriotism of 
the French Revolution without its anti-royalist rhetoric and continued with later attempts to 
impose some level of cultural and political uniformity on a nation that still had many prominent 
local traditions at the end of the 19th century.     
 This results in a common set of assumptions about education shared between the 
Americans, the Russians, and the Germans in 1945:  That education was a powerful tool for 
social engineering and that populations could be educated into behaving in certain ways and 
believing in certain things. Where they differed was on how much social mobility should be 
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inherent in that system and how open the resulting society should be.  The American and Soviet 
models implied, in theory at least, a high degree of social mobility as a reward for participation 
in the broadest agendas of their states: some level of cultural uniformity and assimilation of in 
the American system, and participation in broader economic and political policies in the Soviet 
system.  The Germans, on the other hand, limited upward mobility in order to reinforce 
established social structures and limit the challenges that could be posed to traditional elites by a 
growing middle class.   
 These differing viewpoints were exacerbated by the fact that the German system was 
effectively missing an entire age cohort of educators and educational theorists, the professions 
from which most educational administrators were drawn. The Russians who were in charge of 
overseeing educational matters in their occupation zones were frequently those who had 
undergone their higher education in the 20s and 30s under the burgeoning Stalinist system.  The 
Americans who were in similar positions tended to be either the products of Depression-era 
schools that even further emphasized the need for extensive general education in order to keep as 
many children out of the work force as possible, or in some cases men who had been beginning 
their careers as educators during that period. The Germans, on the other hand, had almost two 
full cohorts of prospective administrators tainted by National Socialism:  those who had 
undergone their training and early teaching careers immediately after WWI and who were 
emerging into the administrative ranks at the beginning of the Weimar period, and those who 
underwent their training under the Nazis and began their careers as educators under National 
Socialism.  This cohort gap left a limited body of prospective German administrators that tended 
to range from people who had been driven out of the field in 1933 at the beginning of their 
careers at the younger end to elderly individuals who had retired during Weimar and spent most 
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of their careers under the Imperial system.  This left the German participants in the dialogues that 
emerged divided into two rough groups with very different political outlooks: a younger group 
that was generally amenable to the institution of radically progressive new models for both 
personal and political reasons and an older one that had a lifetime of professional investment in 
models from a much earlier time, and whose previous professional experiences were during an 
era when educational reform had been an extremely fraught topic.   
 These tensions would make themselves most visible in attempts to reform German 
education to ease transition between educational tracks, but professional considerations from 
earlier eras would also intervene.  The administrative corps in late 1945 was burdened with both 
extremes:  those who viewed the collapse of National Socialism as the perfect opportunity to 
realize decades-old dreams of a progressive Einheitsschule model for general education, and 
those who remembered the political bad blood of the Kulturkampf and the contemporaneous 
fights over the relationship between tracks in the upper schools and pushes towards increased 
uniformity and unity among the elementary schools.  These backgrounds were to prove highly 
important for determining how individuals would react to the various institutional reforms 






CHAPTER 3: WARTIME PLANS AND POSTWAR REALITIES 
 
We must guard particularly against this group; these are the most 
dangerous:  German youth, children when the Nazi Party came to 
power.  They know no other system but the one that poisoned their 
minds. . . .  They were brought up on straight propaganda, 
production of the worst educational crime in the history of the 
world.  
   -Hitler Lives, 1946 Academy Award   
   winner for Documentary Short Subject129 
 
Upon the spiritual and material rubble that the rule of Nazism 
bequeathed us in education as in all other areas, we must begin 
anew, completely anew.   
   -Paul Wandel, President of the German  
   Office for Education (Soviet Occupation  
   Zone), 1946130 
    !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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 In the summer of 1945 Germany was a nation defeated root and branch.  Six years of 
warfare had bequeathed a legacy of physical and human desolation, while twelve years of Nazi 
rule had left behind an equally devastating moral and political vacuum.  Urban centers lay in 
ruins with few buildings suitable for habitation much less government or institutional use.  
Millions of Germans had died in the past twelve years.  They ranged from soldiers and civilians 
killed in the fighting to those put to death by their own government in its pursuit of a new racial 
and political order.  Millions more who survived with severe mental and physical disfigurements 
would require care and treatment for decades to come.  The nation was the epicenter of a Central 
European refugee crisis of an unprecedented scale; one legacy of wartime forced labor policies, 
civilian flight from advancing armies, and the initial stages of post-war territorial concessions.  It 
was occupied by foreign militaries, broken into four distinct territorial zones, and administered 
by a multinational coalition. Significant questions still remained about whether there would be a 
single German polity or a collection of smaller states, and debate continued over whether the 
region should be economically and politically rebuilt or reduced to an essentially pre-industrial 
footing.   
 Despite this destruction and uncertainty there remained the immediate need to put civil 
society back on its feet in some form, whatever alterations future political settlements might 
demand.  Initially this task fell to the foreign military forces that were in the field at the war’s 
end.  Control of the state would have to eventually return to civilian, and ultimately German, 
hands.  In the meantime, however neighboring states needed to feel secure that that militaristic 
recidivism was impossible.  As part of this project pre-war and early post-war occupation 
planners recognized the necessity for restructuring and renewing German education in order to 
guarantee that future generations of German citizens would be free of what was commonly 
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described as the taint of “militarism, the spirit of conquest, and . . . Nazism.”131  There was a 
shared assumption at this time that education was a powerful tool for social engineering and that 
it was possible to ‘re-educate’ the German people away from the expansionist, militaristic 
nationalism that many viewed as the root cause of Europe’s 20th century misfortunes.132  
 These assumptions were at least in part derived from the recent historical experiences and 
educational policies of the Allied powers.  All four of the countries assigned occupation zones 
had a history within living memory of using pubic education as a tool to shape or assimilate a 
target group in its own society.  The French had pioneered this approach in the 19th century, 
utilizing public education to assimilate provincial identities and stamp out regional languages 
and dialects in favor of a broader, national identity centered on Paris.  Proponents of the 
Common School Movement in the United States envisioned themselves serving not only an 
educational need, but also providing a necessary tool for the Americanization of immigrant and 
Native populations. The British had adopted similar techniques to attempt to Anglicize and 
pacify Irish populations, and during the inter-war years the Soviet Union had made very 
profitable use of their rapidly expanding public school system as a platform for political 
instruction in order to ideologically secure the Communist Revolution for a new generation. 133  
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German educators as well accepted the core premise that education would be vital to the social 
rebuilding and denazification efforts after the war; many of them gloomily referenced National 
Socialist successes in this regard in their own arguments for an active re-educational policy 
aimed at the nation’s youth.134  
 As military operations ceased and occupation duties began, the core question remained of 
whether rebuilding a post-Nazi Germany would be accomplished through rehabilitating pre-
National Socialist traditions or through a reestablishment of German society and politics de novo.  
No single occupation policy had been agreed upon during the war by the Allied powers, and 
significant divisions remained within their ranks with regards to how radical a solution was 
necessary to root out National Socialist and militarist ideologies.  Even as fundamental an issue 
as the number of German states that would result from a post-war settlement hadn’t been 
resolved before the surrender, a situation that became increasingly intractable as wartime 
alliances weakened and Cold War animosities built.   
 During the fighting preferences among the various Allied leaders for the eventual peace-
time order had shifted with the fortunes of battle and their own political agendas.  At Tehran in 
1943, for example, Stalin strongly advocated for a permanent division of Germany, but by 1945 
he argued at Yalta in favor of maintaining a single German state under multi-power 
occupation.135   Joint wartime planning was very limited, and the agreements reached at these !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Français de Calvin à Jules Ferry, (Paris: Éditions de Minuit, 1977), Scott Nearing, Education in 
Soviet Russia, (New York: International Publishers, 1926) 
134 See Erika Mann, School for Barbarians (New York:  Modern Age Books, 1938); Werner 
Richter, Re-Educating Germany (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1945); and Karl 
Lowenstein, Hitler’s Germany: The Nazi Background to War, (New York: The MacMillan 
Company, 1940) for representative examples of this kind of literature. 
135 Norman M. Naimark, The Russians in Germany: A History of the Soviet Zone of Occupation, 
1945-1949, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995): 9 
! 94!
meetings tended to be on the broadest of possible topics and, as far as the occupation of Germany 
was concerned, outlined only the barest of essentials.  Eventually it was agreed that Germany 
would be divided into occupation zones between the major allied powers, that each zone would 
be administered independently of the others, but that a central Allied Control Commission would 
oversee major issues that impacted all four zones.  This joint administration was initially meant 
to oversee a relatively punitive package of general policies that has since been summed up as the 
“3 D’s:” demilitarization, denazification, decartelization. This lack of specificity left much to the 
discretion of individual occupation administrations and their own interpretations.  Issues as 
major as the eventual fate of the German state and where precise borders would be drawn were 
left for future peace-time negotiations. 
 This wartime confusion and lack of coordination had consequences for the German 
educational system.  The earliest stages of educational reconstruction were largely shaped by 
general occupation policies enacted in the first months of the after the war and interpreted by 
local military authorities who, for the time being at least, wielded significant decision making 
power.  These men were not educational specialists or even particularly knowledgeable civilian 
administrators but soldiers who had to rapidly transition from combat duties to the requirements 
of a peacetime occupation.  This situation did not last long and specialists did follow in their 
wake, but many of the decisions and appointments they made in the first days of the peace had 
longer lasting implications.   The wartime neglect of specific educational policies also gave 
German regional administrators, many of who had pre-Nazi experiences with strongly federalist 
institutional traditions, significant leverage in dealing with the frequently low-ranking and 
independently operating local military authorities responsible for education.  This provided them 
with the space, especially in the first years after the war, necessary to have a significant hand in 
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shaping educational reconstruction.  The rebuilding of education in Germany after the war 
became a more negotiated process and with more input from the Germans themselves than would 
have been suspected during the closing days of the conflict. It was the administrative layer of the 
educational system that provided most of that influence, whether by interpreting and reshaping 
the demands of the occupation authorities or by pressing for what they believed were necessary 
changes and reforms.      
 It was generally agreed that strong measures of some kind were necessary to remedy 
what was seen as a ‘German problem’ in Central Europe.  The European experience of Prussian 
and German influence on international politics over the previous 75 years was overwhelmingly 
one of belligerence and bloodshed.  The emergence of a unified German state was heralded by an 
aggressive Prussian foreign policy that blemished what was an otherwise notably peaceful 
Western European 19th century.   After World War 2 it was argued by many that the new German 
nation formed as a result of the 1870 settlement consistently pursued militaristic and aggressive 
policies both in Europe and in the broader colonial context, and that these fatally destabilized the 
entire continent and ultimately resulted in two World Wars and bloodshed on a previously 
unimaginable scale.  There was a broad consensus, developed through an active wartime 
literature on the pathology of German politics, that something was deeply wrong with the 
developmental path that the German state had taken, and Nazism was but the final, most extreme 
manifestation of it.136   
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 In its more positive form, early assessment of the potential for the post-war rehabilitation 
of Germany emphasized its previous contributions to European culture and some strongly non-
militaristic traditions that had been subsumed by Prussian militarism.  The hope was that these 
could be presented as an alternative to the aberrant customs of a cultural and political minority.  
More negative assessments asserted the deeply problematic aspects of traditional German 
political and cultural mores and presented them not as one aberrant cultural strand among many, 
but a dominant cultural leitmotif that permeated every level of society.  Proponents of this view 
envisioned a nation-building project from the ground up, one where the ultimate goal was the 
creation of a fundamentally new society laid out along more constructively democratic lines, 
however those were defined. This tension, between salvaging worthwhile traditions and 
beginning completely anew, informed many of the decisions made in the early years of 
reconstruction and, within the realm of education, formed the basis for a series of differences that 
would eventually define two educational systems that grew increasingly distinctive and separate 
as the victorious United Nations of World War 2 splintered into the opposing sides of the Cold 
War and central Europe lurched towards a two-state solution to the question of German 
nationhood.  
 Within the field of education, the publication of the Potsdam agreement three months 
after the general surrender was the first articulation of any policy, however broad.  Articles 6, 7, 
and 9 of the Political Principles taken together provided the basic framework upon which post-
war education would be constructed.  Article 6 mandated the immediate termination of all public 
employees and people “in positions of responsibility in important private undertakings” who had 
been “more than nominal participants” in Nazi organizations or activities.  Article 7 stipulated 
that education would be “so controlled as to completely eliminate Nazi and militarist doctrines 
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and to make possible the successful development of democratic ideas.”  Article 9 instructed that 
civil administration in Germany would be “directed towards the decentralization of the political 
structure and the development of local responsibility.”137  
 The most immediate consequence was that these measures mandated a localized, federal 
framework with high degrees of regional autonomy.  While German education had a broadly 
federal structure under the Kaiserreich and Weimar Republic, it had been to a large extent 
dominated by geographically, demographically, and politically much larger and influential 
Prussian state.  For the areas that would eventually coalesce into the BRD this represented the 
beginnings of a modern era of robustly federal education.  For the areas in the Soviet Zone that 
evolved into the DDR the years of direct military occupation represent a brief interregnum of 
regional authority between the much more centralized models of the Nazi state and East 
Germany.      
 
Planning for peace: the Americans 
 
 Internal American planning for a post-war occupation regime in Germany was 
fragmentary and lacked direction during the war years.  In the absence of strong presidential 
leadership on the matter, individual agencies were left to propose their own solutions within the 
specific areas that most concerned them, an approach that lead to conflicting goals and policy 
disagreements between different sectors of the government.   Examples included State 
Department proposals that favored the widespread cultural and economic reconstruction of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Germany, War Department proposals that were mostly concerned with divesting post-war 
occupation duties onto civilian agencies while protecting the sanctity of its authority in war 
zones, and the highly punitive deindustrialization proposed by the Treasury Department under 
Henry Morgenthau.138   
 This was partially due to ongoing confusion over who would administer the occupation.  
During the conflict the War Department was adamant that, in the interest of security, final 
authority over all occupied enemy territory rest with the Allied Military Government for 
Occupied Territories (AMGOT), resulting in a reluctance on the part of the State Department to 
allocate many resources to planning a post-war order with no guarantee that they would have the 
necessary jurisdiction to see it through.  Meanwhile the War Department operated under the 
presumption that planning for such ‘civilian’ post-war pursuits as rebuilding civil administration 
was the responsibility of the State Department and consequently devoted very few resources to 
the issue, concentrating instead on more familiar issues of security and maintaining order. This 
organizational uncertainty was further exacerbated by a seeming unwillingness of the executive 
branch to take any lead in clarifying matters, either under Roosevelt or Truman.139 
 The resulting lack of direction had a direct impact on the efficacy of educational 
reconstruction in the areas under American occupation.  Education never received enough 
attention from the military authorities that would ultimately be tasked with conducting the first 
years of the occupation, despite the apparent agreement within the State Department that the 
over-all task of the occupation was to democratize the nation from within.  A symptom of this 
disconnect was that the Education and Religious Affairs branch (E&RA) was assigned no officer !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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with a rank higher than Major.  This later substantially damaged its ability to develop and carry 
out its own policies within the military occupation framework that eventually developed.  The 
low ranks held by its officers and its institutionally subordinate status to other branches of the 
occupation lead to enormous difficulties in procuring basic supplies and facilities for its own 
operations, much less the huge levels of aid and material support required by German educators 
and administrators in the early post-war period.140  They were further hampered by general 
occupation policies that, at this early stage, demanded that the United States Army “take no 
action that would tend to support basic living standards in Germany on a higher level than that 
existing in one of the neighboring United Nations.141” This directly resulted in early difficulties 
establishing the necessary authority to carry through desired reforms as well as more concrete 
neglect with regards to supplies, facilities, and other material needs.  This disorganization did not 
go unnoticed and unremarked upon.  As early as the winter of 1945/46 the lack of any concrete 
policy developed during the war was criticized in England both in Parliament142 and in the pages 
of The Economist,143 and both warned of the dangers of losing vital time before beginning a 
meaningful rehabilitation of Germany’s education and the recovery of its children. 
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 Further complicating matters for the American military was the fact that it had been 80 
years since it was last faced with occupation duties on this scale or of this nature.  While they 
had aided in the post-war occupation and disarmament of Imperial Germany following World 
War I, that deployment had been extremely limited in time, geographical scope, and the 
responsibilities assumed.  Their portfolio was strictly military in nature, designed to ensure that 
post-war disarmament was conducted in good faith and provide the necessary security forces to 
encourage the German state to begin reparation payments in a timely manner.  Furthermore, 
political pressures in the United States meant that a protracted occupation was not feasible.  To 
many Americans World War 1 was still “Europe’s War” and there was little domestic political 
support for a prolonged engagement on the continent.  Having achieved the immediate objective 
of ending hostilities and protecting international trade many now felt that the soldiers should 
come home and leave Europeans to settle European political issues.144  Not only was the 
engagement relatively short lived, but the number of soldiers involved was quickly scaled back.  
By the official end of the American deployment in 1923 the occupation force had dwindled from 
the quarter-million initially assigned to the Army of Occupation to less than a thousand men.145   
 Other conflicts and deployments in the first quarter of the 20th century and the last 
decades of the 19th had very different goals as well.  America’s numerous Caribbean and Latin 
American entanglements and the long-running campaign against insurgents in the Philippines 
had all been colonial in nature, with little thought given to local government or self rule.  In these 
instances long-term security was defined by the ability of American businesses to extract labor !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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and crops and the absence of organized, violent resistance to the American military.  Far from 
attempting to organize the local populations for self-government, the purposes of those 
deployments had been to incorporate them into a nascent American imperial apparatus. 
 The most recent occupation duty of the type that the US military faced in Germany in 
1945 was over three quarters of a century earlier:  the occupation and administration of the 
Confederacy after the Civil War. In many ways the patterns of neglected planning, ad-hoc post-
war arrangements, and eventual weak civil administration were similar.  Early in the war, as 
small portions of rebellious states came back under Federal control, local issues such as what to 
do with liberated slave populations and how to interact with civilian populations were dealt with 
on an individual basis by the officers on the scene. As the war progressed, Union armies 
penetrated deeper into the South, and the criteria for readmitting rebellious states to the nation 
became better articulated the duties of the Army away from the front lines expanded and became 
ever more complex and local military commanders were assigned responsibility for 
reestablishing local government under Federal auspices.146 
 Drawing from many of the same early Progressive ideals that would shape the 
development of American public schooling in the coming decades, many educated Northerners 
predicted a need to re-educate white Southern populations into once again being productive parts 
of the nation.  Addressing a presumably skeptical, mostly ex-Confederate audience a Northern 
missionary wrote in the Atlanta Christian Index in 1866 that the North “should teach the South. . 
. by military garrisons, by [Freedmen’s] Bureau courts, by Congregational churches, by Northern 
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newspapers and reading rooms, what be the first principles of social order, political eminence, 
moral worth and industrial success.”147 A similar assessment was provided during the war by the 
general secretary of the American Freedman’s Union Commission who wrote in 1864 that “we 
have not only to conquer the south – we have to convert it.  We have not only to occupy it by 
bayonets and bullets – but also by ideas and institutions.148” 
 While these sentiments proved somewhat naïve in the context of post-Civil War 
Reconstruction, they were still characteristic in many ways of how the optimistic American 
planners conceived of their occupation duties in Germany after World War 2. Though National 
Socialism had been despised for the brutality and destruction that it unleashed on Europe and 
Prussian militarism was viewed as a profoundly troublesome and in many ways more deeply 
rooted problem, many in the United States perceived an underlying cultural heritage that they felt 
sincere respect and affinity for.  Critically, these attitudes were present within the War 
Department headed by Henry Stimson.  Unlike the more aggressively anti-German factions 
within the Treasury Department, many War Department planners saw the potential in 
rehabilitating what they viewed as a nation of wayward Dichter und Denker rather than a nation 
of latter-day barbaric Huns who had twice threatened the destruction of European civilization. 
 One draft proposal for education under an American military government published a 
week and a half after the cease-fire specifically noted, “having purged itself of Nazism and the 
spirit of conquest, the German people have an old and distinguished culture capable of 
constructive development.149” It strongly emphasized the need to focus on these qualities in the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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initial stages of the occupation in order to afford the German people the hope of constructive, 
natively German education in order to prevent the development of a cultural and political 
vacuum “which could only be filled by the old evil in a different form.150”  A Joint Chiefs policy 
memorandum on education, published days after the military surrender of Nazi Germany and re-
published the following February, also noted the need for a “cultural revival” and emphasized 
the opportunities presented by both older, local traditions and the more positive aspects of 
national culture.  “In addition to the mobilization of healthy cultural influence in the locality and 
in the region, it is essential that the cultural revival be allowed on a national scale.  A potential 
basis for German self-respect is the justifiable pride of Germans in their former great literary, 
artistic, scholarly, scientific and religious contributions to civilization.”  The same memorandum 
noted the importance of involving Germans in the rebuilding effort, claiming, “Permanent 
cultural changes can be effected only as they are developed and maintained by the Germans 
themselves.”151  Tellingly, the specifics of Department of War goals with regards to German 
education were incredibly vague, referencing only the need to “eliminate Nazi practices and 
attitudes” and indulging in platitudes about the importance of fostering “universal principles of 
justice.”152  In many ways this presented Allied planners in the West with a self-contradictory 
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task: rid German society of the negative elements hat had led for the previous 75 years, while 
pushing it towards self-government as quickly as possible.  
 General Clay and the military government that he headed understood their role in 
Germany as that of an “instructional dictatorship” [Erziehungs Diktatur]: an openly non-
democratic military government with complete control of civil affairs within their occupation 
zone, but one that existed to teach the German people how to embrace democracy and eventually 
form their own government along those lines.153  They interpreted the sections of the Potsdam 
Agreement which called for the democratization of German culture as an educational mission 
and set out with the express goal of helping Germans to set up democratic institutions of their 
own making rather than imposing a pre-determined structure.  This became increasingly apparent 
as initial efforts to have control of civil affairs inside of Germany transferred from Department of 
War to State Department hands failed and more concrete policies were articulated and 
published.154 In particular the American military authorities mistrusted the strong centralization 
of state resources, claiming that such measures “hold within them the danger of dictatorship.155”  
Consequently they conceived of the future of Germany as a “federation of independent states” 
where the specifics of educational policy and educational structure would vary from state to 
state, but where there would be enough communication and coordination between them that their !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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programs would be broadly comparable.  This would enable states to tailor policies and curricula 
to meet local needs, while ensuring inter-operability across the system.  The latter was necessary 
so that employers and higher educational institutions could be able to distinguish between 
prospective students and employees without being intimately familiar with every nuance in the 
educational agendas of individual states.  Unsurprisingly this model bore significant resemblance 
to American education. 
 This mix of weakly articulated wartime policies, a lack of recent experience in 
conducting non-imperial occupations, structural problems within the command hierarchy of the 
occupation, the rush for a speedy democratization of German life, the rapid development of 
German institutions, and lingering respect in some corners for pre-Nazi German educational 
achievements left American occupation forces in a relatively weak position to reform German 
education.  If blame must be assigned, much of it lies with inter-departmental rivalries within the 
US government and a subsequent lack of systematic, coordinated planning.  However it came to 
be, that lack of a clearly articulated and specific plan for rebuilding Germany’s educational 
system in peacetime left the first occupiers to make many ad hoc decisions based on little more 
than immediate need and their own educational philosophies and experiences with education in 
the United States.  As military men, their rush to put civil administration - a task with which they 
had little practical experience and little training - back into civilian hands ultimately created 
significant space for Hessian educational administrators to push back against reforms that they 





Planning for peace: the Soviets 
 
 While less open in expressing admiration for the 19th century accomplishments of their 
recently defeated fascist nemesis than many Americans, Soviet planners also recognized the need 
to include Germans in the post-war reconstruction effort.  During the war small but significant 
numbers of German intellectuals and communists lived in exile in the Soviet Union, most having 
fled there before 1941.  Although somewhat influential in the years before the war, their status as 
foreigners left them highly exposed during the purges.  Their ranks were further depleted by 
Stalin’s decision to hand significant numbers of them over to the German government upon the 
completion of the Molotov-von Ribbentrop pact.156  Alongside them there existed a body of 
captured soldiers and officers who went through Soviet ‘anti-fascism’ courses of study in 
captivity and founded organizations such as the Bund Deutscher Offiziere (BDO).  These two 
groups together formed the core of the Nationalkomitee Freies Deutschland  (NKFD).  While the 
NKFD was initially organized for purely propaganda purposes, under constant threat of being 
shut down by suspicious Communist Party officials who routinely vacillated on its worth, and at 
its very best only advisory in nature, in the aftermath of the war it was seen by some as a 
potential source of capable, trustworthy politicians and administrators who it was hoped would 
have some legitimacy in the eyes of their fellow countrymen.157  In the end many of the positions 
within the SBZ would be filled by men and women who either survived the war in Western exile !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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or inside Germany despite leftist political affinities.  Ex-officers were often politically 
unacceptable and conditions in the Soviet Union had drastically reduced the numbers of the pre-
war émigrés.  Even so, those who survived a decade of life as suspect foreigners in Stalinist 
Russia had many valuable contacts and understood how to operate within in that system.  This, 
coupled with their immediate availability led to a handful of the highest positions being filled by 
members of the NKFD.  It is also an indication that on some level the Soviets were aware that it 
was ultimately Germans who would have to lead, teach, and administer other Germans for any 
kind of long-term solution and peace to be possible.        
  Soviet policy was predicated on a historical view of Nazism that was fundamentally 
different from the Western Allies’.  Contemporaries on both sides of the Elbe saw Germany’s 
recent past as a symptom of a culture that was somehow malformed as a result of the abnormal 
role played by militaristic, antidemocratic military elites who had never been supplanted during 
the 19th century as they were in other nations.  The Soviets, however, saw this as an acute form 
of the problems plaguing industrially advanced bourgeois societies in general, not a specifically 
German tragedy that needed to be corrected to put them back on a path of normal 
development.158  They also differed on what the eventual solution should be.  They diverged 
strongly from American and British views that there existed a positive, older form of German 
identity that could be salvaged and incorporated into a new German nation.  For the Soviets this 
older identity was a manifestation of antiquated aristocratic and bourgeois values that deserved 
to be swept away almost as much as the more recently tragic Prussian militarism.   While a form 
of reeducation was still seen as a key to moving German society forward, it was not a 
rehabilitative type that would correct a diversion from the normative historical development of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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other Western nations, but one aimed at educating Germany’s workers and farmers to assume 
political power on their own and supplant the previously ruling classes.  The need for 
‘democratic’ government in Germany was constantly evoked, although the Soviet understanding 
of the term bore little resemblance to that of the Western Allied powers. 
    Early Soviet policy was predicated upon putting known opponents of Nazism into power 
in the hopes that they would have more legitimacy in the eyes of the population than the Soviet 
military that they were answerable to.  SMAD believed that once the administrative apparatus 
had been secured and placed in the hands of trustworthy anti-fascists, drawn from what remained 
of the pre-war KPD and the ranks of the NKFD, a new generation of socialist youth could be 
raised who would reject the problematic views and traditions of their forefathers.159  Rather than 
attempt to rehabilitate society at large and resurrect older, untainted models for what it meant to 
be German, they intended to raise up an immediately trustworthy leadership cadre which could, 
within a generation or two, define a new model for German society and culture that would 
represent a clean break with a troubled past and a stark alternative to what was offered under the 
Western Allies.  In this view denazification meant getting rid of the structural and cultural 
underpinnings of the fascist movement, rather than guilt as embodied by specific criminal 
individuals, so it had to be revolutionary. This aspect of the occupation was taken seriously as 
both a challenge and an opportunity by the Soviet occupation authorities.  Lieutenant-General 
I.S. Kolesnichenko, commander of the Soviet Military administration for Thuringia in (SMA-
Th.) in 1945 wrote that the Soviet occupiers had a more challenging task ahead of them than 
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their Western counterparts, as they had the duty to install a new, progressive ideology while the 
Western powers could simply promote a return of inter-war bourgeois culture.160 
  Unlike the Americans, the Soviets desired from the outset a strong centralized 
educational authority from which general policies could emanate.  Initially this was done by the 
simple expedient of issuing identical occupation orders throughout the assorted states and 
provinces that made up the Soviet Zone.  For example, the Law for the Democratization of the 
German School of May/June 1946 consisted of five separate but largely identical laws under the 
same title that were promulgated almost simultaneously: in the province of Saxony on 22. May 
1946, in the state of Mecklenburg-Vorpommern on 23. May 1946, in the state of Saxony on 31. 
May 1946, in the province of Mark Brandenburg on 31. May 1946, and in the state of Thuringia 
on 2. June, 1946.161  This drive towards centralization was further aided by the installment, 
almost immediately upon the cessation of hostilities, of Paul Wandel as head of the new German 
Education Administration in Berlin.  This central authority remained quite weak during the 
occupation period, however, partially due to the strong state-level administrations that were able 
to successfully fend off many of the initiatives emanating from Berlin and partially due to 
Wandel’s own inexperience in educational matters; his chief qualifications were political and 
stemmed from his active participation in the KPD during the 20s and early 30s and his continued 
political activity in Moscow after emigrating in 1933.162 
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 As with the Americans, the Soviet Union published no concrete plans for reforming 
German education until the occupation began.  The first major statement to outline an 
educational policy that went beyond the broadest generalities of reestablishing education under 
non-Nazi auspices was the Law for the Democratization of the German Schools, which was not 
enacted in Thuringia until June 2, 1946.  Also similar to their American co-belligerents, wartime 
planning for the post-war era was significantly hampered by both politics and the pressing need - 
felt more acutely by the Russians than by the Americans - to militarily defeat the Germans in the 
field before worrying about what to do with them afterwards.  Where the Soviets and the 
Americans fundamentally differed, however, was in their historical understanding of National 
Socialism and the relative value of the non-Nazi cultural heritage that Germans could draw on.  
There are many potential explanations for this.  The most obvious lies in the migrant background 
of most American families, the high proportion of those that came from Western Europe, and the 
large number of those who could trace their family trees at least partially back to Germany itself.  
Even those who claimed no German ancestry recognized its contributions to a Western European 
cultural and religious tradition that many in America felt a strong affinity for.  It is much more 
difficult to advocate the complete overturning of a culture and society that one is at least partially 
invested in. Russia had a long history of contact with German culture, one that was especially 
important for the elites of Tsarist society in the 18th and 19th century, in the form of both 
imported high culture and day to day contact with groups such as the Baltic German minorities.  
At the same time they had also suffered much more directly at the hands of National Socialism 
and were for this reason perhaps less amenable to seeking out the more noble aspects of German 
culture and traditions for rehabilitation.  This combined with a Marxist historical understanding 
of fascism to promote much more radical solutions to the 20th century problem of militaristic, 
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aggressive German nationalism.  For German education this meant that the immediate bar for 
restructuring was set much higher than in the west, and the space left for negotiation much more 
narrow.      
  
German contributions from exile 
 
 Some German politicians and educators operating from foreign exile during the war also 
participated in the planning of Germany’s educational future, frequently on an independent or 
informal basis. While their work was fragmented, ad hoc, and frequently restricted to insular 
expatriate communities, it was nonetheless of significant importance in the post-war era.  The 
exact forms that these proposals, planning committees, and correspondence groups took are 
diverse enough to defy generalization.  They ranged from informal study groups led by 
expatriate school teachers,163 to think-tanks organized among educated POWs under military 
auspices,164 to articles and books written for non-German wartime public consumption,165 to 
secret committees formed by political prisoners in concentration camps as the war ground to its 
inevitable conclusion.166   
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 It is also difficult to generalize about their reception, other than to say that it was usually 
more dependent upon the relative openness of their host society than any particulars of what they 
had to say.  At one extreme sits the relatively privileged existence of Erika Mann.  She not only 
published an expose on Nazi education during her exile167 but operated a cabaret in New York 
City that housed many other exiled German artists and operated as a journalist in England during 
the war.  At the other extreme one finds the fates of many who fled to the Soviet Union in the 
thirties only to fall victim to claims of being foreign spies during Stalin’s purges.168    
 As fragmentary and difficult to generalize as these experiences were, they remain 
important due largely to the perceived reliability on the part of the occupying powers of the men 
and women who wrote them.  Many of the most active members in these wartime discussions 
were the same men and women who, whether living as exiles abroad or suffering extreme 
persecution inside Germany, had the impeccably anti-Nazi political pedigrees that were a sine 
qua non for influential, high-level administrative postings after the war.  
 One theme in the writings of these men and women that was fully compatible with the 
wartime views of both the Western Allies and the Soviets was the idea that the direct 
involvement of Germans in the moral and political rehabilitation of the nation was vital.  
Wilhelm Sollmann was a Weimar-era Social Democratic member of the Reichstag and twice 
Secretary of the Interior under Stresemann who fled the country in 1933 after suffering beatings 
and arrest.  He observed in 1944 that, “the one absolute political necessity clearly predictable for 
postwar Germany is broad cooperation of all social groups, political philosophies, and religious 
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creeds, the Nazis and their fellow-travelers, of course, excluded.169”  He advocated applying 
these principles to educational planning and emphasized the legitimacy that German professional 
certification granted local educators in the eyes of their fellow countrymen.  Foreign experts, no 
matter how well trained or accomplished in their own countries, would have a harder time 
ensuring that re-established institutions were seen as legitimate and long-term solutions by the 
general population.  In early 1945 Sollmann wrote in a report on educational reconstruction that, 
“Education must be handled by national professional groups and leaders, if it is to be acceptable 
to the students.  However, native teachers will badly need international assistance, advice and 
help, criticism and encouragement.170”  Reconstruction would need foreign aid, and would need 
to be directed by foreign oversight, but it would ultimately need to be conducted by the Germans 
themselves if it were to be durable.   
 When it came to the question of the value of pre-existing German culture, German 
authors tended to be more ambivalent than either their American or Soviet counterparts.  Many 
of them had a natural appreciation for their own culture and the good parts of what had come 
before, but most were self-critical enough to acknowledge that something was amiss.  Regardless 
of the depth of the rot that they perceived in German society and politics there were two 
fundamental points of agreement within most of the expatriate community:  the German people 
were neither completely lost, monsters incapable of meaningful rehabilitation nor were they 
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purely lambs astray, closet democrats incapable of rising up and freeing themselves purely on 
account of the state terror apparatus.171   
 The more negative assessments emphasized the deeply problematic aspects of German 
political, cultural, and educational traditions and envisioned a great nation-building project.  The 
ultimate goal would be re-education along more constructively democratic lines – however those 
were defined – than had previously existed.  Many of these criticisms came from German 
communists and socialists who accepted Marxist historical critiques and who emphasized the 
danger of reading too much into the cultural “giants” of the German past.  Hans Siebert was a 
pre-war teacher in Kassel who was both persecuted professionally and prosecuted criminally for 
his activism in the KPD, eventually emigrating to England in 1936.  While abroad he wrote 
prolifically about German education, both in German and English language presses, and headed 
many lectures, seminars, clubs, and other social organizations for the German expatriate 
community in England.  In 1942 he wrote that, “There are not a few German opponents of Hitler 
who restrict themselves to uncritically setting the ‘great’ German spiritual heritage against the 
current barbarity of Nazism. However, one can also discern in this ‘great’ German past many of 
the roots and causes of Germany’s later collapse into barbarity.”172  Hitler was not Germany’s 
first brush with authoritarianism nor with violent political repression.  For many among the 
German left the 18th and 19th centuries provided not just cultural alternatives to Prussian 
militarism, but a time when there was a broad consensus among the middle class and elite that 
working class political activism and regional identities should be repressed in the name of 
national unity.       !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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 Siebert also held that the question of German culpability for the crimes of the Third 
Reich could not be reduced to the question of Nazis and anti-Nazis, those who stood with the 
regime or against it.  He claimed that the great difference between the German nation and other 
nations of Western Europe was that this “middle bulk” had been systematically trained “to 
believe in slogans which promise national grandeur at the cost of other nations,” and laid the 
blame solely at the feet of a German educational system that “since Bismarck . . . has gradually 
and systematically weakened whatever other more European, liberal, democratic traditions may 
have existed before that time.”173  In essence, he held that the Germany of Fichte and Hegel, of 
Goethe and Humboldt was an unrecoverable past destroyed by the disastrous legacies of 1870 
and half a century of Prussian rule and administration.  In his view Germany had indeed walked 
a ‘special path’ to the disastrous policies of the Third Reich, but it was one that was rooted 
neither in the mists of antiquity nor in any particular character flaw unique to the German people, 
but a specific political disaster and ruinous policies that had taken half a century to reach full 
fruition.    
 A more moderate sentiment was expressed by Werner Richter, a one-time undersecretary 
in the Prussian Ministry of Education during the Weimar Republic who relocated to the United 
States following the rise to prominence of the Nazi Party.  He emphasized the importance of 
education as a tool for the eventual rehabilitation of German society, but warned against an over-
reliance on it.  He spoke out against what he saw as a contemporary literature that, in lamenting 
the damage caused by the Nazi educational system, simultaneously blackened the reputation and 
called into question the motivation of the Weimar-era educators who had preceded it.  He 
cautioned that “matters in the field of education are. . . not so simple as to justify appraising the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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results of an educational philosophy with a political yardstick” and went so far as to highlight the 
political failings of the Western Allies to prove his point: “Surely, no one would hold American 
education responsible for the emergence of a Huey Long; the two Napoleons did not come to 
power because the French educational system had failed.  The future of education is not served 
by making the educational efforts of the first German Republic responsible for the coming of 
Hitler.174”  If German reconstruction was to depend on using education to reshape society, it did 
no one any good to use it as a scapegoat for the tragedies of the recent past.  
  In most cases opinions on the precise level of cultural and pedagogical renewal that was 
required and the thornier issue of how much of previous traditions could be salvaged broke down 
along political lines.  Communist or strongly socialist individuals valued older traditions less and 
preferred more radical programs of cultural rebuilding rather than rehabilitation.  Those with 
conservative or centrist affinities tended to value certain middle class and non-Prussian 
aristocratic legacies, especially those that could be portrayed as being cultural, rather than 
political, in nature.  This did not always hold true in a formulaic sense, of course.  Richter, for 
example, strongly felt that previous educational models had to be taken seriously as a source of 
inspiration and a model for what was to come, and dismissed out of hand the more extreme calls 
for German dismemberment, cautioning against even separating traditionally Prussian territories 
lest they provide a rallying cause for reactionary forces.175  This is unsurprising coming from a 
man who served extensively in the Imperial and Weimar-era educational systems and sought his 
exile in America.  On the other hand, he also recognized that the world had changed profoundly, 
both politically and economically, since the 19th century and that educational technique must !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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evolve along with it.  Unlike many of his peers who wanted to maintain German educational 
traditions, he felt that “the Oberschule did not justify its existence” and that in light of the “brutal 
realities of the machine age . . . the humanistic Gymnasium can only be a side issue in the 
educational system of the future.176”  In favoring a much expanded, general secondary school 
and an intermediate tier of general college studies before any consideration of university studies 
he sounded much closer to staunchly Marxist proponents of the Einheitsschule model than to 
most of his western colleagues.  He also echoed the sentiments of many younger educators who 
were generally more willing to engage in radical reformation than men of his generation.   
 Even so, these broad differences did lead to a form of self-sorting, with many of those 
critical of the older systems and ready to embrace new models settling in the Soviet Zone due to 
their political convictions, and those more invested in older models and willing to attempt to 
salvage pre-existing structures settling in areas controlled by the Western Allies.  This had 
concrete and long-lasting consequences for the reconstruction of German education, as these 
men and women provided the initial group of educators from whom post-war administrators 
were drawn.   
 Dr. Marie Torhorst was one such educator, a prominent pre-war proponent of 
experimental and reformist educational models and politically active member of first the SPD 
and later the KPD.  Dismissed in 1933 on political grounds, she would later serve in posts of 
increasing responsibility until eventually becoming Minister of Education for Thuringia in 1947.  
Writing in the 1970s she recounted the splintering of the old Reformpädagogiker movement after 
the war and in particular her strained, and eventually broken, relations with Fritz Karsen, an old 
colleague and friend who chose to work with the American authorities in Berlin.  Karsen was !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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himself a well known reformist educator who had founded experimental schools in Berlin during 
the Weimar period aimed at developing a single track Einheitsschule that could be used as a 
model for wider educational reform.  A pre-war socialist and member of the SPD, he was not as 
radical as Torhorst and they had numerous disagreements in the 30s over the issue of 
communism, both as manifested in the KPD and in the Soviet Union.  Upon Torhorst’s return in 
1932 from a period of study and research in Moscow Karsten commented that in light of recent 
political events she appeared to have backed the wrong horse at the worst time.177   
 Their difficulties stemmed not only from political differences, but also his continued 
insistence on the validity of the educational models they had worked on before the war, while 
Torhorst believed that Soviet models had much more to offer in the post-war circumstances.  At 
one early meeting, shortly after the end of the war, she wrote that he greeted her with the 
question: “Isn’t it abysmal, having to work under the constant pressure of the Russians?”  Much 
to his surprise she responded that she had “never in my life been able to work so free and 
happily.”178 Not everyone had positive memories of the way things were before the Nazis.  It 
does not take much in the way of a historical imagination to understand how Torhorst, a highly 
educated woman with socialist leanings who was very active in pressing for educational reform 
before the Nazis, would have very different memories of the old establishment than her male 
peers, even those with whom she had previously found much common ground.       
 Self-sorting of skilled professionals based on individual ideologies would have long term 
consequences for the levels of acquiescence or resistance offered by German administrators to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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the demands of occupation authorities, and the specific policies and structural reforms pushed 
forward within the two zones.  At its simplest, it meant that military authorities in the Soviet 
Zone - already predisposed to press for more far-reaching reforms than their American 
counterparts - generally had to contend with German educational administrators who were far 
more sympathetic to their goals and core ideologies.  It also meant that the Germans working in 
government and administrative posts in the east were somewhat more politically coordinated 
from the outset than their western counterparts.  Barring family concerns, the basic political 
reasons why someone might choose to go live among the Soviets was a general agreement with 
their political and social philosophies.  Those who objected to those same philosophies enough to 
flee westwards were a far more diverse group, who could be expected to have less common 
ground from which to work once they established themselves among the Western Allies. 
 It should also be observed that the German educators who were writing from exile were 
among the most privileged intellectuals in the German speaking world at this time.  They were 
not faced with the reality of living as dissidents under Hitler’s regime, nor were they subjected to 
the hardships of the war years.  While they wrote eloquently and with undoubtedly genuine 
passion about educational subjects that concerned them deeply when they fled abroad, they were 
not there to witness the final extremes that the militarization of German childhood reached nor 
were they immediately aware of plight of the millions of children who lived among the rubble of 
the cities as the war drew to a close.  Often with fathers who were absent or worse, and with 
mothers who spent the days working, these Schlüsselkinder were the original latch-key children 




Rubble and hunger: the condition of schools and students in 1945 
 
 Writing a retrospective on the progress made in the two years after the war for a 
pedagogical conference in the Soviet Zone in 1948, Max Kreuziger recalled the challenges of the 
immediate post-war era.  He broke the efforts of the past two years into three phases and defined 
the first, earliest phase as the “resumption of school activities in their simplest form, the 
reacclimatization of both children and parents to regular school attendance and to regular school 
work.179”  Such a seemingly simple task as reopening school buildings and placing teachers in 
front of children was no mean feat in the Summer of 1945.  Many of the administrators 
attempting to organize this undertaking were themselves only recently thrust into their positions 
by Allied occupation authorities who were scrambling to fill such roles with politically reliable, 
technically competent professionals in the wake of broad purges of Nazi officials.  Once installed 
they had to face chronic classroom shortages, an utter lack of teaching materials, traumatized 
students, and a profession that itself was deeply scarred by the effects of 12 years of National 
Socialism.    
 The shortage of classrooms was largely the result of the war.  Germany’s urban centers 
had been hit especially hard by years of areal bombardment and the final months of street 
fighting, but rural districts had suffered considerable damage as well. School buildings were just 
as likely to have been damaged or destroyed as the rest of the nation’s architectural 
infrastructure, and what had not been directly damaged or destroyed by bombing had frequently 
been re-purposed during the war for other, more immediate needs.  This was a long-term !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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problem that plagued German administrators and the occupation forces they worked with 
throughout the 1940s.  Some short term solutions were attempted, such as housing students in 
temporary classrooms in non-school buildings and shift-based teaching that let multiple classes 
share the same space, however none of these proved sufficient to the problem at hand.  As late as 
1948 the Hessian Minister of Education, Erwin Stein, complained to Vaughn R. Delong, the 
Deputy Director of the US Army’s Education & Cultural Relations Division (E&CR) within 
Hesse about the slowness with which his classrooms were returning to service.  In Bensheim, a 
town in Hesse that suffered relatively mild yet still significant physical damage during the war, 
that only 11 rooms were available for 34 classes and only four of those could be described as 
‘true classrooms.’180  A report published for the 3rd Pedagogical Congress for the Soviet Zone in 
1949 gives an idea of the extent of the over-all damage suffered, and how extreme the 
devastation was in some of the more intensely bombed or fought-over areas. Four years after the 
end of the war the report lauded the progress that had been made in repairing school facilities 
and boasted that only 30% of the estimated 11,000 school buildings in the Soviet sector remained 
damaged or destroyed.181 That nearly a third of all school buildings remained significantly 
damaged almost half a decade after the war ended speaks volumes to the extent of the problem in 
the first days of peace.     
 The facilities crisis was intensified by the ongoing need of both the occupation forces and 
local German civilian authorities for administrative offices of their own, as well as the ongoing !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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need for undamaged buildings to house make-shift hospitals, provide refugee housing, or to 
conduct any other activity that required an indoor space covered by an intact roof.  The few 
classrooms that remained were, as property of the German state, prime candidates for temporary 
expropriation.  The problem was wide-spread enough that as early as March 1946 the Hessian 
state government, still in its infancy, issued a general order for all non-educational activity in 
school buildings to cease in preparation for the new school year.182  Despite this order problems 
of this nature persisted.  More than two years later, as the Hessian Ministry of Education 
prepared for the fall opening of the 1948/49 school year 950 Polish Jews remained housed in one 
of the few standing school buildings in Bensheim - the same Bensheim earlier noted for suffering 
a shortage of appropriate teaching space.183  
 Difficulties such as these were exacerbated by the lack of care for remaining facilities 
often exhibited by the military authorities that had occupied them.  At the same time as his 
colleagues in Hesse were attempting to evict interlopers from their classrooms, the Minister for 
Education in Thuringia, Walter Wolf, was attempting similar measures in a more direct fashion.  
On March 20 he wrote to the Mayor of Greiz to relate a visit he had made to the city’s teaching 
academy.  To his dismay he found that it was completely occupied by units of the notorious 
Soviet secret police (NKVD).  Worse, the invaluable - and at this stage utterly irreplaceable - 
teaching libraries were in immediate danger of destruction as the soldiers were burning books for 
heating fuel.  By the time he had succeeded in relocating them the damage had been done:  most !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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of the windows were broken, metal hardware had been removed from the doors, many lamps and 
fixtures had been taken from the rooms, and the central heating system was so damaged that 
repairs were estimated to cost over 40,000RM, a very significant expense for the Ministry at that 
time.184 
 The classroom shortage had other causes besides the destruction or appropriation of 
facilities.  The major population shifts that took place during the war and the ongoing postwar 
refugee crisis combined to sharply increase the raw numbers of pupils attempting to attend 
German schools.  What was worse, these populations were not evenly distributed and were 
frequently concentrated in areas that had seen fairly low student densities before the war.  A 
number of factors contributed to this: the wartime evacuations of urban children to the 
countryside to escape allied bombing, the mass flight of German civilians out of Eastern Prussia 
and Silesia as the Red Army conducted its final campaigns of the war, and the continuing 
deportations of ethnic Germans from territories that would ultimately be annexed by Germany’s 
neighbors.  The situation was not improved by the general refugee crisis provoked by Germany’s 
wartime forced labor policies and the liberation of the concentration camps.  The Soviet Zone, 
situated furthest to the east, was the hardest hit by these recurring waves of refugees.  At the time 
of the surrender in 1945 it had half a million more school aged children in it than in 1939 and an 
additional 319,000 poured into it throughout 1946.185  The refugee crisis was not restricted to the 
eastern half of the country; by the end of 1946 7.3 million of the 11.6 million refugees were 
present in one of the Western Zones. These refugee numbers presented an enormous burden for !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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non-urban school districts that often had pre-war infrastructures that were designed for a number 
of pupils commensurate with the local population. In some cities the devastation was so severe 
that a widespread return of displaced people was not feasible until some level of rebuilding had 
occurred.  As an example, the center of Hessen’s largest city, Frankfurt am Main, housed only 
350,000 in December of 1945 and did not return to its pre-war population of 550,000 until 
1951.186       
 The classroom shortage was not only a product of the war, but regional imbalances and 
structural problems that had existed long before the Nazis took power.  While in the largest cities 
the pre-war schools had been among the best in the world, the story in the countryside was often  
less rosy.  In some rural areas the educational apparatus was effectively still that of the early 
Kaiserreich.  It is telling that one of the key triumphs of the new Einheitschule trumpeted at the 
3rd Pedagogical Congress in Leipzig in 1949 was the radical reduction in the number of single-
room schoolhouses, the significant reduction in the number of two- or three-class schoolhouses, 
and the enormous build-up of modern eight-year primary schools in the rural districts of the 
Soviet Sector.  Sachsen and Mecklenburg were held up as key examples of this triumph.  In 
Sachsen the percentage of 8-year primary schools had risen by 45.6%, two- and three-class 
primary schools made up only 9.6% of the total schools, and single-classroom schools had been 
eliminated altogether.  In Mecklenburg, an area described as having been “particularly 
backwards in public education,” it was proudly reported that only 146 single-classroom schools 
remained where earlier they had comprised 60-70% of the schools in the region.187  It is worth !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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noting that the very fact that these districts were so rural and relatively underdeveloped 
economically also meant that these were the areas of the country that were the most likely to 
have survived the final years of conflict with their physical infrastructure relatively intact.  
Consequently they were also some of those most heavily hit by the refugee crisis, especially the 
masses of urban school children who had been evacuated from the cities in the face of the allied 
bombing campaigns. 
 These factors combined with a general shortage in qualified and politically acceptable 
teachers to create a chronic over-crowding of classrooms in both the Western and the Soviet 
zones.  In Hesse the average class size at the end of the first year of renewed schooling was about 
50 students with some peaking at over 70,188 while the average age of the remaining teachers was 
52 years old.189  Similar figures were reported in Thuringia, where class sizes of 50-60 students 
were considered normal, if regrettable,190 and almost a fifth of the currently serving teachers 
were over the official retirement age of 65.191  High turnover and dropout rates among newly 
trained teachers exacerbated the teacher shortage.  Low pay, rushed or incomplete training, and a 
chronic shortage of housing were all common complaints among those who left their positions.  
The ongoing effects of denazification further undercut the ability of education ministries to staff 
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their schools.192  In one particular example, the regional offices for the Thuringian Kreis of 
Altenburg noted in December 1945 by that out of a required 457 positions within their primary 
schools only 308 were filled and of the teachers they had 165 were known to have problematic 
connections with National Socialism.  They had additional difficulties recruiting replacement 
teachers; only 65 people had applied for teacher training up to that point.193  This was a major 
problem from both educational and organizational standpoints, and one that continued to be a 
thorn in the side of educational administrators for years to come.   
 The physical devastation of the war was not the only wartime legacy that the German 
schools had to contend with.  The students who sat in the all too frequently bombed-out 
classrooms also bore the scars of the recent fighting.  An entire generation of school children had 
recent experiences and memories of bombing, evacuation, physical hardship, dead or missing 
relatives, and sometimes worse that today would be constitute a mental health crisis among 
returning combat veterans.  Even those who were either too young to have fully appreciated the 
events going on around them or lived someplace out of the way enough that they escaped the 
harshest realities of the war lived in families that were inevitably impacted somehow.   Brothers, 
fathers, or other immediate male relatives were frequently absent, and the remaining family 
members often struggled to make ends meet in a completely shattered economy, and food 
shortages abounded.  From an educational standpoint many of them had the additional 
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disadvantage of having missed out on a year or more of school attendance due to the chaotic 
conditions of the late-war period.   
 A 1947 survey of the social standings and material needs of first graders in a school in 
Erfurt, a city in eastern Germany, gives some idea of the larger pattern of problems faced in the 
nation at large.  The school was located in the city center and it was noted in the survey that the 
social standings of this class were representative of the conditions in the school as a whole and of 
other schools in the city.  Erfurt had been damaged during the war through bombing and some 
scattered fighting in the last days of the war, but it was neither exceptional for having escaped 
relatively unscathed nor for having been devastated to an unusual degree.   
 Of the 51 pupils in the class only 27 had a father at home.  Of the students without fathers 
over half were dead or missing from the war, and an additional quarter were registered POWs.  
Of the fathers who remained, half had their professions listed as “worker,” with an additional 
tenth being categorized as invalids.  The children without fathers in the household tended to have 
working mothers, with only two listed as unemployed.   36 of the 51 students had siblings, and 
20 of those had two or more.  12 were refugees from territories Germany lost at the end of the 
war, six were refugees who were bombed out of other cities still in Germany, and seven lived in 
houses in Erfurt that had sustained significant bomb damage but remained at least minimally 
habitable.  Only eight of the children had their own bedroom, and the others were almost equally 
split between sharing with siblings, with their parents, or with both parents and siblings.  14 
students were recorded as having no leather footwear, and two-thirds of the remainder had only 
one pair of shoes.  36 of the 51 students spent the winter of 1946/47 in a house with either no 
heating at all or heat provided only by the kitchen oven.  All but four of the students were 
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reported as eating a warm supper either at home or in one of the local soup kitchens, however all 
but five ate no breakfast.194 
 The general picture presented by this survey is one of a classroom where the majority of 
the students were living with significant day-to-day material needs that were going unfulfilled.  
The lack of proper heating during the winter was particularly troubling, however the majority 
were at least having basic clothing needs met.  Their families were large, but a great number of 
them lacked a primary breadwinner in a well-paid occupation and those with single, working 
mothers were at significant risk for being un- or under-supervised during much of their time 
outside school.  It is equally important to remember that this was the condition of the students a 
full two years after the war had ended.  By 1947 few of them seem to have been going hungry, 
however food does not yet seem to have been in good enough supply that any of them are truly 
getting enough to eat.  In the first months after the war even basic nutritional needs could not be 
dependably met, the other observed problems would have been even more pronounced, and 
many students simply did not attend in order to aid their families in meeting their daily needs in 
whatever ways possible.  Many of the students in this sample came from refugee backgrounds 
that included a psychologically traumatic mixture of violence, flight, loss of family and 
possessions, and displacement.  Many of the others lived in houses that still bore scars from the 
war.  While the children examined in this survey were too young to have seen any kind of active 
service in the war, older pupils in other classes would have potentially been caught up in the final 
battles for the Reich, either as members of the Volkssturm, a late-war citizen militia, or crewing 
anti-aircraft guns.  Still others, irrespective of age, would have been caught up in the final weeks 
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and months of combat as civilian onlookers and bear the same physical and mental scars as the 
older children who were forced to directly participate.195     
 Regardless of their wartime experiences or post-war circumstances all of them would 
have had their education disrupted by the final months of the war and the interruption of the 
1944/1945 school year in much of the country.  This was considered such a problem that one of 
the earliest articulated goals for schools in the Soviet sector was the “resumption of school 
operations in their simplest form, [and] the re-habituation of children and parents to routine 
school attendance and routine schoolwork.196” Finally, it is important to remember that this 
survey was conducted over two years after the end of the war.  In the first days following the 
surrender the problems outlined by it would have been much more acute.  Problems such as these 
contributed to ongoing difficulties in both attracting and retaining students.  Many children in the 
post-war era simply did not have the luxury of regular school attendance as their families 
struggled to meet the most basic needs of food, shelter, and clothing.  None of these factors can 
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 Even when a suitable classroom could be found and the students coaxed into attending 
there remained the question of what to teach them and what materials were to be used.  
Irrespective of the desires for specific curricular reforms on the part of the Occupation 
Authorities, there was simply a lack of politically acceptable textbooks.  Classroom instruction 
had been highly politicized in the Third Reich.  Subjects such as biology and history had been 
consciously adapted to instill National Socialist ideologies and views on race, German culture, 
foreign nations, and an omnipresent glorification of the Nazi Party and Adolph Hitler. Even 
textbooks for seemingly innocuous subjects such as physics and mathematics were in many cases 
tainted, containing militaristic lessons that involved students solving problems such as the 
comparative flying ranges of loaded and unloaded bombers or artillery shell trajectories. 
Weimar-era textbooks were frequently difficult to find as they had been retired from classroom 
use for well over a decade, and when they were available were often in poor condition from 
years of careless storage.  Decent quality paper for printing was almost impossible to come by, 
and what little there was tended to be earmarked for government or occupation use.  Frequently 
individual schools and districts were left to adapt simple expedients to re-use politically 
questionable texts.  These included ripping out the least offensive pages from Nazi textbooks for 
classroom use, gluing together the most problematic pages in books that were otherwise 
acceptable, and simply blacking out offending passages and images with marker.   
 Eventually the worst of the material shortages were overcome through ad-hoc solutions 
and the eventual introduction by the occupation authorities of short, basic pamphlets printed 
outside Germany that could be used to begin basic instruction.  Even with these gradual 
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improvements, however, material need was a constant theme in German classrooms throughout 
this period.  With the destruction of centralized governmental authority there was also the 
question of who, precisely, was responsible for developing new courses and their content.  
Military authorities, regional ministries, and even individual schools all participated in some 
manner and all were potential authors of new material or custodians of older works.  Furthermore 
there was always the question of who was responsible for any given task and under who’s 
authority a project fell.  This was not only a question of allocating responsibility; it was also a 
matter of ensuring that people with enough authority to get results were the ones pressing for 
needed resources.  
 While writing to the Thuringian Ministry of Education for clarification on these matters 
one local administrator noted that one of his schools was still teaching according to guidelines 
published in 1926.  He blamed the generally slow pace of improvement on the lack of clarity 
concerning who was responsible for what tasks, and where ultimate authority lay.  “Is the district 
school board independent, is it subordinate to the district, or is it directly subordinate to Weimar?  
A legal ruling has, in spite of my suggestions and my insistence, not yet occurred to this day.  
Because of this it is also not possible to have the necessary office workers immediately brought 
here.“197 He insisted that the state must be responsible for the development of new courses and 
material and emphasized that the local authorities were far too over-burdened to take on this 
duty. “The district council must focus on the fundamental questions: the cleanup of the teaching 
staff, training new teachers, reorganization of course books, school reform, the introduction of 
Russian language instruction, the political deprogramming of the teachers.  Therefore there is no !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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time to continuously fret with and urge the district office to action.”198  He claimed that his office 
was already working 13-14 hours a day and that this would worsen in the fall when some office 
staff would be needed for school inspections. 
 Finally, the scope of the political reorientation necessary was a major concern for the 
occupying powers.  In the final years of the war it was widely assumed that the children of 
Germany would be heavily indoctrinated by years of exposure to National Socialist propaganda, 
the influence of state run youth organization, and politically compromised classroom instruction.  
A survey conducted of Hessian school children between 12 and 18 years old in 1946 indicates 
that these concerns were well founded, but that the influence was not as deeply rooted as had 
been feared, especially among the younger children.199  When asked their opinion of National 
Socialism only 3.5% responded that they felt it had been a bad idea, 51% that it was a good idea 
carried out poorly, and 45% declined to answer.  50% felt that German Jews should not have the 
right to return to Germany and 30% responded that they should.  “A little more than 50%” of the 
15-18 year old children believed that unconditional obedience was an important goal of 
education, while “about 70%” of the younger children did.  When asked who they felt was 
responsible for the current state of affairs in Germany 59% of the older children and 66% of the 
younger children responded “Hitler”; 48% of the older boys, 25% of the older girls, 22% of the 
younger boys, and 30% of the younger girls responded “the occupation forces”; and 40% of the 
older boys, 45% of the younger boys, 33% of the older girls, and 23% of the younger girls 
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responded “the Nazis.”  About 15% of all those polled lay the blame at the feet of “the German 
people.”  
 The survey and the manner in which it was conducted were not without their critics.  
Commenting on it a year and a half later, Education Minister Erwin Stein wrote that he believed 
that the survey had been fundamentally flawed in its approach.200  He stated that German 
children were not accustomed to answering questionnaires like this and that, especially given 
their recent experiences under National Socialism, one would expect that they tailored their 
answers to fit what they thought the questioners wanted to hear.  He also questioned how much 
of what they said reflected their own beliefs and how much of it was just parroting the attitudes 
exhibited by their parents.  However, even the critical Minister Stein noted that the answers were 
in many ways at least suggestive of the influences that the schools, Nazi propaganda, their 
families, and society in general had had upon the children during the Hitler period.  While they 
should not be overly relied upon as firm evidence of the specific breakdown of beliefs among 
school children, they convey the scale of the job faced by post-War educators seeking to instill 
democratic and non-militaristic virtues into a generation that had already been partially raised on 
the opposite.  
 In many ways this was the most shocking discovery made by American and Soviet 
soldiers as they advanced into Germany in 1945.  Based on reports from inside the country, the 
accounts of expatriates living abroad, pre-war observations of Nazi classrooms, and the all-too 
frequent discovery of armed, uniformed children among military units in the apocalyptic final 
days of the conflict, nearly all wartime planners had expected to find a thoroughly indoctrinated, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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militantly National Socialist youth once peace came.  Many writing about the prospects for the 
post-war era had assumed that at least one generation of German children would be completely 
unsalvageable, a generation educated entirely under Nazi auspices.  Some lamented them as 
Hitler’s final victims, while others feared their potential for criminal or even organized military 
mischief.   American officers in charge of the occupation issued non-fraternization orders that 
specifically addressed the threat offered by boys steeped in the traditions of the Hitler Youth and 
radicalized by their schools into a blind devotion to their Führer. 201  Instead they found an age 
cohort that had certainly absorbed some unfortunate views and beliefs, but which showed every 
sign of being open to rehabilitation and continued, normal education. 
 For that to happen, though, education would need to be restarted.  Schools would have to 
be reopened.  Teachers would have to be found, texts would have to be published, and eventually 
some long-term vision for institutional reformation would need to be articulated.  While both the 
American and the Soviet sectors would need to abide by the broad guidelines published by the 
joint Allied Occupation Council, within each sector the specifics of how those guidelines were 
interpreted were entirely up to local authorities.  As pre-war suspicions and ideological 
differences reemerged to sour post-war relations those interpretations became ever more 
divergent, culminating in two radically different visions for German education.  In the Soviet 
sector it became increasingly clear that the occupiers were in favor of radically rebuilding 
education from the ground up, while in the West more sympathy existed for those who would 
attempt to salvage elements of the existing system. 
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 All of that, however, lay in the future.  Before any serious reconstruction could begin a 
political reckoning needed to take place and civil life at least minimally restored on an anti-







CHAPTER 4: ESTABLISHING A FRAMEWORK: DENAZIFICATION AND INITIAL 
POLICIES 
 
Your way [in building a new German society] is not that of the 
restoration or the revolution.  Your way lies in the middle, in the 
joining of the uncorrupted old with the good new. 
   -Erwin Stein, CDU politician and Hessian  
   Minister of Education and Culture, 1948202  
 
The pedagogue  is lucky to not only contend with the “it is” of the 
moral economy (seelischen Haushalt) of humanity, instead the 
main focus of his work lies in the domain of the “it should be.” 
   -Karl Trinks, Professor of Theoretical  
   Pedagogy, 1946203 
 
 The summer and fall of 1945 was a period of extremely rapid change inside Germany.  
The political order established by the Nazi Party collapsed along with its armies, government !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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functions almost completely ceased, and what little remained was usually stopped by Allied 
militaries that were themselves in a transitional phase between being field armies and occupation 
forces.  New civil infrastructures were very quickly put in place on an ad hoc basis.  Politics and 
the demands of wartime had severely limited the planning for a post-war order while the fighting 
was still underway.   Unfortunately, the questions that presented themselves as peace once again 
settled over Europe demanded immediate answers.  In addition to the looming economic, 
humanitarian, judicial, and political crises presented by the need to sort out the chaos bequeathed 
by Hitler’s Reich, every profession in Germany required some way to take stock, pick up the 
pieces, and resume some form of daily civic life.  These were not issues that would stand still 
while a perfect accord was negotiated among the victorious allies.  One way or another they 
would sort themselves out, and inaction could prove to be just as decisive a choice as action.  
 The rapid reorganization of German government, education, and the physical boundaries 
the states themselves that followed set the mold for what was to come in the next four years.  
Many critics of this period in German history have observed the subsequent re-emergence of ex-
Nazis into public life and condemned the post-war reforms as failures. But this viewpoint 
unfairly measures the actions of the occupation forces against the longings of a later generation 
for justice on the behalf of Germany’s victims and a sense of emotional closure with a troubled 
past.  The immediate need of the occupation powers was to remove adherents of political Nazism 
- in the summer of 1945 not as safely discredited and disposed of as it would be even a couple of 
years later - from German government and civic life in order to create the space necessary for a 
coalition of anti-fascists to construct the rudiments of a new state.  Judged by this standard the 
efforts of the occupation forces and German anti-fascists immediately after the war were 
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remarkably effective, and all the more impressive for the improvisation required by the relative 
neglect post-war planning suffered during the war.    
 Following the immediate post-war meetings of the Allied powers at Potsdam, the initial 
priorities heavily emphasized denazification, with the specific shape of what was to follow left to 
be defined in the future.  In the case of education what transpired was a rapid initial 
denazification process, first of the administrative layers and later of the rank-and-file teachers, 
followed by an equally fast filling of the vacated positions as best as possible.  In the specific 
case of the administrators, this process was fairly successful.  The number of people involved 
was relatively low compared to other professional groups and the positions deemed important 
enough to prioritize the remaining politically reliable Germans for them.  By the end of the initial 
post-war purges the ranks of the administrators could be said to be largely free of ex-Nazis.  For 
working teachers the story proved to be somewhat different, with denazification and the hiring of 
replacements both stretching out into the early years of the two Cold War German states. In both 
systems the conclusions were much more ambivalent because their numbers were vastly greater 
and there was a pressing need to fill classrooms at any cost, if only to keep children off the 
streets and re-accustom them to the habit of regular school attendance.   
 The initial policies of the occupying allied powers themselves proved a further obstacle.  
Wartime pressures might excuse the lack of priority and planning given to developing a single, 
coherent plan for the future of German education, but they did nothing to mitigate the immediate 
need for some form of policy.  The cooling ardor of wartime bonds and rapidly developing Cold 
War tensions made the development of a unified policy for all of Germany increasingly unlikely, 
devolving the issue onto the level of the individual occupation zones and, frequently, states.   
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 This was problematic as the Nazis had highly centralized what was once a federal 
administrative system, and significantly confused the issue of local authority through their 
introduction of a new internal framework for organizing German territories.  Before 
administrative tasks could be handed over to more flexible and responsive local governments the 
physical boundaries of the territories that they oversaw needed to be established.  The decision to 
revive German federalism as a barrier to dictatorship required the restoration of the Länder, 
albeit in significantly altered form to take into account the effects of the defeat and political 
collapse.   
          
Federalizing educational policy 
 
 Before any significant movement could be made on the issue of how to restructure 
German government and civil society - including the educational system - a number of far more 
elementary tasks had to be addressed.  Among these was the issue of how to draw the internal 
territorial boundaries within Germany.  This reorganization was important to the educational 
landscape that eventually emerged because it ultimately determined the geographical reach of 
numerous measures taken by the occupation authorities.  The requirement that all four of the 
occupying powers agree to reforms affecting the entirety of Germany left many of the nation-
wide measures vague, watered down, and frequently affirming a status quo years after they had 
been established at the level of the occupation zones or individual states.  It was far easier for the 
occupying powers to make unilateral decisions that affected only the territories under their 
jurisdiction, or to affirm measures originating from state-level occupational authorities or the 
incipient state governments.  The reach of these governments was determined by this very early 
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restructuring of the German interior.  There were similar implications for the uneven topography 
of denazification once it was turned over to the nascent state governments in the years preceding 
the establishment of the two Cold War era German states.204  
 The regional governance of Germany in the immediate post-war era was complicated by 
the incomplete and partial Nazi-era suppression of the German states (Länder) and Prussian 
provinces as the regional basis for administrative organization.  The provinces and Länder were 
organizational relics of Imperial Germany’s fragmented legacy and torturous route to statehood.  
Their boundaries were a tapestry of old provincial and territorial borders that were shifted, 
consolidated, and renegotiated nearly every generation between the Napoleonic wars and 
German unification.  After World War I and the abdication of the Hohenzollern monarchy they 
were once again reorganized and consolidated and formed the basis for regional governance 
during the Weimar Republic.   
 The situation at the end of the Second World War was complicated by the introduction of 
yet another set of regional sub-divisions during the Nazi years.  Beginning in the 1920s, as the 
Nazi Party began to spread from a local to a national phenomenon it formed regional party 
districts, or Gaue, to streamline local political organization.  After the NSDAP assumed political 
control of Germany these unofficial party boundaries increasingly became incorporated into the 
day-to-day administrative life of the German state.  Beginning with The Enabling Act in 1933 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
204 For in-depth examinations of the structure of American and Russian occupation see Tent, 
James F. Mission on the Rhine: Reeducation and denazification in American-occupied Germany, 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1982) and Jan Foitzik, Sowjetische 
Militäradministration in Deutschland (SMAD) 1945-1949: Struktur und Funktion. (Berlin: 




the regional governmental administration shifted ever more power and authority from provincial- 
or Land-based institutions to Party authorities that were organized within the Gau framework.  
The provinces and Länder continued to exist, but were sidelined to a large degree.   After the war 
the Gau, with its Nazi origins and political connections, was abandoned almost immediately as 
an administrative sub-division and the organization of the German interior devolved again upon 
Länder and provinces, sometimes after the consolidation and rationalization of local territorial 
borders.  In many cases this had the happy side effect of functioning as a first step in institutional 
denazification.  Many political and party offices established by the NSDAP ceased to be as the 
Gaue that they were attached to were administratively dissolved.    
 In the Soviet Zone these internal territories were established on July 9, 1945 by Order 
Number 5 of the Supreme Headquarters of the Soviet Military Administration in Germany 
(SMAD).205  The local military commander determined the specific details of each state’s 
government.  In Thuringia this job fell to General Vasily Chuikov, who issued Order Number of 
16. July 1945 under his authority as chief of Soviet Military Administration in Thuringia (SMA-
T).   Ultimate authority in the Soviet Zone lay with SMAD, which liaised closely with zonal-
level central authorities responsible for various aspects of governance and public life.  These 
offices were roughly analogous to national-level ministerial offices.  The German Central 
Administration for Education, dominated by the SED, was intended to be the central national 
authority on all educational policy.  In practice this central administration was relatively weak, 
especially in matters of civil administration. Many of the major policy directives came from the 
military government, both at the zonal and regional level, and the bulk of the day to day 
administration and implementation of these directives was carried out at the level of the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
205 Foitzik, Sowjetische Militäradministration in Deutschland (SMAD) 1945-1949: 149  
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Länder.206 This was a relatively unique administrative structure for this region of Germany, as 
both the National Socialist organization that preceded it and the structures that developed under 
the DDR in the 50s were much more centralized.     
 The relationship between the Länder and Zonal administrative organs is well illustrated 
by the way in which the Law for the Democratization of the German School was promulgated in 
May and June of 1946.  This was the key document of early educational reform in the SBZ and 
firmly established by SMAD-backed fiat the polytechnic Einheitsschule as the basic model for 
education.  All subsequent measures would be taken with this as an assumed reality and steps 
towards transitioning from the older organizational scheme began immediately.  Rather than 
issuing it as a single directive via the authority of the Central Administration for Education, 
however, it was mandated in the form of five different provincial- or Land based laws with 
nearly identical texts.  In Thuringia this was the Law of the State of Thuringia of 2 June, 1946 for 
the Democratization of the German School.207  The ultimate legal responsibility for the sweeping 
changes being made lay therefore with state governments, and it is largely there that any 
concerns or issues arising from the reforms would be addressed. 
 A similar pattern of local administration existed in the American Zone, although with 
different causes. Military Government Proclamation Number 2 issued by OMGUS on 19 
September, 1945 defined the borders of the new “administrative territories” 
(Verwaltungsgebiete) that would eventually become the Länder of Hessen, Baden-Württemberg, 
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and Bavaria.208  The city of Bremen was still under British administration at this time. It would 
be organized under similar principles as a state of its own in 1947 when it became an enclave of 
the American Zone of Occupation within the British Zone.  A very short, basic constitution was 
provided for Hessen on the 22nd of November, 1945 that served to establish a provisional civilian 
government, one that was staffed with carefully selected and politically vetted local citizens.209  
This government was established to organize elections for representatives who in turn debated 
and wrote a much more comprehensive constitution.  This constitution came into power on the 
1st of December, 1946 and served as the ongoing basis for the first freely elected German 
government since 1933.210   
 This push to rapidly establish local democratic governments had two major effects inside 
the American zones.  It provided a German face for subsequent measures and reforms and aided 
in generating a local level of acceptance for them.  At the same time it gave Hessian citizens and 
politicians much more room to push back against American demands, as they could legitimately 
claim to be enacting the democratically voiced will of the population.  Furthermore, once the 
second constitution was enacted, Hessian citizens were once again living under a government 
that had a German, rather than foreign, origin.   This difference in governmental organization 
was partially responsible for the moderate success enjoyed by Hessian educational administrators 
who sought to maintain some aspects of traditional German education.  The space that this 
structure provided for resisting Allied demands ultimately lead to a Hessian educational system !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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that, while still very significantly reformed, never underwent the profound and rapid transition to 
an entirely new system experienced within the Soviet Zone.   
 As the first state to establish itself after the war Hesse also served as an example for 
German politicians and administrators in other areas under Western occupation.  While West 
Germany would eventually emerge as a federal government with federalized education based on 
relatively autonomous but coordinated state systems, its rapid emergence meant that Hesse 
provided a working model with which all others had to contend and a concrete example of what 
was and wasn’t possible in a post-war, democratizing German political landscape.  
  
Initial educational policies: joint measures 
 
 As with many other aspects of the post-war occupation, the specific details of a joint 
educational policy were neither adequately prepared before the war ended nor definitively agreed 
upon in its immediate aftermath.  The earliest policies were determined independently by each 
occupying power and implemented on the local level.  As with many other occupation 
regulations, they were focused mainly on eliminating obvious sources of Nazi influence and 
shutting down the most egregiously National Socialistic bodies and agencies.  As an example, 
the War Department published a guide in 1945 that listed the Nazi public agencies that would be 
immediately shut down once occupation began.  Among the bodies targeted for “complete 
abolition” were the various organizations associated with promoting sports among the German 
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youth, the office of the Reich Youth Leader, agencies associated with the mandatory year of 
post-secondary manual farm labor, and the German College for Politics.211   
 The first, and for a significant amount of time only, joint statement on the matter can be 
found in the Potsdam Agreement, which simply noted that “German education shall be so 
controlled as to completely eliminate Nazi and militarist doctrines and to make possible the 
successful development of democratic ideas.212”  There were additional ordinances that touched 
on education tangentially due to their subject matter.  For example, proclamations were made 
regarding the removal of inflammatory, nationalist, or militaristic literature from public and 
school libraries.  With that caveat, however, the full Allied Control Council did not directly 
address the fundamental question of how German education should be reformed until the middle 
of 1947.  In the early summer of that year Control Council Directive No. 54, “Basic Principles 
for Democratization of Education in Germany,” was issued.  
 Many of the immediate postwar problems had to be addressed on the state level before 
this policy was decided upon.  Pressing issues that required immediate action ranged from what 
the continuing status of religious education would be to the particulars of how institutions and 
curricula would be restructured.  If national policy was not to be dictated, or at least significantly 
constrained, by the earlier adaptation of a patchwork of local policies a strong, mutually agreed 
upon framework was required.  What emerged was a relatively weak statement that plotted safe 
middle courses between existing practices and did far more to signal a modern variation of cuius !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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regio eius religio for the occupation zones than establish the framework for a unified German 
school system in the future.   
 The principles laid out in Directive No. 54 were fairly straight forward.  The most 
groundbreaking, and the single major reform that would take place in both Soviet and American 
zones, was the strong emphasis on equal educational opportunity for all students in Germany.  
The first principle of the directive stated simply “There should be equal educational opportunity 
for all.”  While this left a large degree of room for interpretation, later principles narrowed the 
understanding of this somewhat. In addition other points addressed the issue indirectly.  It was, 
for example, explicitly stated that terms like “elementary education” and “secondary education” 
must refer to consecutive levels of instruction rather than separate, overlapping forms or qualities 
of instruction.213  This specific point was made even clearer in the official German translation of 
the order, which used the terms Volksschule and Gymnasium in place of ‘elementary’ or 
‘secondary’ education.214  This was a direct move against the tiered nature of German education, 
something that had come under attack from all quarters following the war as a major means 
through which a militaristic, Prussian elite had maintained political control over the nation since 
its initial unification.  Other measures aimed at making education as inclusive as possible.  These 
included free tuition and textbooks for school aged children, compulsory education for school 
aged children, and the provision of free educational and vocational guidance.   !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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 The rest of the document avoided such strong assaults on traditional structures and 
methods without asserting their immutability and guaranteeing their future well being.  
Education was made compulsory for all children between six and fifteen and part-time 
compulsory up to eighteen years.  The supervision of students’ health and universal instruction in 
basic hygiene were also mandated. These requirements, however, largely reproduced measures 
that had been taken by most German states decades earlier.  Directive 54 also demanded that ‘all 
schools . . . lay emphasis upon education for civic responsibility and a democratic way of life,’ 
and that the curricula ‘promote understanding of and respect for other nations and . . . the study 
of modern languages without prejudice to any,” while leaving the critical terms undefined.  For 
example, the clause demanding that all teacher education ‘take place in a university or in a 
pedagogical institution of university rank’ had the potential to end a centuries-old divide within 
the German teaching profession and significantly open up administrative positions to people with 
a background in elementary school teaching. But the lack of any clear definition of what 
constituted ‘university rank’ opened up significant space for interpretation.215 
 Finally, it is worth noting what was not included.  No mention was made of religious 
education.  The relationship between church and state in the upbringing of Germany’s children 
was a highly contentious issue that had been fought over in one form or another since before 
unification.  The resulting history of settlements and compromises created an atmosphere where 
citizens were wary of any change as an attack not only on the educational status quo but on their 
spiritual lives and cultural identities as well.  It also so entwined school and religion that they 
were impossible to address in isolation.  By not mentioning religious education at all, Control !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
215 “Basic principles for reorganization of education in Germany.  Control Council Directive No. 
54,” in Enactments and Approved Papers of the Control Council and Coordinating Committee 
Vol VII: 153 
! 148!
Council Directive 54 essentially let the issue of religious education devolve to local authorities, 
and with that the initiative on other key educational issues.   
 
Initial educational policies: Soviet measures 
 
 In the Soviet Zone many of these issues had already been approached directly and 
authoritatively from the outset.  SMAD Order Number 40, which mandated the reopening of the 
schools in the fall of 1945, simultaneously forbade private instruction of any kind, including 
religious schools.  While mostly done to combat the perceived elitist nature of private education, 
it had the additional effect of cutting parochial education off at the knees.216 Early measures like 
this were noted and enforced by the local administrators.  Similar to the pattern seen in areas 
under American occupation they were recently selected by the Soviet authorities largely on the 
basis of their political reliability and immediate availability.  This combination of relatively 
robust early directives and quick establishment of local, loyal German authority meant that even 
controversial reforms were implemented.  In late November of 1945, for example, the 
Thuringian Ministry of Education received notice that a parochial kindergarten in Eisenach was 
continuing to provide both regular classes as well as religious instruction.  They quickly moved 
to shut it down, ruling that any education conducted outside of the framework of the state school 
system constituted private education and was therefore illegal.217   !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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 Initial measures such as these were soon consolidated and superseded by the Law for the 
Democratization of the German Schools, a package of state- and provincial-level decrees with 
nearly identical texts that were promulgated within two weeks at the end of May and beginning 
of June, 1946.  Unlike earlier SMAD proclamations that forbade certain practices and ordered 
the short term resumption of education within some bounds without commenting on the nature of 
the system itself, the new law clearly and concisely dismissed earlier practices as inherently 
flawed, and presented the case for an entirely new school system.  It began with a brief historical 
analysis of German education, clearly stating that it, “was - despite its respectable quality before 
1933 - never a place for the truly democratic education of children into responsible and self-
consciously free citizens.  It was a social class-based school [Standesschule] . . . [wherein] not 
the competency of the children, but the financial status of the parents determined admittance.218” 
This structural deficiency, alleged to have been abused by everyone from petty lords to Prussian 
emperors to the most recent Nazi dictatorship, was cited as driving logic for the establishment of 
an entirely new, democratic school. 
 This new school would be a radical departure from what had come before.  It would be 
purely the domain of the state, freed from any influence by religious organizations.  In turn, 
religious education was remanded to religious orders to conduct as they saw fit for their own 
needs,.  It would be a single, unified system (Einheitsschule) from Kindergarten through 
secondary education.  While it did eventually differentiate into three separate tracks consisting of 
practical, technical, and higher education it provided much more room for transitioning between 
the tracks, split students off later, and differentiated based on academic performance rather than 
social position.  Furthermore, both the technical and higher tracks had provisions for students to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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continue on to a university if they so wished.  Attendance at primary and technical schools was 
guaranteed free of cost to all and the law contained provisions for providing the children of 
economically disadvantaged parents with various forms of financial aid should they wish to 
attend the Oberschule or continue on to a university.219   
 American observers paid close attention to these early Soviet educational measures.  In 
September 1946 the weekly OMGUS Information Control Intelligence Summary (ICIS) noted 
both the ambitious scope of the laws and the pattern of local implementation of common 
measures. 220 Of particular interest for the Americans was the way that these Soviet decrees 
quickly “decide[d] three interdependent, controversial political issues which have often occurred 
as the result of liberal and socialist reform demands in the German political scene.221”  These 
three issues were: the core clauses reserving general education as the responsibility of the state, 
the delegation of religious instruction purely to religious groups, and restructuring public 
education as a unified system open to all.  
 The Americans saw this as a profoundly political move.  Writing about the Einheitsschule 
in particular they noted that “the political significance of this decision can hardly be 
overestimated, since the educational program of the Einheitsschule, if carried out over a number 
of years, would operate so as to change the whole structure of German society.222” The report 
specifically claimed that the school system as now arranged would destroy the uneven social 
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structures that had previously dominated in Germany, radically changing the social and cultural 
landscape of the country.  The notion of a single, universal educational system struck at the heart 
of both the notion of Bildung as a measure of social distinction and the privileged Gymnasium as 
its means of reproduction.   The ICIS report broadly lauded this goal, while developing a more 
concerned tone about what the exact nature of the newly homogenized education would be. 
 
In all, it may be said that the machinery set up under the new school law is 
technically suited to the democratization of education and the selection of 
students and of educational material is so designed as to bring wider knowledge to 
a greater number of German youth than ever before.  But the nature of this 
knowledge, particularly its political slant, depends on the degree of political 
control which the SMA will be able to exert through the SED on schools and 
teachers.  While the elections have shown that the SED will not be able to impose 
its will without a continuing fight and inevitable compromises, the character of 
the SED school leadership will serve to keep these compromises to a minimum.223  
 
 The reforms being pushed by the Soviets did not necessarily represent the state of the art 
in contemporary teaching within the USSR.  Beginning with Stalin’s consolidation of power in 
the mid 30s Soviet education had steadily moved away from many of the more experimental 
methods it had embraced in the 1920s, concentrating instead on polytechnical education to meet 
specific economic goals.  It also rapidly politicized as increasing emphasis was placed on 
indoctrination at all levels of society.  Following the shocks and privations of wartime, in 1945 it !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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was in the midst of rapid and substantial change, including a relatively short-lived flirtation with 
gender-segregated education.  Soviet occupation authorities never attempted to pursue similar 
measures in Germany, and most of the administrators with whom they worked based their 
knowledge of Soviet education on what they had observed in the 30s and, in some cases, during 
the war.224  It was this inter-war educational model that was most influential to educational 
planners in the Soviet Zone, and these pedagogical models continued to have major influence in 
the years to come.  As late as the 1960s translations of the major works of influential interwar 
Soviet pedagogues were published under state auspices as a means of exploring the intellectual 
roots of the Einheitsschule.225  
 The Soviets faced a secondary problem in their attempts to reestablish education in their 
occupation sector, namely widespread anti-Russian prejudices present within the German 
population.  Partially a result of Nazi wartime propaganda and partially a result of the near 
legendary status of the backwardness and general lack of development in the Imperial Russian 
countryside, many Germans had grave reservations about both the effectiveness and political 
grounding of Soviet education.  Many assumed that at best it was sub-standard compared to the 
educational techniques employed in German schools and at worst a tool for propagandizing to 
children that rivaled anything the Nazis had ever developed.  Those Germans who had some pre-
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war connection to Soviet education as it stood in the 20s and 30s faced the additional hurdle of 
convincing their fellow countrymen that Soviet reformers had ideas worth paying attention to.   
 Dr. Marie Torhorst, a Weimar-era campaigner for educational reform who traveled to the 
USSR in 1932 to study Soviet education, is an example of this.  After the war she initially taught 
in Berlin but by 1947 was the Minister of Education in Thuringia, replacing Walter Wolf.  
Writing retrospectively in the late 40s about the trials of the immediate post-war period, she 
noted how much initial professional resistance there was to adopting Soviet techniques.  
“German pedagogues,” she wrote, “and especially the ‘School Reformers,’ were skeptical of 
Soviet educational developments.”  In particular she criticized a view of Soviet education that 
equated it to the earliest forms of public schooling under the Prussian kings; a primitive program 
designed to teach peasants the most basic rudiments of literacy required for military service.    
She held that the Soviets had in many ways already advanced beyond the simple reforms that she 
and her compatriots had advocated in the 1930s and insisted that it was necessary to rebuild 
German education along the lines of the Einheitsschule.  Even as late as 1948 this was a message 
that had to be strongly articulated.  Part of the purpose behind her efforts to trace the pedagogical 
lineage of the Soviet reforms was to defuse those prejudices and reassure the reluctant that rather 
than aping a system designed for teaching farmers to read and write that was far behind pre-war 
German standards they were adopting a revolutionary new type of education that was 
pedagogically superior to what had been done previously.226  
 This tension can be seen in the introduction of a volume published for attendees of a 
pedagogical conference held in Leipzig in 1947 titled One Year of Democratic Einheitsschule: 
review and forecast.  Its purpose was to describe both the progress that had been made in !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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rebuilding German education, as well as outline the measures that still needed to be taken.  While 
the specific authorship of the introduction was unclaimed, the report as a whole was attributed to 
the Berlin-based German Office of People’s Education in the Soviet Zone and can be safely 
taken to represent the views of the Soviet occupation forces and those Germans working most 
closely with them.  The language within the document itself already has a vocabulary and tone 
that reads very similarly to documents and publications published by the SED in coming 
decades, after they took over leadership of an independent East German state.  In the 
introduction they speak of the necessity to not only avoid the pitfalls of recent German history, 
but also to avoid the earlier failures of the Weimar and Imperial periods.  “The realization of this 
educational ideal forbade both the continuation of the educational ideals and methods based on 
the “leadership principle” of the schools of the Hitler years as well as the resumption of the 
exaggeratedly individualistic methods of school reform of the Weimar Republic or even the 
methods of the even older “Learning Schools.””227  From the point of views of those attempting 
to reshape education in the east, the proclivity of educators who had been active in reforming 
German education before Hitler to want to fall back on the methods they advocated in the 20s 
was just as problematic as the specific fascist ideologies that needed immediate quashing.  The 
new wave of reformers did not want to revive the compromise half-measures that had been 
attempted before but to use the opportunities provided by Soviet occupation to establish an 
entirely new way of structuring and conceptualizing German education.       
 The Soviets and their German supporters also operated under a very different definition 
of ‘democratic’ reform from that envisioned by most of the Western Allies.  “It [education] !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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should,” in the words of the prominent pre-war pedagogue and notable Social Democrat Karl 
Trinks, “be democratic, in the original sense of democracy as our great fathers Marx and Engels 
gave us: leadership of the people, the working, the active components of the population.”228  In 
this socialist interpretation of democracy the fact that society is led by representatives of and for 
the benefit of the working class majority of the population is more important than the specific 
means by which that leadership is selected.  Definitions and interpretations such as this left those 
in political and institutional power in the east free to follow a more Leninist approach to 
leadership and act in a far more authoritarian and decisive manner in implementing the various 
structural reforms that they felt were necessary.  Much as Lenin saw no inherent contradiction in 
promoting a small leadership cadre to work on behalf of the workers and peasants and hold the 
nation in trust until control could be passed onto them as a group, so too “democratic reform” 
could remain “democratic” while being unilaterally carried through by a narrow band of elites so 
long as they worked on behalf of the people as a whole and for the benefit of all.   They were far 
from bashful when it came to promoting the interests of political groups that were sympathetic to 
them and enlisted their aid to ensure the relatively smooth transition to some radically different 
systems.  In the specific case of education they simply solved via decree long-standing issues 
that would continue to be highly fraught points of contention within the Western zones for 
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Initial educational policies: American measures 
 
 American efforts to reform German education began in the final stages of the war with 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff Directive 1067.  This was a wartime document aimed specifically at 
outlining how the US Army would administer captured German territory as it was overrun.  
Among other topics it ordered the immediate closure of German schools in any occupied 
territory.  Crucially, it also permitted first the Supreme Headquarters of the Allied Expeditionary 
Force (SHAEF) under Eisenhower and later OMGUS to reestablish educational institutions on a 
piecemeal basis once Nazi educators and teaching materials had been eliminated.  The directive 
was relatively open ended and left much to the discretion of the senior officer on the scene.229  
 The first steps towards reopening German schools in areas under American occupation 
took place before the war finished.  The fall campaigns of 1944 brought a strip of German 
territory west of the Rhine into American hands, including the city of Aachen.  Despite the 
relatively low population - most residents had obeyed evacuation orders ahead of the fighting - 
local civilian government was reestablished as quickly as possible and provisions made to begin 
purging and reopening schools along provisional lines.  Although shortages of qualified, non-
Nazi teachers and an almost complete lack of suitable textbooks delayed the onset of instruction 
until shortly after the general surrender, this relatively rapid and localized approach signaled the 
general way in which the Educational and Religious Authority (E&RA) Division of the 
American Occupation Government would handle similar matters in other parts of the country.  
 In August of 1946 the State Department sent an educational mission to Germany in order 
to evaluate the progress that had been made on reform and to issue specific suggestions.  Due !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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largely to internal conflicts between the Department of State and the Department of War the 
military, which at that point had complete control over the civil administration of the occupation, 
was reluctant to permit any civilian oversight of their efforts.  As a result of the success of a 
similar educational mission to Japan and the warm reception that it received from General 
Douglas MacArthur, General Lucius Clay was eventually persuaded to allow a delegation to 
observe, evaluate, and recommend improvements to American efforts to rehabilitate German 
education.230    
 The mission was comprised of 9 men and women, all of who were accomplished 
educators, administrators, and educational theorists:  George F. Zook, President of the American 
Council on Education; Bess Goodykoontz, Director of the Division of Elementary Education 
within the US Office of Education; Henry H. Hill, President of Peabody College; Paul Limbert, 
President of Springfield College; Earl J McGrath, Dean of the University of Iowa; Reinhold 
Niebuhr, Professor at Union Theological Seminary; Reverand Felix Newton Pitt, Secretary of the 
Catholic School Board of Louisville, Kentucky; Lawrence Rogin, Director of Education for the 
Textile Workers Union of America; T.V. Smith, Professor from the University of Chicago; and 
Helen C. White, Professor from the University of Wisconsin.  They all shared common 
assumptions about the capabilities of education to uplift both individuals and societies through 
personal growth and curricula oriented on civic improvement that grew out of the Progressive 
movement of the late 19th and early 20th centuries.  Their views on pre-Nazi German education, 
as revealed in the background section of the final report, were almost as negative as those 
expressed by the Soviets.  The report was highly critical of the harsh nature of early 
denazification proceedings, arguing that such high attrition rates made the reestablishment of any !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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kind of meaningful education impossible from the outset.  Based largely on their extremely 
critical evaluation of pre-war German education and the ways in which it fostered inequality 
between students they advocated an almost complete rebuilding of German education into a 
single, comprehensive system modeled on that in the United States.231 
 The report was particularly harsh in its evaluation of the administrative structure present 
in the educational systems that they inspected, calling the allocation of administrative duties 
“traditional and haphazard.”  It recommended extending cooperation and coordination between 
the three Länder in the American zone of occupation, while maintaining the federal structure and 
avoiding any single, central authority that would dictate policy.  The report also emphasized the 
need to simplify the existing patchwork of locally responsible offices, officials, and inspectors 
into a more consistent and universal pattern based around the office of the district 
superintendent.  Finally, it recommended a considerable expansion of the number of personnel 
employed in administrative capacities, noting that the current administrators “both in the larger 
cities and in the country districts, have at present almost no assistance to enable them to provide 
the professional leadership now so much needed.232”  Along with this expansion of the ranks of 
German administrators it recommended a broad increase in the number of Americans assigned to 
the E&RA, both in terms of military personnel and American civilians employed on a contract 
basis by it.             
  A comparison of the recommendations of the State Department educational 
mission and the policies that were already being implemented within the Soviet Occupation Zone 
gives some indication of the attitudes and assumptions about the future of German education that !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
231 Report of the United States Education Mission to Germany, (Washington DC: Department of 
State, 1946) 
232 Ibid.: 40-42 
! 159!
culminated in Control Council Directive No. 54. There was a fair degree of agreement about the 
fundamental inequality of German education extending far back before the Nazis.  There was an 
equally strong assumption that education was a powerful and effective tool for social engineering 
that would be vital to building a future German state that could avoid the militaristic excesses of 
the early twentieth century.  Finally, there was a general agreement that it was desirable to 
restructure German education along much more equitable lines in order to maximize its potential 




 One of the earliest effects of the Allied occupation on German education was the 
sweeping initial wave of denazification that took place throughout the summer of 1945.  This 
was initially experienced at all levels as a massive purge as people were dismissed based on any 
tangible connection to the Nazi Party.  Paragraphs 6 and 7 of Section 2 of the Potsdam Accords 
both directly affected German education, as they demanded that it “be so controlled as to 
completely eliminate Nazi and militarist doctrines and to make possible the successful 
development of democratic ideas,” and that “all members of the Nazi Party who have been more 
than nominal participants in its activities and all other persons hostile to Allied purposes . . . 
[should] be removed from public and semi-public office. . .”233  One of the reasons for the 
teacher purge in particular was the wide-spread belief that party organizations such as the Hitler 
Youth had contaminated German schoolchildren ideologically and that the schools had been !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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deeply complicit in it.  This was particularly problematic, as the Accords never defined what 
“nominal” meant, leading to standards for dismissal and hiring that changed both across time as 
general policies shifted and regionally depending on local courts and officers.  This was 
exacerbated by the lack of initial guidance as to how various levels of culpability were to be 
defined or measured.   
 Within the administrative layers of the educational system denazification proceeded 
relatively quickly and thoroughly.  While the specific numbers of administrators, ranging from 
local school principals on up through the highest ranks of the educational ministry, who were 
removed in 1945 remains to be determined, a detailed examination of the personnel files from 
both Thuringia and Hesse indicates that nobody appears have successfully negotiated some form 
of continued employment from 1945 through 1946.  While far from a comprehensive study, an 
examination of the files of 40 mid-level administrators in Thuringia and 63 in Hesse shows only 
one case that was employed in an administrative capacity during the war years.   That single 
individual was at the age of retirement in 1945 and took his pension before the beginning of the 
new year.  Of those who were employed in an educational capacity under the Third Reich most 
were classroom instructors with a few school rectors represented as well.  Of those with a Nazi 
past, none had risen to an administrative rank higher than local school inspector through 1950; 
even a more limited National Socialist taint affected an individual’s ability to secure subsequent 
promotion and increased authority.   All instances of more senior inspectors and ministerial staff 
had exceptionally clean wartime records, frequently including exile, imprisonment, or some 
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other form of obvious antipathy for National Socialism.  Denazification, both in the East and in 
the West, was thorough, quick and effective within the ranks of the administrative corps.234 
 The case of Dr. Bernhard Krumm illustrates the immediate needs of the occupation 
authorities regarding whom they chose as administrators, the grounds that someone could be 
immediately dismissed upon once hired, and the brusqueness with which early denazification 
was carried out.  Immediately following the surrender of Germany in 1945, Dr. Krumm was 
elevated to a position as Schulrat in Wiesbaden.  Although he had just turned 65, the age at 
which teachers and regional administrators were normally pensioned off, he was considered an 
exceptional candidate for the position.  This was due to his previous experience teaching in 
schools throughout the area and a political pedigree that initially allowed him to be categorized 
as un-implicated in any Nazi activities or organizations.  Alongside his professional credentials 
and long-time familiarity with the region, his mastery of English was considered a significant 
advantage in his installation, due to the necessity of working closely with American forces.  
Shortly after being hired, however, it came out that he had a wartime affiliation with the Orient-
Institut in Frankfurt, a division of Frankfurt’s Goethe University devoted to Islamic and middle 
eastern studies.  Somehow the occupation authorities had mistakenly listed it among Nazi Party-
affiliated academies. While he eventually succeeded in legally clearing his professional name 
and obtaining a pension befitting a Schulrat, this did not happen until 1949.  In the meantime he 
was completely unemployable within the Hessian educational system. 235        
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 Despite pressure to remove administrators with troubled histories or insufficient 
professional credentials, it was not always feasible to do so and in some individual cases men 
remained on the books who probably should have been replaced.  As late as 1948 a report on the 
Schulräte in Hessen, for example, noted that provisional Schulrat Georg Volkenand was 
recommended for replacement.  In addition to being politically unsuitable due to a history of 
writing poetry praising Hitler, he was professionally unsuited to an administrative post as he had 
never taken his second teaching exam, despite numerous opportunities to do so.   On the whole 
he was noted as having “extremely modest” qualifications.  The local government recommended 
his immediate dismissal and requested his replacement with an elderly Schulrat who had been 
pensioned off due to his age fifteen years earlier.236  Despite this active attempt to unseat him he 
reappears in a summary report of Schulräte a year later.  Not only was he still in his position, his 
status was no longer provisional but had been confirmed as permanent.237  Not even physical 
infirmities that impeded day-to-day administrative duties guaranteed replacement.  The same two 
reports list a Schulrat Philipp Müller who was recommended for replacement in 1948 due to 
extreme hearing deficiencies that presented daily professional difficulties.  Mr. Müller, however, 
remained in his position a year later with no indication of impending retirement or transfer.  
Cases such as these, however, remained the exceptions rather than the norm.  On the whole the 
period between 1945 and 1949 is notable because of the amount and speed of change in the ranks 
of local administrators, positions that under less extraordinary circumstances were normally quite 
stable.  
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 The reason for these successes, especially in the light of the more ambivalent 
denazification of the teaching corps that they oversaw, was a simple matter of numbers and 
scale.  While it was impossible to replace every trained teacher in Germany over night due to the 
large number of people involved and the vital necessity of having some kind of trained adult in 
the classrooms, there were few enough administrators which meant they could be fired and 
replaced en masse without undue hardship.  Furthermore, it was easier to over-burden the 
administrative layer of an organization without seeing a catastrophic decline in its effectiveness 
than it was the productive layer.  Between 1946 and 1948 the numbers of administrators 
overseeing both Hessian and Thuringian education multiplied, with some cities having three or 
four instructors by 1949 where one had to make do immediately after the war.  
 In the short term the first order of business for this rapidly denazified administrative 
corps was to oversee the general denazification of the educational system.  The results of these 
initial efforts were generally uneven due to shifting interpretations of “nominal” Party 
membership, both locally and nationally, and local pressures.  On the national level this was the 
result of differing understandings of German fascism and its root causes among the Allies, while 
on the local level the varying zeal of individual officers and tribunals responding to unique 
conditions complicated the issue.238   
 In the longer term it was unclear whether the end goal was a complete and permanent 
purge of Nazi Party members and influences from public life, or if rehabilitation and 
reintegration of these men and women into German society was a component as well.  The most 
extreme possible reading of the Potsdam Agreement would render it difficult for Germans to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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provide themselves with even the most basic public services through the exclusion of individuals 
with necessary professional and technical expertise.  There was also the danger of alienating 
even those Germans who were not politically compromised by destroying what civic life and 
structures that remained following the war, an issue that endangered a peaceful reconstruction.  
At the other extreme, an overly generous understanding of how extensive “nominal” 
participation would contain danger of leaving many with truly criminal pasts in positions of 
respect and authority.  Many within the occupation feared that this approach would challenge not 
only any notion of justice or retribution, but also sow the seeds of a future political revival of 
German fascism or expansionist militarism. 
 Initial instructions were clear that denazification was to be a high priority, but far less 
clear on how it was to happen or what the specific criteria were to be.  In Hesse, for example, the 
cabinet of the fledgling state government complained in the fall of 1945 of an almost complete 
lack of instruction from OMG-H on how they should proceed.  They expressed concern over the 
lack of clarity on issues as basic as who, specifically, was responsible for distributing and 
collecting denazification questionnaires and what was to be done with them once they were 
gathered.  Some ministers believed that administering them was the direct responsibility of the 
military authorities themselves, others that local civilian authorities were responsible, while 
others opined that it should probably be left up to the immediate supervisors of the affected 
individuals.239  Despite this confusion the military made starting the process a priority, even if 
only on an ad hoc basis using the best judgment of local authorities. By the spring of the 
following year they expressed concern that denazification was being hampered by a lack of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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previously vetted German personnel to aid in the tribunals.240  These initial tribunals were quick 
to judgment and preferred to err on the side of making a clean break with the Nazi past rather 
than retaining skilled workers.  As a result many of those fired in this period would later sit 
before additional denazification boards that would reverse the earlier findings and re-categorize 
them as fit for employment by the state.  In the first year following the surrender, however, the 
effects were keenly felt.  
 The Nazi Party had proven very skillful over the preceding decade at penetrating the 
associational lives of various professions and usurping this framework for its own goals.  By the 
later years of the Third Reich membership in Party-affiliated professional organizations such as 
the NSLB was mandatory for employment, and active party membership was highly encouraged 
for anyone who hoped to advance his career in a meaningful fashion.   Consequentially, the first 
denazification tribunals did not lack targets. The resulting reduction in the numbers of available 
staff was quick and devastating.  By the beginning of 1946 50-55% of all German teachers had 
been removed from classrooms in the American Occupation Zone.241 Similar percentages were 
removed from schools in Soviet territory, with estimates for first-wave firings ranging from 50% 
to 75%.242  In some instances the dismissals were done without even the courtesy of a review 
board, much less a serious trial or inquiry.  In the American Zone one of the first published 
policies demanded that all previous members of the NSDAP or affiliated organizations be 
summarily dismissed and re-hired only pending the completion of denazification proceedings, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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rather than waiting for a court decision before terminating them.243  This essentially placed 
denazification in the position of considering all accused guilty and demanding that they prove 
their innocence before a court, reversing normal legal procedure.    
 In the months that followed more comprehensive investigations were undertaken by local 
military authorities, and more dismissals handed out.  Both the military authorities who 
demanded these professional purges and the administrators who over saw them understood this 
to be a process that would require radical restructuring of the teaching corps, regardless of any 
discomfort that might arise or the short term chaos that the changes would create.  Writing in 
retrospectively in 1948 Max Kreuziger stated that after the earliest tasks of resuming regularly 
scheduled classes had been achieved there remained a second phase that he described as the 
“restructuring” (Umbau) of the pre-existing system, both ideologically and from a staffing 
standpoint.  He emphasized that it would not have been possible without a solid administrative 
corps that had been ideologically dedicated to seeing the task through to completion.244 The men 
and women who oversaw the process understood that staff dismissals were a key component of 
the ideological house cleaning and low rates of dismissal were simply not accepted.  In one 
instance in late 1945 the Minister of Education in Thuringia, Walter Wolf, wrote to a regional 
office complaining that only 16% of their staff had been dismissed.  He described this rate as 
“completely unsatisfactory” and threatened to replace the local district officials unless they 
immediately expressed a greater willingness to “clean more thoroughly.245”  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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 The immediate post-war experiences of Felix Conrad illustrate how quickly these early 
proceedings progressed and what the immediate concerns of the occupation forces were.  A 
resident of a small town in Hesse at the end of the war, Conrad was appointed to be the local 
Schulrat on August 28th, 1945 by order of the local Bürgermeister.  This appointment was made 
primarily due to his pre-war political activities.  During the 20s and 30s he had been an active 
member of the SPD and as a result was dismissed from his teaching position during the 
Gleichschaltung.  For Conrad the appointment represented a significant professional 
advancement over his old position.  In October 1945 the local military authorities performed an 
audit of the teachers and officials in the school system and, based only on their wartime political 
histories, conducted a wave of firings that resulted in the termination of more than half of all 
educational staff at all levels.  Seven were fired and six retained.  Conrad was retained as 
Schulrat along with one rector, two primary teachers, a kindergarten teacher, and a classroom 
aid. Within little more than a month he had gone from long term unemployment to a locally 
powerful administrator, only in turn to become responsible for finding replacements for the 
majority of his staff. 246  For those who had refused to join Nazi political organizations to save 
their careers and endured the subsequent twelve years of harassment, termination, and 
persecution this was a relatively common outcome. 
 The levels of resentment that the denazification proceedings engendered in the local 
populations further complicated matters.  In many cases the individuals being replaced were 
people who had served in the community for years.  Their friends, colleagues, and neighbors all 
remembered the reality of life under Nazism far too well and understood that party affiliation did 
not necessarily imply deep political conviction.  There was also a general awareness that few !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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people could claim to have escaped the past twelve years of rule by the NSDAP completely free 
of anything that could prove embarrassing in a post-war context.  Furthermore, while the war had 
done much to discredit National Socialism in the eyes of many, it was not yet the completely 
bankrupt ideology that it would become in following years.  Many of the men and women facing 
dismissal had worked under extremely hard circumstances to both protect and provide some 
level of education for the community’s children under the harshest of conditions.  Consequently 
many of them still enjoyed quite a bit of local favor and support.  They could not easily be 
accused and targeted for removal with impunity, since they were members of communities who 
had frequently been held in high respect due to their positions within them.247    
 Ernst Halberstadt is an example of one such case, a man who was unfortunate enough to 
be caught on the wrong side of both the Nazi Party’s Gleichschaltung and post-war 
denazification.  He taught in the Hessian town of Hachenburg, eventually achieved the post of 
rector, served and was wounded in World War 1, and returned to briefly become the town’s 
mayor in the 20s before becoming a teacher again.  He was highly active in the Center Party and 
publicly clashed with local Nazis to such a degree that National Socialist agitators led 
demonstrations against him, personally.  Unsurprisingly he was among the first people in the 
town to be dismissed from his public positions in 1933. But he later successfully petitioned to be 
rehired, claiming that he had been drawn to the Center Party only through his religious 
convictions as a Catholic.  In letters written to the school authorities he expressed deep personal 
admiration for Adolph Hitler as both a leader and a man, statements that would haunt him in later 
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court proceedings.  Following this narrow escape he obtained a Nazi Party membership at the 
behest of the local magistrate who had been assigned his case.248   
 After the war he was initially retained as the middle school rector.  Unfortunately for him 
discrepancies were soon discovered between the political questionnaires that he filled out in 
1933 and the denazification paperwork that he filled out in 1945.  The courts presumed that he 
must have been speaking truthfully in 1933 rather than attempting to save his career in the light 
of the disastrous shift in German politics, which in turn called into question the veracity of his 
most recent answers.  He was accused of falsifying documents and prosecuted.  In the end he 
served a short jail sentence, paid a hefty fine, and was judged ineligible for employment above 
manual labor.  He appealed this harsh judgment, and the process dragged through 1947 and into 
1948.  Eventually he successfully presented evidence and testimony that showed he was a non-
active party member who only joined to protect himself and his family from persecution due to 
his previously strong opposition.   The court eventually cleared him of both the earlier charges of 
falsifying documents as well as the Nazi Party connection that had rendered him unemployable.  
It reclassified him as a member of Group 5 in the categorization scheme used by denazification 
courts at this time - those “unaffected by Nazism.” Soon after he was rehired into the local 
system and eventually earned a promotion to Schulrat in 1950.249   
 In both Hesse and Thuringia cases such as Halberstadt’s inflamed public opinion and led 
to claims that the denazification process was simply a political witch hunt with no more 
legitimacy or moral standing than the National Socialist Gleichschaltung of the 30s. Rather than 
finding acceptance as a necessary step forward in rehabilitating German society, it was in danger !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
248 Abt. 650/B, Nr. 2901 – Personal Akte – Ernst Halberstadt, HHStAW 
249 Ibid. 
! 170!
of being publicly perceived as the crudest form of victor’s justice, indiscriminately targeting both 
deeply implicated Nazis and relatively innocent political bystanders.  In the early Spring of 1947, 
for example, numerous towns in Thuringia saw protests, assemblies of parents and concerned 
citizens, and even strikes organized by students and teachers against local schools to protest a 
recent wave of firings that targeted educators who had been ‘nominal Party Members’ under the 
Nazis.  In the cases of the student-organized strikes the local rectors and principals reported that 
they had been organized along democratic lines, following votes within the student body.250  
These were not isolated incidents or the spontaneous results of individual cases.  The problem 
had been simmering for the better part of the year, and there are indications that at least some 
level of organization was present.  As early as February of 1946 the Thuringian Ministry of 
Education dispatched investigators to look into reports of “illegally organized parents’ advisory 
councils” within schools that had allegedly organized resistance to the further firings of teachers 
with Nazi backgrounds.251  
 This resentment was not restricted to the grass roots activism of citizens, parents, and 
children.  It could also be found in the highest levels of the state governments.  At one meeting 
of the Hessian cabinet in early 1946 Georg Häring, the Minister for Nutrition and Agriculture, 
remarked that it was a shame that denazification and the prosecution of German war criminals 
were being carried out by the Americans, because “[we the Germans] should have put our house !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Demokratische Union Deutschlands Landesverband Thüringen an das Landesamt für 
Volksbildung z.Hd. d. Herrn Landesdirektor Wolf,” 19. November 1946, LT-MfV Nr. 22, 
THStAW  
251 “Land Thüringen, Landesamt für Volksbildung an Herrn Schulrat Linde, Eisenach” 21. 
Feburary 1946, LT-MfV Nr. 22, THStAW 
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in order ourselves.252”  Wounded Teutonic pride was not the only issue at stake.  The compulsory 
approval of all administrative postings by local military authorities was also questioned, due to 
the way that they slowed the hiring necessitated by the large purges and added another point of 
friction with local populations and administrators.253  As thorough as it was, early denazification 
could also be hindered by the simple necessity that some level of professional continuity exist in 
the earliest transitional phases, and the incredible need for competent staff and educators.  For 
example, in the summer of 1946, a year after the first proclamations demanding the immediate 
termination of all state employees with strong NSDAP affiliations, it was brought to the attention 
of the Ministry of Education in Weimar that two senior instructors with Nazi Party histories were 
still employed in the town of Vacha.  The Minister wrote to the local Landesdirektor des 
Kreisbildungsamts to bring this matter to his attention and question why they still held their 
positions.  It came to light that the earliest denazification regulations, under which the instructors 
had initially been processed, allowed for the reclassification of politically tainted individuals to a 
status that permitted their employment if they were deemed critical employees and could gain 
membership in one of the four approved postwar political parties.  This regulation had, in the 
intervening year, changed and the grounds upon which ex-Nazis could be retained further 
restricted.  The two instructors were duly fired.254  
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 The unevenness, resistance, and at times imprecision in early denazification proceedings 
should not be taken as an indication that the ultimate goal of a German political system cleansed 
of Nazi influences was taken lightly by either regional authorities or German administrators.  
Despite whatever misgivings they may have had about the more obvious injustices, they 
understood its necessity and were generally willing to fire those obviously connected to the 
previous regime.  One clear example of this can be seen in the correspondence only months after 
the war’s end between Dr. Walter Wolf, the recently appointed Minister of Education in 
Thuringia, and Dr. Karl Friel, the Oberstudiendirektor in Jena.  Friel, a highly active Nazi Party 
member, was among the very first Nazi era administrators fired from their positions, dismissed 
even before the American soldiers who initially occupied Thuringia turned the region over to the 
Russians.  He complained bitterly that he had only joined the Nazi Party out of concern for his 
career [Selbsterhaltungstrieb], that he was highly respected by his peers, and that he had been his 
whole life a socialist at heart.  He further stated that as a recently released prisoner of war he 
should be given his position back out of recognition for his patriotic service.255   
 Wolf’s response was both unambiguous and uncharacteristically combative for the 
usually professional and even tempered bureaucrat.  He began with the less than polite 
observation that “this letter should reach you, unless you have already fled from the Russians,” 
and from there continued to dismiss Friel’s every complaint in progressively harsher and more 
impolite language.  Friel was held in contempt not only for his service to the Nazis, but also his 
willingness to switch political masters so quickly.  His supposed sufferings over a couple of 
weeks in an American POW camp were dismissed by a particularly pointed reference to Wolf’s 
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own history of internment at the concentration camp at Buchenwald. By the end of the letter the 
final judgment was as harsh as it was inevitable:  
 
Through a criminal policy you have significantly helped throw the entire German 
people into the abyss.  And now, when there are no laurels to be won [kein 
Blumentopf mehr zu gewinn ist] with Hitler’s bandits, now you attempt with the 
help of the “enemy” (for me as a Buchenwalder as for all German antifascists the 
Russians, Americans, and the English are friends of the German people as they 
militarily eradicated the Nazi tyranny - but they were no doubt your enemy - ) to 
secure a new position for yourself . . . It is probably superfluous for me to further 
clarify to you that as an early Party member [Altparteigenosse] I would not leave 
you in the teaching profession and it goes without saying that I do not intend to 
use you “in the reconstruction of the German school system.”256 
 
To say that Minister Wolf appreciated the need for a thorough cleansing of the existing 
administrative order would be a gross understatement. 
 At the same time, allowances could be and were made for cases where officials felt that 
justice had been miscarried.  The same Minister Wolf who responded with so much vitriol to 
Friel’s request for employment intervened a little over a year later on behalf of an old colleague 
and friend who had fallen afoul of the ongoing denazification process.  Wolf wrote that Max 
Riedel, a principal in Zechau-Leesen, had been personally responsible for his evading arrest by 
the Gestapo in 1933.  He attributed Riedel’s joining the Nazi Party in that same year to justified !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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fears for his personal safety rising out of previous membership in and activism on behalf of the 
SPD.  There are notable parallels between the political history so openly mocked by Wolf in his 
correspondence with Friel and the grounds on which he petitioned that an exception be granted 
for Riedel.   Whether this instance represents a case simple cronyism or the use of relevant 
personal insight to spare a valuable state employee is a matter of interpretation, but it does 
indicate the level to which early denazification was contingent on personal networks and other 
less tangible aspects of a subject’s history.257  
 The net effects of early denazification can at best be described as ambivalent.  They were 
not wholly successful, and men and women with deeply troublesome wartime histories would 
continue to be uncovered both in the East and the West well into the next few decades.  These 
failures were not, however, due to any ingrained apathy or antipathy towards the process on the 
part of those charged with carrying it forward.  It was also not the resounding failure that 
subsequent generations, particularly in the West, later charged it to have been. While some of its 
later critics would later charge that denazification whitewashed culpable Nazis into “fellow 
travelers” with the aim of speedily reintroducing them as productive members of German 
society, the view from the occupation period is significantly more complicated than that.258  
Massive numbers of Germans lost their positions within both the educational system and the 
broader government.  Even if many of them later came back into the system this initial purge 
provided the space necessary to rid German education of the worst excesses of National 
Socialism and reestablish some level of respectability to German civil authority in general.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Furthermore, the higher the position, the more political the appointment, and the further removed 
from the possibility of an upsurge of grassroots support, the more likely it was that an individual 
would not only lose his position but that the loss would prove long term.  While it may be 
possible to find teachers who regained their positions in the months, years, and decades to come, 
few who served as administrators under National Socialism managed to regain their erstwhile 
positions.  Even if the success and ultimate legacy of denazification remains problematic from 
the perspective of later generations that desired some sense of justice and closure with a troubled 
past, in the immediate aftermath of the war it adequately performed the task that was required of 
it:  men and women with Nazi pasts were removed from public life long enough so that others 
could build the framework for post-fascist governments and societies that could begin the much 
longer, much more complicated task of coming to terms with the events of the past twelve years. 
 
Rehiring 
      
 Many of the earliest denazification proceedings used the broadest definitions for what 
could suffice as active support of Nazi Party goals or participation in the Party itself. As a result 
the only locally available candidates for filling vacated government jobs were frequently those 
who had suffered directly from Nazi persecution, particularly those who had been members of 
political parties that had been targeted for retaliation after 1933.  Even relatively ancient 
allegations or rumors of pro-Nazi sympathies could derail a candidate’s hiring process, and 
frequently had to be counter-balanced by even more solid evidence of strong antifascist 
convictions.   
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 Philipp Müller, for example, was provisionally promoted from rector of a school in 
Obertaunus in Hesse to his region’s Schulrat immediately after Germany’s military collapse.  
During the post-appointment inquiry into his political life after 1933 an incident from 1937 came 
to light that nearly cost him both his promotion to Schulrat and his current position as rector.  In 
1937, while searching for a replacement knob for a household drawer, Mr. Müller inadvertently 
entered a Jewish owned store.  He was denounced for this and was investigated by the police and 
local Nazi Party leaders.  When questioned he was recorded as emphatically asserting his 
“complete agreement [with the Party] on the Jewish Question,” a statement that proved highly 
problematic eight years later.  In the end it was determined that despite his attempts to placate the 
investigators in 1937 his career had been materially damaged by his “failure to conform to Nazi 
methods and standards.” This was considered evidence enough to enter a finding that there was 
significant proof of anti-Nazi activity on the part of Mr. Müller and the investigating US Army 
Captain recommended his confirmation as Schulrat.259 
 The career of Dr. Karl Höfer is fairly typical of the men who were hired, and in many 
cases re-hired, to serve as administrators during this period.  He was born in March of 1886 and 
sat for his first teaching certification exam in April of 1906.  That same year he began teaching at 
a school in Frankfurt.  Two years later he took the second level of teaching certification exams.  
He fought in World War 1, entering military service on March 19, 1915 and was discharged in 
August of the same year.  In 1928 he earned his doctorate and on August 1, 1932 he was 
promoted to be the rector of the school that he taught at.  This promotion did not last long.  In 
1933 he was demoted back to being a classroom instructor due to his membership in the SPD.  
He continued teaching throughout the war.  He never joined the Nazi Party, although he did join !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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the NSLB after membership became compulsory for state employed educators.  In the Spring of 
1944 he was evacuated to the countryside with his class.  After the war ended he was promoted 
to rector once again by the Oberbürgermeister of Frankfurt, on August 21, 1945.  In September 
he and the children under his care returned to the city.  The American Military Government 
retroactively approved him for service in the school system on March 8, 1946 and six months 
later on November 1 he was promoted to Schulrat.  He remained in this position until he reached 
the retirement age of 65, with an effective date of retirement of January 1, 1951.  After his 
retirement Dr. Höffer was recognized for what his contemporaries saw as exceptional service in 
helping to rebuild Hessian education after the war.  He was nominated for the 
Bundesverdienstkreuz, an order of merit established in 1951 to recognize notable service to the 
Federal Republic, although it is not recorded whether or not he received it.  It is a notable 
achievement but not exceptionally so; annually 2,000-4,000 of these decorations are awarded of 
varying degrees and classes.260             
 While the particulars of his service may have been impressive, the general path that Dr. 
Hoffer’s career took was fairly typical.  He was a member of the generation born in the mid to 
late 1880s that began their professional lives in the early 20th century but was still young enough 
to have their careers interrupted by the First World War.  Those who survived that experience 
generally continued their normal professional development until the social upheavals of the early 
1930s abruptly divided them based on their political convictions.  Many had their careers 
damaged or put on hold, and those who managed to stay employed had to find some 
accommodation with the Nazi state.  How skillfully they negotiated Hitler’s rise to power largely 
determined whether they would be fit to continue service after the war; for every man like Dr. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Höffer there was a handful of others who were deemed unsuitable for teaching positions due to 
their Nazi past, at least in the short term.  Those who could demonstrate a lack of overt Nazi 
sympathies and, ideally, some level of verifiable antipathy towards the NSDAP or professional 
harm caused by the Gleichschaltung were generally quickly moved into positions of greater 
authority.  Whatever their Nazi-era pasts they tended not to stay in office long enough to face 
serious criticism.  Most of them reached retirement age in the late 40s or early 50s.  
 The most important criterion for hiring new administrators after the war was lack of any 
major Nazi affiliation.  Pragmatic exceptions were made for people who only belonged to 
professional organizations such as the National Socialist Teachers League (NSLB) that were 
mandatory for employment under the Third Reich, but actual Party membership would almost 
always result in automatic dismissal.  Distinctions were also drawn between those who had only 
the minor affiliations that accrued, barnacle like, as a result of living within the National 
Socialist state and those who held leadership positions or could otherwise be shown to be ‘active 
participants.’ The second major criterion, which could at times even atone for earlier Party 
membership, was some level of verifiable persecution at the hands of National Socialism.261  
While this severely restricted the number of available teachers and administrators after the war, it 
was not always read as a disadvantage.  The fact that the Nazis had been so thorough in their 
own political purges and had targeted so many of their own citizens for abuse guaranteed that 
some minimum number of politically palatable professionals would be available.  This was the 
assessment made by William Sollmann, a pre-Nazi Social Democrat and Secretary of the Interior 
under Stresemann forced into exile in 1933, when he wrote that, “The number of educators !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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dismissed or demoted or exiled by the Hitler government is not known, but it must amount to 
many thousands.  This is a reserve which can be used immediately after Hitler’s downfall.  These 
German teachers know age-old German habits of thought and feeling better than any 
foreigner.262”  The second characteristic mentioned by Sollmann, the familiarity of Germans with 
their own countrymen and their habits, would prove invaluable in helping the occupation 
authorities to smoothly transition from a combat footing to occupation duties and eventually to 
rebuilding German civil society.  
 Preference in hiring was also shown for those who had previous experience as 
administrators, or at the very least as teachers.263  Age also became a factor, both because of laws 
regarding mandatory retirement ages and the general view that older administrators were seen as 
undesirable due to their “undemocratic upbringings.”264  There was also the desire to repair at 
least some of the damage done to individuals professional lives by the 1933 political purges.  
While not as firm a priority as other considerations, there is direct evidence in at least one case 
that this kind of professional reparation (Wiedergutmachung) was a firm secondary concern.  In 
this instance a pre-1933 Schulrat who lost his job under the Nazis due to his political beliefs was 
re-hired very close to retirement age in a higher capacity specifically so that he would eventually 
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be able to draw a state pension that reflected what he should have obtained had his career not 
been disrupted.265  
 Finally, local sensibilities were also assessed, although these considerations were 
distinctly secondary to the others.   They came into question when multiple candidates were 
available or a pool of recently vetted candidates was being assigned to new postings.  Issues 
considered included the political leanings of the candidate, their confessional status, and the 
general makeup of the populations of the district they would be assigned to.  In both Hesse and 
Thuringia, for example, there were prominent pockets of Catholic communities where it was 
considered highly preferable to have a Catholic school inspector, if possible, and in areas where 
two inspectors covered the same territory it was desirable to have both a catholic and a 
protestant.266  When considering the possibilities for shuffling personnel during a minor 
reorganization of positions near Darmstadt in 1948, one sub-director in the Ministry of Education 
specifically noted that “Herr Köth is assigned to the district of Friedberg; he is catholic.  The 
second position must therefore go to an evangelical [evangelisch].  [Schulrat] Mayer is 
evangelic.267”  Similar allowances were made for political leanings in Hesse, while in Thuringia 
a strong Socialist or Communist background was a virtual requirement for administrative 
employment.  
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 The eventual divergence of education in the west in the east wasn’t a result of 
fundamentally different understandings of the role of education in a modern nation or of different 
assessments of the needs of German society as it rebuilt.  The roots of that divergence lie in the 
paradoxes of post-war occupation government and in the fundamental ideological differences 
and different understandings of history that separated the Cold War superpowers.  While an 
exceedingly complex topic in its own right, many of the key aspects of this divide can be seen in 
the differing understandings of the term ‘democratic,’ a word that was key to defining the end 
goal of German education. 
 For the Americans ‘democracy’ was a specific type of political organization based on the 
will of a majority of the people as expressed at the ballot box.  A ‘democratic education’ was one 
that properly prepared students for participation in this society and instructed them in their rights 
and responsibilities as citizens.  For the Soviets, ‘democracy’ represented the rule of the nation 
by the majority of the citizens.  This was not a democratic ideal so strongly tied to notions such 
as free speech or political agency via the vote, but on the ideal that the working classes would 
lead the nation, rather than a hereditary or political elite.  A ‘democratic education’ was one that 
was equally available to all regardless of their origin or background.  
 The paradox of occupation government was the attempt to implement democratic rule via 
what amounted to a short-term military dictatorship.  This was a problem much more acutely felt 
in the west, where that the early establishment of relatively strong civilian rule under the aegis of 
politically vetted Germans provided a plausible means for resisting the demands of the 
occupation authorities.  Educational administrators in Hesse who opposed some of the structural 
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changes to German education that American planners thought were necessary could argue that 
they, as members of a duly elected government, were representing the will of the German people.  
This is a problem that persists to this day for those who would seek to spread democracy through 
military force:  what do you do when the people you are occupying elect leaders who oppose 
your occupation goals or strategies? 
 The Soviets, on the other hand, had no such worries about establishing democratic 
governmental structures within their occupation zone.  As a defeated enemy state under military 
occupation, Germany was subject to rule by fiat and any measures that they felt were necessary 
were simply enacted.  Educational administrators under the Soviets tended to be firm believers in 
these new models and promoted them from within over any objections from the local citizenry.        
 In both cases the important contributions made by German administrators were only 
possible because of a denazification process that, while imperfect and perhaps even rather flawed 
when viewed from a long-term perspective, did its job in the short term.  It successfully managed 
to purge the ranks of civil administration of the worst adherents to political Nazism create the 







CHAPTER 5: ADMINISTRATORS AS INTERMEDIARIES 
 
The district education office is not a self-contained bureaucratic 
authority, but a living member of the democratic administration of 
the country. 
   - Walter Wolf, Thuringian Minister of  
   Education, 1945268 
 
The reconstruction [of the schools] in the new spirit demands ever 
more extensive and responsible work of the school inspectors, 
[including] negotiations with the occupation authorities. 
    - Georg Krücke, Mayor of Wiesbaden,  
    1945269 
 
 Whether under Soviet or American occupation, German educational administrators after 
the war found themselves caught between the metaphorical rock and hard place. The major 
restructuring of an essential civil service would be a daunting task under ideal circumstances, but !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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conditions in post-war Germany were far from ideal.  National government was in a state of total 
collapse, physical infrastructure lay in ruin, and the citizens struggled with profound personal 
hardship.  Foreign militaries dominated the landscape, both conceptually and literally, and state 
level governance was almost entirely in their hands. 
 The realities of foreign occupation complicated rebuilding efforts at every level.  The 
military authorities were generally eager to establish some degree of German civil administration 
if only to relieve themselves of a burden that they were culturally and institutionally ill-suited 
for.  At the same time, they were reluctant to hand any degree of meaningful executive authority 
over to German leaders. This was due in part to a combination of short-term security fears 
regarding the threat of armed resistance and long term concerns about the rebirth of German 
militarism.  Occupation authorities retained ultimate control over all major policy decisions and 
oversight, direction, and approval was the order of the day for the Germans they worked with.270      
 This was true regardless of the rank or office that an administrator might hold.  Within 
the educational systems, even the ministers for education of the re-established governments of 
the Länder found themselves subject to the requirements of military occupation authorities, in 
effect functioning as subordinates rather than semi-autonomous leaders. They had little direct say 
in the general policies that were decreed, but were nonetheless responsible for their 
implementation. In the areas under Soviet occupation, these demands came quickly and 
decisively.  By the first anniversary of the peace Soviet authorities had proclaimed nothing less 
than the wholesale restructuring of the educational system with the broader goal of transforming !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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German society from the ground up.  While the Western Allies were far less decisive in their 
reform efforts, when they did come they were equally dedicated to seeing them through. 
 If the dictates of the occupation authorities were the rock, then their public reception by 
the German population was the hard place.  Major changes to as basic a public service as 
education directly affected the lives of many, and they were not shy about voicing their opinions.  
In both the east and the west there was significant pushback against educational reforms for a 
variety of reasons.  An example of this is a fairly typical letter sent by a concerned mother to the 
Thuringian Ministry of Education at the beginning of 1947.  She complained bitterly about the 
rapid pace of change. She claimed that it exposed children who had experienced nothing but 
political upheaval, war, and the uncertain lives of refugees to yet more turmoil.  Despite all of the 
hardships of post war schooling, she said that with the simple resumption of classes “We parents 
exhaled, as this seemed to finally initiate a calm development for the children, at least in this 
area.”   This hoped for calming influence and stability proved illusory, however.  “Since the 
school reform was carried out in November, it is completely over:  teachers change almost daily, 
in four weeks seven schedules, instead of the instruction in Russian begun in August now classes 
in English because there are no teachers available for Russian, and lessons in 4 (FOUR!) 
different schools, and inevitable wasted hours in which card games prevail.”   Under these 
circumstances she found it absurd to reform the schools, the one bastion of normality for 
Germany’s children.  She also complained of what she perceived as an “at any price” ethos to the 
drive for specific reforms.271 In another contemporary instance residents of a town threatened to 
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strike in protest over the dismissal of locally popular teachers with prior Nazi Party ties.272   The 
discontent with attempts to de-couple religious and secular education was widespread and 
troubled reform efforts in both the east and west.   
 Not all communications, however, were so uniformly negative, and some did express 
approval for what was happening.  A letter from a retired school teacher promised “flowers from 
the hands of children . . . [as thanks for] the gift of the new Einheitsschule.273”  As refreshing as 
correspondence like this must have been it was, however, distinctly in the minority.  
 This combination of pressures placed German educational administrators in the role of 
“transactional intermediaries” between the military occupation authorities and German civilians, 
two groups that were heavily invested in post-war education.  Transactional intermediaries are 
those individuals who enable communication between dissimilar peoples, cultures, or 
organizations.  The men and women who weathered early denazification to either retain or, far 
more commonly, newly acquire positions under the occupation tended to be well positioned to 
serve in this intermediary role.  Frequently they were selected because of pre-existing 
international connections or political ideologies that had placed them at odds with National 
Socialism but which now facilitated, both linguistically and culturally, their work as 
intermediaries. 274   !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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 German educational administrators provided a bridge across which communication 
between the occupiers and occupied was possible, while simultaneously dampening the intensity 
of that communication for the betterment of everyone.   Direct communication between the 
occupation authorities and the civilian population was hampered by a number of fundamental 
difficulties.  These included linguistic and cultural differences, basic security concerns, wartime 
prejudices and animosities, and the inevitable remoteness of policy-level governmental structures 
from the daily lives of individual citizens.  This was especially important in an occupation 
system that was designed from the outset to minimize fraternization between foreign military 
forces and German civilians, although this particular feature was relaxed as years went by.  
 Administrators also mediated between traditionally antagonistic groups within the 
German educational system itself.  These internal tensions took two basic forms.  The first was 
the opportunity provided by reconstruction to re-fight old battles and attempt to protect pre-
existing goals.  The renewal of debate over what the educational relationship between church and 
state should be and the future of religious instruction in public schools stands as a highly visible 
example of this.  The second was the necessity, born of the specific nature of the Allied reforms, 
for previously antagonistic groups to work together or cross previously sacrosanct professional 
boundaries.  This can be seen in the attempts to move away from the heavily tracked, tiered 
nature of pre-war German education and the resultant blurring of professional distinctions 
between primary and secondary school teachers. 
 Essentially, administrators were expected to help ensure that all of the various parts of the 
community could work together to make “democratically” - however one chose to define it - 
reformed school systems a reality.   As expressed at the 2nd Pedagogical Congress in the Soviet !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Sector, educational administrators were expected to encourage a “. . . growing cooperation 
between school board, school leaders, and local authorities, [and an] increasing interest of the 
public in the development of the school.275”  How well did they meet these expectations and 
what was the cost for the Allies of earning their cooperation?   
 
Interactions with the occupiers 
 
 As was previously discussed, the Allied Occupation Authorities entered the occupation 
period with some level of agreement on the broadest, most basic reforms necessary within 
German education.  Denazification, of both curricula and personnel, was a fairly consistent, 
albeit extremely broad and vague, set of priorities for restructuring the German educational 
system at the outset of the occupation.  These included practical measures that were applied 
across the entire civil administration, such as the general denazification of its personnel, and 
more education-specific measures such as cleansing curricula of pro-Nazi materials and lessons.  
There was also a broad agreement that German education needed to be reformed to make it 
equally accessible to all members of society and a vehicle for social change and mobility.  
Towards this end a comprehensive, unified educational institution for all students - an 
Einheitsschule - was proposed as the basic framework for reconstruction across all of Germany.  
The variations in how this was carried out and the different types of reforms that ultimately 
resulted underscore a number of key differences in the relationships between educational 
administrations in Hesse and Thuringia and their respective occupation authorities.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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 One key to the differences in how educational administrators interacted with the Russians 
and the Americans was the latter’s relatively quick re-establishment of civilian civil 
administration and the high degree of interaction that they had with local military authorities on a 
day to day basis.  This created opportunities for significant resistance on the part of German 
administrators to unpopular policies and demands.  With the relatively early reestablishment of 
civilian government in areas under American control, their own stated emphasis upon 
democratizing both German society and education could be used to delay or alter controversial 
changes.  Reluctance to engage in mandated reforms was often represented as the democratically 
voiced will of the German people.  Tardiness in meeting deadlines for the implementation of 
measures about which there could be no negotiation was often defended as the result of time 
spent convincing a skeptical public, a necessary pre-requisite if the reforms were to be 
democratic in anything more than name only.   
 The relationship between Erwin Stein, the first Minister of Culture in the re-constituted 
Land of Hesse, and Vaughn R. DeLong, the chief of the Education and Religious Affairs 
(E&RA) division in Hesse, provides numerous examples of this tension.  Even though Hesse had 
organized an elected civilian government, the United States Army still held ultimate authority in 
the region and, as such, DeLong had the not unreasonable expectation that the reforms that had 
been ordered would be carried out in a timely fashion.  The reception that their reform efforts 
met in Hesse, however, was not uniformly positive.  Rather than simply follow through on the 
changes demanded by the Americans, Hessian educators convened their own committees to 
evaluate those proposals and put forward their own counter-proposals.  On a few of issues there 
was a broad consensus.  For example, the need to improve the training of the new teachers who 
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were being brought into the schools to replace the large numbers removed through denazification 
was entirely uncontroversial.276   
 On the other hand, there was a fundamental reluctance to undertake structural reforms of 
the proposed new school system and an attempt to preserve some of the familiar structures and 
divisions of the old one.  For example, there was strong resistance to the expansion of primary 
education from four to six years, on the basis that maintaining the four year schedule would 
allow them to preserve the current level of achievement and concentrate on promoting gifted 
students.  The Americans strongly objected to this both on the grounds that it went against the 
basic principles of having a comprehensive institution and that it was far too early to distinguish 
‘gifted’ from ‘normal’ students.  They castigated this as the “undemocratic giving of the best 
advantages to those who can best help themselves.”  In a similar manner they were harshly 
critical of the continued German emphasis on retaining the Gymnasium as an independent, 
parallel school system, calling such a move “exactly contrary to the basic philosophy of the 
Einheitsschule.”  They were reluctant to even consider retaining the name ‘Gymnasium’ for any 
level of the reformed schools, claiming that “Gymnasium, Studienschule, or any other name 
which denotes a parallelism is contrary to point 4 [of Allied Control Council Directive Number 
54: Basic principles for the democratization of education in Germany].”277  
 Stein, however, was not solely responsible to the United States Army; he had to answer 
to the Minister-President, the other members of his cabinet, the state assembly, his own political 
party, and ultimately to the people of Hesse as a whole.  In Stein’s case, he used the demands of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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this democratic framework to enable himself to push back against American demands and create 
the time and space needed to make educational reform a more German affair.   In doing so he 
was able to slow down and even reverse Allied efforts at reform to the extent that even 
educational officials in areas under Soviet control took notice.     
 Some of the points of contention between the Americans and the Hessian educational 
authorities were due to the realities of education in Germany at this time.  For example, DeLong 
complained of the lack of progress in starting instruction in English for all schoolchildren in the 
state.  He observed at a meeting in July of 1948 that two years had passed since the subject was 
ordered to be mandatory in all schools, yet it was still only sporadically taught.  Even the 
optimistic progress reports from the Hessian Ministry of Culture and Education only predicted 
full participation by 1949 or 1950, a lapse of nearly four years.  Stein maintained that his 
ministry had worked as hard as possible to speedily implement English instruction, however they 
had been hampered by a lack of textbooks and, above all, qualified teachers.  Not only was the 
general denazification-related shortage to blame, but English had up until then always been an 
elective subject, resulting in a far shallower pool of potential teachers than would otherwise be 
the case.278 
 German administrators also used American priorities regarding the democratization of 
German government, education, and culture to gain leverage with the occupation authorities.  
They claimed that the support of the public and of their democratically elected representatives 
was not only necessary to avoid public relations blunders that could discredit the ongoing 
reconstruction efforts in the public eye, but as was necessary in and of itself if the notion of a 
democratic Germany was to have any legitimacy at all.  For example, in August of 1948 DeLong !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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was engaged in discussions about founding a new educational institute for Central European 
studies.  The American occupation authorities hoped that such an institute would attract foreign 
scholars to Germany and help foster the re-integration of German academia into a broader 
international framework.  Stein, meanwhile, was faced with ongoing budgetary chaos, partially 
due to continued demands from both the public and the state government to reduce classroom 
sizes.  In order to do so his ministry was attempting to funnel all available funds into teacher 
recruitment and training, constructing new school facilities, and contracting for the publication of 
new teaching materials.  Numerous unpopular cuts had already been made in other areas, 
including the postponement of the beginning of the next school year by a few months and deep 
cuts into state funding for theaters and other cultural outlets.279  Stein refused to sign the charter 
for the institute on the grounds that a project with such heavy budgetary implications needed to 
go before the entire cabinet, and might need approval from the state assembly.  As a temporary 
work around, he suggested founding the institute as an appendage of a pre-existing institution 
and funding it through private donations, should those be available.  While it is clear that his 
primary concern was preserving the integrity of his ministerial budget, he appealed to the 
necessities of the democratic apparatus within which it operated in order to steer matters towards 
a privately funded resolution.280 
 It is important to note, however, that the dialogue over these issues was not the simple 
imposition of Allied will over German objections.  The Americans pressured, cajoled, and 
objected but ultimately negotiated timetables, accepted delays, and assented to some moderation !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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of the initially proposed reforms.  Whether or not these sorts of delaying tactics had a long term 
future remains open to speculation.  Although the behavior was more organized than simple foot 
dragging of individuals and institutions that were reluctant to pursue change, it was not 
orchestrated enough to describe as a fully realized campaign with well articulated goals.  The 
historical realities of the emerging Cold War, however, and the subsequent rush for West 
German statehood meant that many delayed demands ultimately became moot as military 
occupation transitioned to political partnership.  More importantly, the Germans who were in 
charge of overseeing these changes were not politically naïve, and perhaps most importantly they 
generally came from a generation that had experienced a chain of revolutionary moments and 
transitions in government during their adult lives.  Indeed, if there is any single constant in 
German political life between 1900 and 1945, it is the short-lived nature of governments and the 
vigor with which their successors set about ‘reforming’ the nation.  Regardless of whether it was 
part of a conscious plan to resist American demands, they would have had an intuitive grasp of 
the notion that political realities might change in the near future and postponed changes could 
quickly become abandoned ones.      
 In areas under Soviet occupation, such as Thuringia, the relationship between regional 
administrative authorities and the military government was simultaneously more direct and also 
more tenuous than in the Western zones.  Unlike the Länder under American occupation, areas 
under Soviet control had a central educational authority that was nominally in charge of 
coordinating a common educational policy.  The German Central Administration for Education 
was based in the Soviet controlled parts of Berlin, and was staffed by Germans - albeit men and 
women selected more for their political loyalty than their pedagogical acumen.  Like the other 
branches of the Central Administration, it was explicitly designed for the outward transmission 
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of Soviet orders rather than any kind of independent leadership.  After the establishment of the 
SED it also functioned more as a party apparatus than a state one, with a subsequent shift in its 
attentions and priorities.281 
 Further complicating matters, Soviet officials at all levels paid far more attention to 
matters involving the German economy, reparations, and demilitarization than they did to 
managing aspects of civil society.  Additionally, SMAD undercut what little authority the 
Central Administration had by issuing many of its edicts and orders directly to the Länder via its 
various regional branches (e.g. SMA-Th.) rather than through the central authority.  Within the 
lower-order military governments of the Länder there were sections directly responsible for 
public education, however these offices were likewise tasked first and foremost with carrying out 
the general orders promulgated by the central military authorities in SMAD.282  Similar to the 
staffing neglect faced by the E&RA division in the American zones, the Soviets tended to fill 
these specialized military offices with either civilians or very junior officers.283  In the case of 
Thuringia, Dr. Nokolai Bogatyrov, the man in charge of the Section for Education, held no 
military rank at all and intervened relatively minimally in the affairs of the Thuringian Ministry 
of Education.284   
  The results of this unusual arrangement were that, compared to their colleagues in the 
American zones, those in the east had simultaneously more freedom to do as they chose due to a 
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relative lack of systematic, regular oversight but also less room to oppose measures that they 
objected to.  Unlike the robust relationship between Stein and DeLong and the frequent 
communication, both in correspondence and in person, there is relatively little record of routine 
interactions between the Thuringian Ministry of Education and Bogatyrov, and what there is 
consists mainly of simple requisitions for resources or personnel.  One typical communiqué 
dated 22. August 1947, for example, was a simple request for permission to reopen the Natural 
History Museum in Saalfeld and the installation of the necessary staff to oversee it.  There was 
no debate, discussion, or any sort of dialogue outside of the terse few lines of text required to 
make the request itself.285  The resulting lack of a discourse robbed administrators of a venue 
within which they could oppose against unwanted reforms.  Rather than the give-and-take of 
proposals and counter-proposals, demands and delays observed in Hesse, in Thuringia there was 
more room for German administrators to take the initiative in solving specific problems, but 
much less ability to do so in a way that challenged the broad instructions issued by SMAD and 
the Allied Control Council.   
 Officials in the Thuringian Ministry of Education are frequently recorded as issuing 
reminders to recalcitrant local organizations about specific orders and regulations emanating 
from the Soviet military authorities and demanding the cessation of transgressive activities.  A 
sampling of the correspondence with the district office in the town of Eisenach from late 1945 to 
early 1946 yields some typical examples.  Some of the issues were shifts in policy that were 
opposed by skeptics as contrary to traditional values, and were in turn re-framed as being a 
necessary part of the post-war antifascist struggle.  For example, in mid-October, 1945 Minister 
Wolf wrote to Eisenach to remind them that “the Nazis were against double-income households.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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We are in favor of women working as well.286”  In other instances it was to ensure compliance 
with specific military directives that they anticipated would be locally unpopular, as when 
Marshal Zhukov banned private schools in the Soviet Zone.  Wolf wrote to Eisenach in order to 
ensure complete compliance, even regarding private religious education:  “You are advised, that 
the Kindergarten in the deacon’s house in Eisenach must cease not only the prohibited 
instruction, but also religious instruction.287”  Finally there are instances where local officials 
were dragging their feet on needed changes and had to be prodded along into action.  On July 24, 
1946 Wolf wrote to the Eisenach office and noted that two school inspectors named Schottsky 
and Puda were still employed, despite being former Nazi Party members and ineligible for 
government office.   He demanded their immediate termination and asked to be notified of such 
before the first of the following month.288       
 Similar to their counterparts in Hesse, Thuringian administrators were also at least 
nominally responsible to the state government and, in particular, the Landespräsident.  While 
little in terms of concrete educational policy emanated from this direction, they were sensitive to 
the complaints of the broader public and, when those concerns were addressed to them 
personally, would often forward them to the educational ministry and ask for some kind of 
explanation or clarification of the matter.  A typical example of this is a letter from 
Landespräsident Dr. Rudolf Paul to Minister Dr. Wolf in July of 1946.  President Paul had been 
made aware of a Schulrat Ortband in Eisenach who was recorded to have said that “for myself, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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the most hated people are the religion teachers.  These are the biggest criminals in my eyes, yes it 
may be said that they are the greatest criminals of our people.”289 He demanded to know what 
kind of actions would be taken against the Schulrat and pressured for his immediate 
termination.290  Unlike their colleagues in the west, however, the educational ministry in 
Thuringia was primarily staffed with men and women who broadly approved of the changes 
being proposed by the Soviets and who labored to see them through, rather than delay or alter 
them.  They worked closely with local representatives of the SED, which itself had an 
understanding with SMA-D and SMA-Th.  In the specific instance of Schulrat Ortband the 
Ministry of Education worked directly contrary to the expressed wishes of the Landespräsident 
and, after consulting with local SED leadership placed him on administrative leave until the issue 
blew over.291  As an interesting coda to this incident, it is worth noting that Landespräsident Dr. 
Paul’s tenure in office ended one month later when he fled to the American occupation zone via 
West Berlin.              
 Ultimately in the West there was more debate about reform, what the content of it would 
be, and to what extent it would reach.  This was due at least in part to the way that American 
occupation government was structured to involve more interaction between German government 
officials and occupation officers. The push for democratic self-governance also opened up more 
debates about reform.  The key questions involved were about the content of the reform and the 
extent to which the reforms should reach.  In the East, however, there was far less disagreement !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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between the military government and their chosen civilian administrators about whether or not 
reform should take place. The major concerns surrounded how sweeping reforms should be made 
and, occasionally, how fast they should be implemented.  If the basic question under examination 
in the West is how much reform should be attempted, while the basic question in the East is how 
it should be executed.   
 
Interactions with the occupied 
 
 Public concern about the reforms that were being carried out was a fairly common and 
widespread issue across both the American and Soviet Zones after the war, and many of the 
written expressions found their way to the desks of officials in local educational ministries.  
Some comentary came directly, often addressed to men and women of high political rank.  It also 
came in the form of correspondence forwarded by ministers, politicians, city officials, and other 
public notables who wanted to bring the issues to the attention of those who they felt would be in 
the best position to respond to them.    
 In general the concerned citizens, parents, and parents’ councils of the various affected 
schools voiced broad support for some restructuring and reforming of German education.  In 
particular they approved of the broadening of opportunities for children to embark on academic 
career paths and the general goal of increasing the accessibility of higher education. In their 
letters they “welcomed school reform in principle” and agreed that “a unified educational ideal 
for all types of schools from the Volksschule to the university is necessary, in order to bridge the 
spiritual divide between the primary- and higher schools.292” There was, however, continued !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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alarm at the relatively unstructured nature of the reforms, especially within the American Zone.   
Some were troubled by the manner in which each Land was responsible for reforms within its 
own borders and the unevenness that would inevitably result.  There was a general fear of a 
splintering of German education, and the potential difficulty of using educational credentials 
from one part of Germany in another.  In general they argue for a continuation of German 
education as it had been practiced before, emphasizing the value of stability and a system 
understandable to those who must use it, even if that meant “avoiding experimentation” until the 
system was fully established.293   Tellingly, many of the arguments for a “nationally unified 
school reform” added caveats such as “at least for West Germany” or “in any case for the three 
Western Zones.”  By 1948 the growing divide between the Allied and Soviet Zones of 
occupation was increasingly an accepted, if not embraced, political reality.294 
 Such worries were not restricted to the level of the primary schools.  Many were equally 
concerned about what effect this would have on professional education and in particular the 
means by which tradesmen were certified.  In one case a CDU representative in the Hessian 
Landestag included the Ministry of Education in a correspondence he was having with a 
constituent who, in a number of lengthy letters, expressed grave concern with the impact that the 
reorganization of the German school system would have on engineering schools.  He further 
worried about the health of the engineering profession in Germany as a whole and whether or not 
it would even be able to function as a single entity after so many independently directed reforms.  
He was particularly concerned with the danger that the “equating engineers from technical 




our Hessian engineering and construction schools will no longer be recognized by the other 
states and the national railway.295” 
 Such concerns could even cross the boundaries of the occupation zones, and Germans in 
one area of the country were by no means ignorant of what was transpiring in others.  As an 
example, a reporter for the Hessische Nachrichten wrote in July 1947 to the Thuringian Minister 
of Education, Dr. Marie Torhorst, asking for specifics of how educational reform and 
reconstruction was being carried out in her state.  He wrote that “there have been repeated 
objections made, that the state now holds a monopoly over education,” and inquired how she 
responded to these claims.  This was almost certainly a reference to the ongoing debate over 
what the post-war fate of parochial education would be, and what the historically complex 
relationship between the church and state in matters of public religious instruction would look 
like in the future.  He also noted the Thuringian tradition of private, experimental schools, citing 
the specific example of the Freie Schulgemeinde Wickersdorf.  He asked what role they would 
have in the future of Thuringian education.  Finally, he asked about how denazification had been 
handled within the Thuringian educational system.  These were all issues that were of 
contemporary concern in Hesse but which also resonated within Thuringia as well.296    
 Some members of the public resisted the proposed changes due to their prior experience 
with the German school system as it existed during the previous half century and their 
understanding of how to best negotiate their children through it.  Whatever flaws someone might 
recognize or ambivalent memories he might have of earlier methods of instruction and the way !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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the schools were structured before, these were the systems that millions of Germans had personal 
experience with and understood broadly what they could expect for children.  For example, in 
Hesse there was some resistance to the introduction of mandatory classes in English.  There was 
a general fear that this would hinder the ability of children to master Latin, which had previously 
been one of the hallmarks of the privileged upper track of German education that led to the 
University.  For parents preoccupied with ensuring that a pathway to a university education or a 
white-collar profession remained open to their children, this was a serious concern.  Rather than 
mandate English, there were proposals to offer both English and Latin and leave it up to the 
parents which option their child chose.297 
 Specific, policy-oriented and -aware correspondence such as this made up a minority of 
the education ministries’ communication with citizens, however.  The vast majority of the 
concerns voiced by the general public were somewhat more mundane and fell into three general 
categories:  complaints about perceived transgressions against existing regulations, especially 
those committed by occupation forces; complaints about denazification; and requests for 
clarifications about confusing orders or situations arising from new educational policies or orders 
from the Allied Control Council and the individual military governments within the occupation 
zones. 
 The educational administration served as an authority to which appeals could be made 
when citizens felt that the military authorities were over-stepping the bounds of their power or 
abusing their positions.  In such cases the aggrieved parties could be justifiably uncomfortable 
appealing for redress to the same military authorities that they felt were persecuting them.  A 
nominally neutral - and perhaps even sympathetic - German authority could be much more !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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approachable.    An example of this in action can be seen in early 1947 when a Soviet military 
officer observed the elections of class officers within a Thuringian branch of the Free German 
Youth (FDJ), a communist and socialist youth group, that was associated with a local school.  He 
inspected the school records of the students involved and immediately insisted on the expulsion 
of seven of them from the public schools.  His rationale was that, “In the Western Zones fascist 
youth groups have recently formed and worked illegally.  In order to prevent such here, strict 
measures are necessary.298”   
 All of the affected students had been youth leaders in the League of German Girls 
(BDM), the Nazi youth organization for girls and young women.  The Soviet officer appears to 
have been applying a very narrow reading of the denazification laws and procedures, and 
interpreting them to mean that children who were active participants in Nazi Party organizations 
could not participate in any public institution, including schools. It was noted by their teachers 
and local officials that expelling these girls would be a special hardship for them, as they were 
older students and there was a limited amount of time to reverse the damage caused by over ten 
years of politically problematic and academically shallow Nazi education.  They also made it 
clear that the girls hadn’t shown any indication of post-war fascist activities and expressed 
confusion as to why the local military officer was being so zealous in the matter.299  Minister 
Wolf directly asserted his authority in this matter, asserting that final judgments about the 
removal of students from schools fell under the authority of the ministry and not the military 
occupation authorities.  He later determined that all of the girls fell under an amnesty law !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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designed specifically to protect minors from prosecution for Nazi-era activities. He also used his 
influence to prevent even a temporary suspension while the matter was adjudicated, ensuring that 
they had no needless delay or break in their ongoing education.300   
 At times the transgressions that citizens complained about were directed against members 
of the Ministry of Education itself.   In the Summer of 1947 the recently appointed minister Dr. 
Marie Torhorst received complaints from local CDU officials about an inspector dispatched by 
the Ministry to a church-operated kindergarten.  The complaints alleged that the inspector 
demanded that pictures of biblical events be removed from all areas where students received 
instruction, and that other religiously affiliated schools had suffered similar experiences.  They 
demanded to know on whose orders the inspector was operating, whether she had the authority to 
mandate the removals, and whether this represented an official policy.301  In this instance 
Torhorst backed the school inspector while admitting that no specific orders had been given to 
her to remove religious pictures, symbols, or icons.  On this she was acting of her own initiative.  
Even so, that initiative fell within both the spirit and the letter of the published laws and 
guidelines as set forth by the occupation government and the Ministry of Education.  She further 
emphasized that due to the new laws regarding schools all kindergartens, both parochial and 
secular, fell under the jurisdiction of state and as such the Ministry was well within its rights to 
step in and make changes within church-affiliated schools.  These particular changes are 
noteworthy as these changes were not designed to right a specific Nazi-era wrong but to enact a 
new policy designed to determine the future shape of Thuringian education.   
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 Denazification and its immediate results were frequent topics of correspondence as well.  
In the vast majority of these instances the subjects were complaints about teachers being 
removed from communities that they had long served.  The professional purges mandated by the 
Allied Control Council were fairly thorough, especially in the early years, and many people were 
at least temporarily caught up in them who had joined the Nazi Party for professional reasons 
rather than deep political convictions.  Even though many of these men and women would later 
resume their careers, in the immediate aftermath many Germans were outraged by what they 
perceived as the unfair persecution of beloved local educators who were no more guilty of 
specific crimes than anyone else who had lived through Hitler’s Reich. 
 While most of these objections were voiced over individual cases, in some instances they 
could galvanize communal action.  In area around Eisenach in Thuringia, for example, there was 
a coordinated series of strikes and protests by students in multiple grades, their parents, and 
concerned members of local political organizations in the opening months of 1947. This sort of 
direct opposition presented a three-fold challenge for educational administrators:  it disrupted 
day to day operations of the schools, it dissuaded and discouraged new teachers who were 
frequently the immediate targets of this ire, and it represented a direct challenge to the state and 
public order that had to be addressed least the occupation authorities do so themselves.302  In the 
specific case of the disruptions around Eisenach this challenge was made explicit by one 
newspaper that made pointed reference to how many teachers had only begrudgingly joined the 
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“’Unity Party’ [‘Einheitspartei’] of that time.” Such direct comparison between the NSDAP and 
the SED did not go unnoticed and uncommented upon in Weimar.303  
 Some cases simply concerned interpreting the frequently confusing and sometimes-
contradictory orders of the occupation authorities.  The early vague, sweepingly general 
proclamations by the combined Allied Control Council were moderated or interpreted by local 
military authorities, leading to uneven and at times tragic applications of them.  One example of 
this can be observed in Thuringia in the first year after the war.  Early on in the occupation 
Soviet military authorities issued orders for the confiscation and destruction of any “militaristic 
literature” and any literature that was “directed against the United Nations.”  This order drew the 
attention of Dr. Hermann Brill, who wrote directly to Minister Walter Wolf at the Ministry for 
Education on September 25, 1945 for clarification.  
 In particular, he questioned whether books that were simply of a broadly military subject 
fell under this order as well.  The examples he cited as questionable materials were Caesar’s 
Gallic Wars, Schiller’s History of the Thirty Years War, and Moltke’s History of the Wars of 
1870/71.  He was of the opinion that a distinction needed to be drawn between works that were 
‘militaristic’ and those that were merely on military subjects.  He provided Peter Moor’s Journey 
to Southwest Africa by patriotic novelist Gustav Frenssen as an example of ‘militaristic’ 
literature that should be subject to the ban while suggesting that various contemporaneous books 
published by Social Democratic politicians about German colonial policies and the Herero 
Rebellion should be among those retained.304   !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
303 “In Abschrift an das Ministerium für Volksbildung, Abschrift aus dem Würzberger 
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51, THStAW  
! 206!
 The answer he received was typical of the measured responses that normally emanated 
from the Educational Ministry under Dr. Walter Wolf.  He stated his basic agreement with the 
distinction that Brill had proposed, but indicated that he would soon forward a list of books that 
must be specifically banned by name as well as clearer guidelines for drawing up such 
distinctions in the future.305  He acted on his own judgment in supporting the somewhat moderate 
interpretation of the directives regarding ‘militaristic literature’ while making it clear that the 
ultimately such situations would have to be resolved by occupation-approved policies rather than 
ad hoc judgments made by individuals in the field. 
 This exchange is noteworthy for another reason as well:  Brill was far from a normal 
citizen, and he and Minister Wolf had a relationship that went back at least to the Nazi era.  
Dr. Hermann Brill was a prominent pre-war socialist who had been a highly active member of 
the Thuringian parliament and - briefly - the national parliament.  He was a staunch anti-Nazi 
who left the SPD over what he felt was a tepid resistance to Hitler, and was eventually 
imprisoned in the concentration camp at Buchenwald.  While a prisoner there he remained 
politically active and aided in the organization of numerous clandestine resistance groups and 
committees.  It is likely this wartime activity that led him to write directly to Minister Wolf.  
They were imprisoned together at Buchenwald and were both founding members of the camp’s 
Popular Front Committee, an underground group designed to coordinate the efforts of various 
political prisoners in the camp.  Brill was the main representative of the prisoners who identified 
with the SPD as well as the group’s chairman, while Wolf represented the KPD.  He was briefly 
appointed Regierungspräsident of Thuringia when the US Army liberated the region but was 
almost immediately removed from office by the Soviets.  He aided in the re-founding of the SPD !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
305 “Brief an Dr. Brill von W. Wolf,” 17.9.1945, LT-MfV, Nr. 51, THStAW 
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in Thuringia but very quickly left the region to work for the Americans in Berlin in late 1945.  
His later political life would be no less remarkable: he had a hand in the drafting of the new 
Federal Republic’s Basic Law and served as a representative in its parliament in the early 50s.   
 At the time that he wrote to Wolf regarding the Soviet orders to purge the libraries, 
however, his remarkable career was in a transitional period.  He did not write as one government 
official to another, but as a politically active, highly prominent citizen reaching out to an old 
colleague and fellow Buchenwald survivor.  Personal connections and networks such as these 
undoubtedly played a role, both formally and informally, in how information about the 
occupation mandates was transmitted and how administrative intermediaries interpreted and 
reacted to them.  In this instance the prominence of both of the individuals involved makes these 
connections much easier to trace, however the nature of it is similar to many others that remain 
obscure to the historical record.    
 Whether in the east or the west, this kind of pressure from the public was taken seriously.   
In his dealings with the Americans Minister Stein laid a strong emphasis on the importance of 
maintaining public support for the general thrust of the reforms that the Allies were attempting to 
make.  He framed the issue of the ongoing delays in introducing mandatory English instruction 
not only in terms of current capabilities to put together the required classes, but also with regards 
to maintaining public support.  He warned that if quality were sacrificed to meet arbitrary 
deadlines “The whole school reform would be publicly discredited,” with the result that “Anyone 
who wants to work with us today will begin to have doubts, and some would no longer 
participate because of the two years lost [to delays].”  Stein’s strategy was to keep his fellow 
citizens invested in the ongoing reforms by showing that they were necessary in order to produce 
a better, stronger post-war educational system.  This was especially necessary with regard to 
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mandatory English instruction, which many viewed with mistrust as intended purely to make the 
American sector easier to govern rather than to tie it into Western Europe more broadly.  Stein 
warned that should the introduction of mandatory English classes be rushed there was the risk 
that “It will be said that the American military government is only interested in reducing the 
overall level of education.”306 
 Stein made these views absolutely explicit during a joint meeting of the staffs of the 
Ministry of Education and the E&CR Division to discuss his plans to bring proposed reforms 
before the public for comment and criticism.  He opened by responding to earlier suggestions 
that the reforms simply be carried through via fiat, something well within the power of the 
American occupation authorities.  Bringing it before the public, he maintained, 
 
is the way in which I foresee the realization of a German school reform. . . . There 
is also another way.  Then, however, we don’t have a German school reform any 
more; then it is an American school reform. . . If we want to carry the school 
reform to the grave from the outset, then we should introduce it in the form of 
commands; then you will find no response with the general population. . . If we 
do not implement a school reform that is personally affirmed by the majority of 
the German educators and population then we will have a school reform that is 
not earnestly intended and which will perish.  And then all of those who 
disapprove of school reform today will rejoice.  And a great hope will be lost once 
again. . . I do not know what else to say to the public, when I hear over and over !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
306 “Abschrift, Besprechung zw. Mr. V.R. DeLong & Minister Dr. E. Stein,” 26. July 1948, Abt. 
1178, Nr. 67a, HHStAW  
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again: “You do everything at the direction of the military government.” “How is 
that democracy and independent education?”307 
 
Stein’s approach seems to have been to bring the public around to reconstruction more gradually 
and with longer periods of public comment and involvement, rather than via a single strike that 
would be packaged as a simple necessity of post-war reorganization.   
 Educational officials in Thuringia were equally cognizant of the need for direct 
interaction between the educational administration and the communities that they served.  As 
early as December 1945 Minister Wolf ordered the creation of district-level advisory committees 
made up of prominent members of the local community.  These committees were to include at 
least one member of each of the four ‘antifascist parties,’ one trade union representative, one 
representative from the local youth groups, one from the local Women’s Committee, and three 
parents representing the largest schools.  In ordering the organization of these advisory bodies, 
Wolf noted that “The district education office is not a self-contained bureaucratic authority, but a 
living part of the democratic administration of the state.”308  These were not just the fleeting 
concerns of officials operating in the extraordinarily unstable period immediately after the war.  
Two years later, with the political situation in Thuringia significantly more settled, Wolf’s 
successor Dr. Marie Torhorst expressed frequent concerns about what “the farmers” thought of 
the reforms that were being implemented and their perceptions of the staff that were carrying 
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them out.309   Similar to Wolf’s earlier conscious inclusion of representatives from of the public 
via advisory committees, Torhorst made specific instructions during the preparations for the 
1947 Pedagogical Congress that “approximately ten people from public life should take part, 
except for principals and teachers (mayors, youth and women’s representatives, etc.).”310 
  
Mediation within the profession 
 
 The immediate post-war era was filled with many tensions that had within them the 
potential for a high degree of friction between various groups, if not explosive confrontation.  
The trauma of complete government collapse followed by the uncertainties of foreign occupation 
created space within which previously conflicts could be reignited and renegotiated and new 
ones settled.  For educational administrators this posed a number of challenges and required that 
they mediate such conflicts within their own ranks.  In some instances a degree of confrontation 
and resolution was required, however in others there was little to gain and much to lose if small 
scandals and petty differences spiraled out of control and came to the attention of the occupation 
authorities.   By responding to these local disturbances directly and largely preventing them from 
coming to the attention of the occupation authorities, German administrators were able to ensure 
that the problems were resolved by people most familiar with the entire context from which they 
emerged and avoid damaging over-reactions that could result in disrupted classrooms, the loss of 
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badly needed educators and staff, or the loss of much needed community support for their 
ongoing rebuilding efforts.  
 One of the key areas that needed constant tending were the bruised professional egos and 
inter-personnel tensions that resulted from flattening what had previously been a very 
hierarchical school system.  In the Imperial- and Weimar-era school structures within which 
most teachers and virtually all of the administrators had been acculturated, primary and 
secondary education were considered two different professional worlds.  The professional 
certifications required for each were significantly different, as were the levels of education 
expected of an instructor.311  Teachers at a primary school were only expected to attend a non-
university teaching academy for their professional training, while those in the secondary schools 
were required to have university degrees.  University-trained educators who had a few decades 
of classroom experience and some additional training were the usual candidates for promotion to 
administrative positions, creating a deep professional divide based on education and credentials.  
This was exacerbated by the fact that university training required an Abitur, while entrance to a 
teaching academy did not.  This created an additional class and economic facet to the 
professional divide, one created by the very tiered nature of the educational system that the 
reforms were attempting to eradicate.  
 There was a social and cultural basis for this division as well.  The positions that required 
university training were recognized by the state as civil servants, or Beamte, a position that 
traditionally carried a degree of social cachet and respectability within German society.  Primary 
school teachers lacked this recognition.  The neohumanistic ideal of self-cultivation or Bildung !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
311 For an excellent overview of the structure of the schools of this period see Marjorie Lamberti, 
State, Society, and the Elementary School in Imperial Germany, (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1989) 
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lent an additional edge to this differentiation as well. Usually translated as either “cultivation” or 
“education,” Bildung referred to both the process and the final result of intellectual development. 
Juxtaposed against the more utilitarian concept of practical instruction, or Erziehung, and the 
frivolity of aristocratic dilettantism, Bildung provided grounds on which professionals and civil 
servants could lay claim to a measure of social prestige above the traditional trades and 
commercial classes.  A university-trained teacher at a secondary school would be considered a 
gebildete Beamte; a primary school teacher trained at a teacher’s academy would not.  While 
Erziehung implies cognitive training, Bildung bore with it additional implications of social 
station that were vital for those who would use education as a means for social mobility - either 
for themselves, or to encourage it in others.312 
 This could be problematic in a number of ways.  In the East, where education was 
undergoing a more thorough restructuring into a unified system than the more limited reforms 
being undertaken in the West, there was the subsequent need to constantly remind educators that 
previously important professional distinctions were not nearly as important.  An appointment of 
a highly-skilled individual to oversee a primary school need not be read as a professional slight, 
for example.  Meanwhile in the West the more limited integration meant that regardless of what 
the official policy might have been, many traditional professional distinctions remained in place, 
but the reforms that managed to be successfully enacted meant that university and teaching 
academy trained educators needed to work much more closely together than they had previously.   
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 The friction resulting between these two groups was significant and an ongoing source of 
petty disputes and complaints.  In one typical instance in late 1949 in Hesse, a routine meeting 
over relatively minor curricular adjustments for the coming school year degenerated into a 
heated argument between two committee members.  One held a doctorate and represented the 
various Gymnasia in the district, while the other was named only with the title of “Lehrer” and 
represented the Volksschulen.  The argument revolved around the virtues of traditional lecture 
based instruction as opposed to a more flexible lesson plan that allowed teachers to approach 
each student individually and develop instruction that originated “from the child out.” The 
tellingly reformist phrasing itself harkened back to the pedagogical debates of the late Imperial 
era and the argument, which quickly spread to include the rest of the committee, broke down 
over clearly professional lines.  Disturbances such as this posed a direct challenge to the ongoing 
efforts to unify the school system.  Reformers were faced with the prospect of not only merging 
numerous previously divergent educational tracks, but also bringing together two previously 
antagonistic professional groups in order to make it happen. 313 
 As challenging as these professional animosities could be, they were not nearly as fraught 
as the realities of denunciation and allegations of political sabotage under a military government.  
In both the Soviet and Western Occupation Zones the military authorities were quite sensitive to 
the dangers, real or imagined, of a post-Nazi resistance movement. Allied authorities were 
keenly vigilant against the threat of any kind of so-called ‘Werewolf” activities, a term derived 
from the apocalyptic final exhortations of Nazi leaders to continue the fight after the military 
collapse via guerilla warfare.   
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 Spurred by a highly critical and pessimistic wartime analysis of Nazi education and its 
effects on a generation of schoolchildren, Allied occupation authorities paid special attention to 
the potential threat posed by the schools themselves.  Instructional films for American soldiers 
on occupation duties exhorted them to avoid fraternization with Germans, especially children.  
One such film, Your Job in Germany, called German youth the “most dangerous” group, citing 
an upbringing that “poisoned their minds” and named them “[products] of the worst educational 
crime in the history of the world.”  The fruits of this educational malpractice were claimed to 
“believe they were born to be masters and that we are inferiors, designed to be their slaves,” and 
ominously concluded that, “They may deny it now, but they believe it and will try to prove it 
again.314”  Soviet military authorities were no less concerned with the threat represented by 
deeply indoctrinated school aged children and the opportunities that the flotsam and jetsam of 
war provided for either scattered mischief or organized insurrection.  
 This background of fear and mistrust coupled with a base assumption that some form of 
resistance was not only possible but also likely heightened the danger of overreaction on to any 
infractions or challenges to military rule.  The recent experiences of the occupied Germans 
further complicated this explosive situation. Over the course of twelve years of totalitarian rule 
they had learned hard lessons about the utility of political denunciation as a tool for professional 
advancement and an outlet for petty personal grievances.315  As a result, administrators had to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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not only contend with the damage that could be caused by over-zealous military officials 
paranoid about the possibility of armed uprisings, but Germans both within the school system 
and without who were willing to leverage that paranoia to further their own agendas.  In this 
atmosphere administrators played a vital role in defusing these potentially explosive situations in 
order to both spare innocent victims of denunciations and prevent the widespread disruption to 
educational reconstruction that further purges and searches for revanchist Nazis could trigger.  
 The example of Dr. Theodor Frey, an elementary school principal in the Thuringian town 
of Apolda, illustrates both of these forms of internal tension and the troubles that could arise 
from them.  Dr. Frey was a Baltic German resettled to the area by the German government in the 
first years of WW2.  His actions during the war remain unclear, however at the very least he 
stayed politically clean enough to pass initial denazification measures.  His native fluency in 
Russian, combined with apparent socialist or communist political affinities, quickly provided 
him contacts within both the local KPD as well as the Soviet military authorities in the region.  
He parlayed these connections into employment, first as a translator for the local occupation 
government and later as the principal of the town’s primary school.316   
          His tenure at Apolda was brief and nothing short of a disaster.  He fought constantly with 
his teaching staff over every conceivable matter, ranging from classroom instruction to how to 
conduct food distribution programs overseen by the school to minor scheduling details. By all 
accounts he was challenging in the extreme to speak with, a problem that was alternatively 
blamed on his being personally antagonistic, hard of hearing, and difficult to understand due to 
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his Baltic dialect. 317  As someone with a doctorate he felt that his assignment to a Volksschule 
was beneath him and frequently wrote directly to the Ministry of Education seeking a better 
position.318  He had significant contacts with the local office of the KPD and made frequent use 
of them in his attempts to secure a new job.319  These requests were constantly rebuffed, with 
frequent reminders that in the new system there was nothing lesser or demeaning about being 
associated with the primary schools.320  This was an annoying but not irreconcilable situation.  
Such prejudices were still relatively wide-spread and a key component of the ongoing 
reconstruction process was bringing older educators around to accept that assignments that 
would have been interpreted as a professional rebuff a few years earlier no longer held such 
opprobrium.   
 In the spring of 1946, however, Dr. Frey escalated matters badly.  He resorted to alleging 
that he could no longer continue on at the Apolda Volksschule because it was a nest of 
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revanchist, fascist agitators who were plotting against both him, personally, and the government 
as a whole.  He formally denounced virtually the entire teaching staff by name, along with a 
lengthy list of allegations, including very dangerous charges that they were an organized 
‘Werewolf’ cell.321  These allegations were not to be taken lightly; given the explosive post-war 
political atmosphere any one of them, investigated by a individually zealous or politically 
motivated Soviet officer could have been both personally and professionally disastrous for every 
person named.   
 The situation was resolved in the most expeditious manner possible:  It was brought to 
the personal attention of the Minister of Education, Dr. Walter Wolf.  After a rapid investigation 
Dr. Frey was quickly dismissed and one of the men whom he had denounced was promoted to 
take his place.322  He was eventually given a new position as a non-academic translator at the 
Friedrich Schiller University in Jena, at which point he faded into historical obscurity.323 
 Frey’s example highlights the means by which potentially disastrous internal disputes 
could be quickly resolved such that outside authorities, who may have had other priorities than 
the smooth functioning of the schools, would not become involved.  The invocation of the phrase 
‘Werewolf action’ in particular by Fry was very precise and highly incendiary.  These were not 
simply charges of past political affinities, but allegations of ongoing, active resistance to the 
military occupation in support of the renewal of German fascism.  Had the allegations drawn the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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attention of local military authorities the subsequent investigation likely would have ruined the 
professional lives of many involved if only through association. It does not take much creativity 
to imagine the potential for personal ruin that would have attended them as well.  By elevating 
such a sensitive issue up to the ministerial level as quickly as it was, and dealing with it almost 
entirely internally, many potentially disruptive political entanglements were avoided. The result 
was that Frey was correctly identified as the troublesome influence and removed rather than 
expose the Apolda primary school to the wholesale disruption that the mass censure or 
replacement of affected teachers would have entailed. 
 The incident also illustrates the ongoing importance of older tensions within the teaching 
profession, and the difficulties experienced by administrators who were attempting to diffuse 
them to more efficiently bring about the new order.  In the case of Dr. Frey it was his ongoing 
insistence that he be placed somewhere other than the Volksschule.  Despite the ongoing reform 
efforts and transitions to more egalitarian forms of education that were taking place across 
Germany, and the noticeably more radical transition to the Einheitsschule that was taking place 
in the Soviet Zone, Dr. Frey continued to assume that a position as principal of a primary school 
was beneath someone of his education.  In the older system he would have been correct.  In it 
education and class were tightly bound up and a stark professional distinction was made between 
the university-educated gebildete Beamte at the higher schools and the far less prestigious 








 The work of educational administrators as institutional intermediaries between the 
various groups participating in and concerned with the rebuilding of German education was vital, 
not only to their own project but to the broader functioning of German society under military 
occupation.  They provided an accessible touchstone across which communication could happen 
across cultural, political, and professional voids.  Not all of this, of course, was strictly unique to 
the ranks of educational administrators.  Administrative professionals in other fields undoubtedly 
played similar roles across Germany as they sought to rebuild the areas of civil society and 
government that lay within their own professional purview.   
 The specific example of educational administrators is, however, remarkable in the level 
of public interest generated by their efforts, the depth of importance ascribed by the occupation 
authorities to the reforms that they were tasked with, and the relative weakness of the branches 
of occupation government that they were partnered with.  The resulting mixture of public interest 
and pressure with uneven military oversight resulted in significant opportunities to create a 
specifically German reconstruction effort; one that in many ways was guided more by the 
individual beliefs and priorities of the administrators themselves than the public that they served.  
This is itself part of the nature of intermediary positions: the intermediary can express a 
surprising amount of agency based on how they promote or hinder different activities at different 
times. 
 It is this agency that helped to magnify the differences between what would become East 
German and West German education, as one set of administrators chose to fight a rear guard 
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action against many supposedly inevitable reforms while another embraced them and pushed 
them through to create an almost completely new school system.   
 In the areas under Soviet control the ‘costs’ of earning the cooperation of these 
administrators were largely born by the German public and the educational system that was 
being reformed.  The educational administrators in the SBZ tended to be pre-war socialists and 
communists who were far more open to broad, sweeping reforms of German education than their 
western counterparts.  This was partially due to private histories that were more likely to include 
critical views of pre-Nazi educational structures, if not significant professional difficulties.  
These were not recalcitrant reformers brought only reluctantly to remodeling German education, 
but believers in its necessity who could be counted on to quash local opposition if necessary. 
 In the areas under American control, however, the administrators that the US Army was 
working with were significantly less eager to embrace deep, systematic change in German 
education.  While they certainly acknowledged that some reforms had to be made in light of the 
disasters of National Socialism, they were far more likely to have had more positive experiences 
of older German educational traditions and were understandably less enthusiastic about 
abandoning them wholesale.  Rather than aiding the Americans in winning over local 
populations to the reforms that they wanted to make, they were more likely to stall, support local 







CHAPTER 6: PERSONNEL IS POLICY - THE AGENCY OF ADMINISTRATION 
 
In politics power, not administration, is decisive; but, unless 
tyranny is to hold the whip hand, all questions of culture and 
education must be matters of administration as well as of power. 
   - Werner Richter, former undersecretary  
   in the Prussian Ministry of Education,  
   1945324 
 
A public office is not a job, it is an opportunity to do something for 
the public. 
   -Franklin Knight Lane, American politician,  
   1902325 
 
 It is deceptively easy to underestimate the role that Germans played in the post-war 
reconstruction project.  The immediate result of the war was a complete collapse of Germany as 
a political entity and the imposition of military rule by their wartime adversaries, a state of 
affairs that did not lend itself well to domestic political agency.  The relaxation of the earliest, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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most heavy-handed forms of military rule and gradual restoration of civilian government hardly 
alleviated this, taking place as they did against the backdrop of the escalating political tensions 
between the Soviets and Western Allies that eventually culminated in Cold War.  This was 
accompanied by the adaptation of a two state solution for the question of post-war German 
nationhood, a solution that inextricably linked German foreign and domestic politics with the 
policies and priorities of NATO and the Warsaw Pact for decades to come.  While educational 
policies were not as heavily moderated under occupation as foreign or economic issues, many of 
the key agendas were set by the local occupation authorities and influenced by their policies and 
priorities.  The idea of renewing religious education in public schools was a complete non-starter 
under the Soviets, for example, while the Americans were far more amenable to it. 
 Nonetheless there existed space within the occupation system for initiative and agency on 
the part of the occupied.  The ultimate direction that German domestic policy took may have 
been dictated by the needs and priorities of the members of the Allied Control Council, but they 
were in large part dependent on individual Germans to implement it.   German educational 
administrators were necessary for the smooth functioning of the educational system and as such 
could not readily be replaced by foreign officers, assuming the occupation forces had either the 
inclination or the resources to do so.  As members of a German civil administration, the 
intermediary position that they held between the occupation forces and the general population 
not only allowed them to function as a bridge for communications between these groups, but as a 
gatekeeper as well.  There was therefore a significant amount of power and agency in 
functioning as an intermediary, but not an unlimited amount.  Generally speaking they did not set 
the policies and goals for educational reconstruction, but German educational administrators 
could use that agency to shape and nuance the policies that they were tasked with overseeing.  
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The way that they chose to shape and direct those policies was determined by what can be 
broadly categorized as three sets of general loyalties that they had above and beyond their 
responsibilities or even loyalties to the occupation forces and their priorities. These were: to their 
personal beliefs and convictions, to political parties with which they were affiliated, and to the 
needs and wishes of their fellow Germans.  Like most attempts to categorize motivations these 
are imprecise and overlapping categories, but broadly speaking they describe many of the 
responsibilities that influenced these men and women.   
 The occupation administrations were not blind to the agency inherent in these positions 
and the potential consequences of giving the Germans some degree of power over their own fate.  
There was little alternative, short of making the choice to micromanage every level of the 
educational system.  This option would have been infeasible at best and would have done little to 
engender enthusiasm within the local population for the major reforms that they viewed as 
necessary.  Some degree of decision making autonomy was unavoidable, and even desired by the 
occupation forces. At a meeting between the Hessian Minister of Education Erwin Stein and 
American Deputy Director of the US Army Education & Cultural Relations Division in Hesse 
Vaughn R. DeLong, DeLong noted that “Educators and teachers should get accustomed to the 
fact that they can determine their own details on a general outline which has been agreed upon 
by everybody.  Policies should not define too many details, as the teacher should teach upon his 
own, individual decision and on the individuality which population and district require.326” 
 This was especially true given that in both the east and the west there were attempts to 
convey at least the impression of renewed democratic governance, with multiple political parties 
pressing issues at local assemblies.  This arrangement was not purely negative from the point of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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view of the occupation authorities.  By fostering the development of a native civil administration 
and giving it some degree of real power it legitimated the government in the eyes of the German 
population in a manner that a purely foreign regime grounded in the physical might of a military 
occupation would find difficult.    
 One reform that the occupation forces were steadfast on was that educational 
administration be ‘democratic’ in nature, although precise understandings of that term differed.  
A letter from the E&RA Division of OMG-H to the Hessian Ministry of Culture concerning 
debates over proposed school reform legislation made the importance of this to the American 
forces explicitly clear.  The letter began very bluntly, stating, “Democratic school administration 
is basic for a democratic school system.  All school reform is empty and meaningless unless the 
administration itself is democratic.  Such administration must occur on all levels.327”  How, 
exactly, ‘democratic’ was to be understood was never defined. From context, and their constantly 
expressed fears of autocratic rule and despotic tendencies at any level of German government, it 
seems that they meant it to reflect a general dispersal of authority and the mirroring of 
democratic governmental structures.  For the western allies it also implied political democracy 
and the construction of a system within which all participants had a voice in how it was run, 
either directly or through the election of representatives.   
 For the Soviets and German communists, on the other hand, ‘democratic’ wasn’t directly 
associated with a specific type of government but with a system that was designed for the benefit 
of the majority of its users.  In this it stood in direct contrast not only to the obviously and 
egregiously exploitive schools of Nazi Germany, but also to German education as it had existed !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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under the Weimar Republic and the Kaiserreich.  This is the distinction Hans Siebert made in 
1950 when he described the changes of the immediate post-war period using a distinctly socialist 
vocabulary:  “Our schools transformed themselves [with these democratic reforms] from an 
instrument for exploiting and dumbing down our children in the monopoly-capitalist economy 
into a tool of free, creative work and the improvement of the general educational level of our 
children in the new democratic order.328” In Siebert’s view the schools were democratic 
specifically because they rejected reproducing the inequalities of previous eras in favor of 
presenting equal opportunities for all children.  Rather than focus on a definition of democratic 
that privileged a specific electoral methodology or government organization, the Soviets and 
their allies in the east articulated one that in theory emphasized equality for all.  It is easy with 
the benefit of half a century of hindsight to be cynical about how the concept of ‘democracy’ was 
used and at times abused by various Eastern European single party dictatorships during the Cold 
War.  This does not, however, mean that we must necessarily be equally skeptical of the 
motivations of the idealists and reformers who first adopted that language in the years after 
World War 2.    
 The notion of democratic government or democratic renewal also incorporated a sense of 
political aloofness that most Germans would have already been familiar with.  One 
communication between E&RA and the Ministry of Culture emphasized that “Democratic 
procedure means also that extraneous factors such as political party and religious confession and 
other factors not of a professional nature should not enter into the selection or dismissal of 
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employees.329”  Similarly, the post-war loyalty oath administered to newly hired staff within the 
educational ministry required that they swear to serve “impartially” [unparteiisch] and in the 
“spirit of constructing a democratic state.330”   What they were describing wasn’t just a necessary 
impartiality in laying the groundwork for a politically democratic government, but an ideal of 
disinterestedness in politics on both professional and administrative grounds.    
 This emphasis echoes the values of an earlier generation of German educational 
administrators.  Before the political disruptions of the late Weimar era the ideal of the politically 
aloof civil servant held sway.  In its idealized form these were people who, while not necessarily 
disinterested personally, professionally stayed above political disagreements and squabbles in 
order to best serve the interests of the state while retaining the freedom to make general decisions 
on their own.  Inextricably linked to their identities as Beamte, this ideal encouraged all civil 
servants to behave politically such that they could “look after all levels of the population in an 
equally just manner.”331  This model of an impartial civil service had been taken for granted by 
generations of German administrators and, while degraded by the actions of many under Nazi 
governance, remained a powerful ideal.   
 A return to this approach would help avoid an overly politicized teaching corps 
disrupting the classroom with contemporary political controversies, as well as buffer the 
democratic state against the potential abuse of the classroom as a tool for indoctrination by a !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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future party-in-power, as it was under the Nazis.332  For the men who came of age professionally 
within the German Civil Service when this was presented as a normative ideal, it continued to be 
an alluring aspiration.  In 1948, in the middle of a politicized sexual scandal involving a school 
inspector near Kassel that had implications for an upcoming state election, the Hessian Minister 
of Education and Culture Erwin Stein wrote to the head of the state government that “an 
educational and cultural policy that is in the interest of the whole nation and not just a segment of 
the population or a party cannot be operated in this way.  It seems necessary to me - and I must 
point to this time and time again - that the professional and political suitability must take priority 
over party considerations.333” The distinction being drawn between political suitability and party 
considerations must be considered in the context of denazification.  The need to discriminate 
between applicants based on past political activity could not be escaped, but it was also 
undesirable to make contemporary political activity a primary concern in making staffing 
decisions. Stein himself was a prominent member of the CDU, and the head of government in 
Kassel that he was writing to was a fellow party member as well.  That Minister Stein chose to 
remind him of the necessity of maintaining professional discipline even at the risk of politically 
inconveniencing the party to which they both belonged indicates how desirable it was to 
maintain some level of professional impartiality as civil servants. 
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 Like most ideals, this conception of bureaucratic aloofness was more valuable as a goal 
to be striven towards than a rigidly upheld virtue to be maintained. In practice few post-war 
educational administrators were capable of fully separating their convictions, ambitions, and 
hopes from their professional duties at all times.  This would be true under the most stable and 
ideal of circumstances, much less amid the numerous challenges and opportunities posed by the 
conditions in occupied Germany.  While it is difficult to answer the question of what inner, 
personal convictions motivated someone in the pursuit of their duties, it is not impossibly so. 
Some of the men and women who were put into these positions wrote about their views of recent 
German history, the potential for reconstruction, and the moral implications of reestablishing 
self-governance for a country that had so recently transgressed every imaginable civilized norm.  
It is logical to presume that these personal convictions were incorporated at some level into their 
day-to-day duties, and perhaps give some indication of the underlying attitudes and beliefs that 
governed the way they helped shape educational policy. 
 In the East, Karl Trinks was a prominent pre-war pedagogue and noted Social Democrat 
who was fired in 1933 for his political views during the National Socialist Gleichschaltung.  
After the war he was influential in restructuring the professional training of educators in the 
Soviet Zone and wrote prolifically on what the pedagogical goals of a renewed postwar Germany 
should be.   He blamed pre-Nazi educational and political traditions for enabling the rise of the 
NSDAP.  In his eyes decades of politicized educational policy had rendered them hopelessly 
intertwined and significantly contributed to generation after generation of Germans embracing 
militarism and undemocratic ideals. “Thus trod the German people through its two educational 
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institutions - the school and the barracks - and down the straight path to destruction,” he wrote.  
“The youth literally led a ‘dangerous’ life and ended on the bloody fields of the wars.  After all, 
in the schools they had learned Dulce et decorum est pro patria mori. . .334“  A firm Marxist, he 
maintained that any new law governing schools “should be a democratic one, whereby the notion 
of democracy will be ascribed its original meaning as it was given to you by our great fathers 
Marx and Engels:  Dominance of the people, of the workers, of the active portion of the 
population.  In educational efforts and endeavors the ultimate goal is also the classless society, a 
social body without any privileged other than those who produce the most, the most 
educationally ambitious (Bildungswillen), and the most talented.”335 Despite bearing more than a 
passing resemblance to the sort of language that would become commonplace in coming decades 
within the SED’s DDR, this was not a simple political or economic application of Marxist theory 
or the policy of any single political party but a broadly Marxist understanding of history and 
human nature, and one with which he hoped to guide Germany out of a dark past and into a 
better future.  
 In the spirit of this new classless society that Trinks wished to construct there should also 
be a new German, and “The new German should peace-loving, civil, have a good will, be 
understanding of other peoples, and bring a readiness for peaceful joint work.336” He did not 
write simply of the re-education of a nation or the rehabilitation of older traditions that a post-
National Socialist Germany could rightfully be proud of, but the fresh foundation of a 
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completely new society, nation, and individual free from all of the baggage of a deeply 
problematic educational culture and history.337   
 In this he was in agreement with Hans Siebert, a pre-war communist teacher who 
emigrated to England in 1936 and was active in western expatriate circles before returning to the 
Soviet Zone after the war.  Siebert held that the issue of German culpability for the crimes of the 
Third Reich could not be reduced to the question of Nazis and anti-Nazis, those who stood with 
the regime or against it.  He claimed that the great difference between Germany and other 
nations of Western Europe before the war was that the “middle bulk” of the population had been 
systematically trained “to believe in slogans which promise national grandeur at the cost of other 
nations,” and laid the blame solely at the feet of a German educational system that “since 
Bismarck . . . has gradually and systematically weakened whatever other more European, liberal, 
democratic traditions may have existed before that time.”338  In essence, he believed that the 
Germany of Fichte, Hegel, Goethe, and Humboldt was an unrecoverable past destroyed by what 
he saw as the disastrous legacies of 1870 and half a century of Prussian rule and administration 
dedicated to consolidating Hohenzollern dominance and establishing a military state capable of 
pursuing the aggressive foreign policies of its political elites.   
 In his view Germany had indeed walked a ‘special path’ to the disastrous policies of the 
Third Reich, but it was one that was not rooted in the mists of antiquity or in any particular 
character flaw unique to the Germans as a people.  Instead he traced its origins to a specific mid-
19th century political disaster and ruinous policies that had taken half a century to reach full 
fruition.   If anything this was a relatively optimistic reading of German history for its time, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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because it contained within it a logical basis for repairing or curing whatever defect one believed 
led to the rise of National Socialism.  At a moment when many were arguing that there was some 
kind of inherent flaw or defect in the German national character that made the very existence of 
German culture or nation problematic, Siebert was pointing to specific political and 
administrative explanations.   If these were the causes of Europe’s tragic early 20th century then 
it stood to reason that political and bureaucratic processes could reverse them as well.  If 
Bismark’s educational system had laid the groundwork for the emergence of a Hitler, then 
perhaps a self-consciously anti-fascist successor could prevent the advent of another dictator. 
 In Hesse, Erwin Stein also held the firm conviction that the roots of recent German 
history lay beyond the immediate political crises of the interwar years.  Like his contemporaries 
under Soviet occupation he also contemplated the recent history of his countrymen, its causes, 
and how best to move forward in the future.  For him the answer was a more spiritual renewal.  
A noted post-war CDU politician and eventual Minister of Culture in Hesse, he had been forced 
from public life during the war because of his wife’s Jewish ancestry. Unlike many others he did 
not see German culture as irreparably tainted by the years of National Socialism.  He called for a 
moderate approach that both recognized the need for fundamental reform but did not seek a 
complete break with the past for its own sake.  He recommended the combination of the best that 
pre-war Germany had to offer with an intelligent reform of the inner weaknesses that contributed 
to its debasement under Hitler.  “Your way is not that of the restoration or the revolution.  Your 
way lies in the middle, in the joining of the uncorrupted old with the good new.339”  
 A staunch Catholic, Stein identified the deficiencies that had led to the depravity of the 
Nazi regime as a core weakness in the modern, Western way of life, a spiritual emptiness that !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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left citizens open to demagoguery and the appeal of secular savior figures in times of political or 
economic crisis.  While Germany had fallen most spectacularly as a result, these were not forces 
or flaws that were unique to it or which it alone could have given way to.  In this he was of a 
very different mind than most of the foreign occupation officials.  While the occupiers tended to 
focus on what they saw as inherently German flaws and failures, Stein was constructing a 
narrative in which Germany fell victim to more general influences that could have plagued any 
modern industrial nation.   
 Unlike the most radical reformers he saw much that was positive in older, specifically 
German traditions and emphasized the role that Christianity played in that heritage.  He wrote 
that “all that is good and great in German history comes from the ethos of Christian 
humanism.340”  This was not without political consequences.  First and foremost his emphasis 
upon Christian humanism fell directly in line with the CDU at this time, which is unsurprising 
given how politically active he was with it.  Stein also maintained that it was the basis of a deep 
cultural connection to the Western Allies, a common religious and moral tradition upon which 
the foundations of long-lasting political cooperation and stability could be built.  “This is also the 
ethos that internally binds all the peoples of Western culture, among which I also count America.  
It alone will be able to carry the future of the democratic world.341”  This notion of shared values 
of the Abendland stands in implicit contrast to the presumably atheistic, eastern politics of the 
Soviets.   
   For Stein, however, the answer to the specific spiritual and moral failings that led 




Much like the American educators that he worked with, Stein was also a strong believer in the 
social engineering potential of a national educational system, and felt that it would play a key 
role in any true denazification of society.  Despite his professional predispositions he also 
recognized that such a system was limited in the scope of its influence.  The much-acclaimed 
Imperial German educational system had, after all, produced the generations that voted the Nazis 
into office, the engineers that designed the gas chambers, and the officers who commanded 
Hitler’s armies.  Unlike Trinks he did not find that education at fault for those later injustices, but 
lamented that it had fallen so pathetically short of preventing or ameliorating them.  “Our old 
educational system and its so finely developed institutions could not render our people immune 
to the poison of the militaristic and nationalistic craze [Ungeist].  Our schools did not arouse 
sufficient defenses against the political radicalisms of the left and the right.342” 
 Through reforming the pre-war school system to extend a quality education to everyone, 
regardless of social or economic standing, society as a whole could be uplifted and improved 
while still retaining the best of what remained after Hitler.  “In this case, the structure of the 
education and training system must be determined by the requirements that the cultural and 
economic situation of our people demand.  This means providing a comprehensive educational 
system for all youth based on the democratic principle: “equal educational opportunities for 
all.343“  In contrast to more radical proposals, he did not advocate creating an entirely new 
system, but reforming the old, multi-tracked and -tiered system of the Empire and Weimar 
Republic to remove the structural inequalities while retaining the basic system that Germans 
citizens were familiar with and trusted. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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 In all these cases there was an emphasis on the need for some kind of national renewal 
following the decades of Nazi leadership.  However uneven in the specifics, the common mission 
was to aid in the rebirth of not only the German state, but of the German people in a new and 
better form that runs throughout.  While it would be unwise to lay too much emphasis upon this 
sort of inner, personal conviction and the role that it played in shaping policy and administrative 
direction during the post-war restructuring and rebuilding of the educational system, it also 
should not be completely ignored.  It should be noted, for example, that throughout his tenure in 
office Stein maintained contact with religiously affiliated youth groups, was in favor of retaining 
some level of religious education in the public school system, and was politically affiliated with 
the CDU.  Likewise both Trinks and Siebert settled in the Soviet Zone after the war and devoted 
themselves to an educational program that included the full remodeling of the German system as 
an Einheitssschule.  While none of these were necessarily due to personal convictions regarding 
the root of Germany’s recent failings they do help to place them in context.  The same can also 
be said of the more tangible political connections that they and their colleagues made within their 
communities during the occupation period. 
      
Responsibilities and loyalties to political parties 
 
 There is, of course, a broad distance between a person’s personal philosophy and the 
actual political measures that he advocate and support.  This gap is often the result of simple 
pragmatism; an individual working alone and answerable only to his own conscience can only do 
so much, while many working in concert can achieve much more.  In order to obtain that unity, 
personal goals sometimes need to be sacrificed in order to achieve the larger results that the 
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group can compromise on and agree to pursue.  This is the simple logic of party politics.  The 
men and women in charge of educational reconstruction in Germany used the power inherent in 
their administrative posts to support the political parties to which they belonged, both through 
advancing the interests of those parties and by actively blocking those of competing parties.   
 The post-war restructuring that took place in most aspects of German political life 
affected the political landscape as well.  The CDU and it’s Bavarian sister party the CSU were 
founded in 1945 under new party programs.  They essentially replaced the defunct Center Party 
and sought to be an inter-confessional party that could use a common Christian tradition to 
bridge the political divides between working and capital-holding classes that they saw as leading 
to the political chaos of the late Weimar Republic.344  The 1945 Berlin Proclamation that marked 
the establishment of the new party also called for educational reform, albeit in a fairly general, 
vague sense.  It demanded the protection of religious instruction, the end of all racial education, 
immediate action to undo the damage done by Nazi indoctrination, and a humanistic emphasis in 
education, emphasizing the connections between Germans and the rest of humanity in order to 
lay the groundwork for the moral renewal of the German people.345  As a new party they had no 
special institutional or historical affinity towards the educational structures that had existed under 
the Kaiserreich or Weimar Republic and were fairly open to reform, although some of their older 
members who were political refugees from the defunct Center Party would have had lingering 
loyalties and personal nostalgia for them.  They were, for example, largely supportive of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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reforming German education to allow students to change which track they were on later in life 
and of breaking down traditional professional hierarchies and distinctions between educators at 
different levels.346 
 This stands in contrast to the SPD, which continued to operate under its 1925 
Heidelberger Program until the end of the 1950s. Officially, this limited its educational demands 
to the educational reform packages that it had championed before the war.  These were a general 
disavowal of the structural inequalities in the German educational system, a call for reform to 
offer the same opportunities for all, the complete separation of church and state in all educational 
matters, equal attention to the development of educational institutions of all levels, unified 
teaching instruction for teachers of all institutions, and “co-education of both sexes by both 
sexes.”347  Although this was a somewhat dated program many of the reforms that were called 
for were broadly similar to those that had been announced by the Allied Control Commission, 
and there is no indication that the SPD’s supporters and members were opposed to any of the 
inescapable post-war measures, such as denazification.  This issue is further complicated due to 
the way in which the SPD in the Soviet zone was incorporated into the SED, while in the 
Western zones it remained an independent entity.  
 In marked contrast to the relative political stagnation of the SPD after Hitler’s rise to 
power, the KPD continued to refine its political stance during and after the takeover, from exile 
abroad during the war, and immediately following Germany’s surrender.  As early as 1930 the 
KPD’s Central Committee issued a “Program clarification for the national and social liberation !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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of the German people,” and by 1935 it was operating from exile in Moscow where it published 
the so-called “Brussels Manifesto.”  Understandably all of these suggestions focused on the 
immediate need of addressing the ongoing political and humanitarian crisis within Germany.348  
The first major post-Nazi educational policy articulated by the KPD came in the “Declaration of 
the Central Committee of the KPD of 11. June 1945.”  Among other important post-war issues, it 
called for: 
 
Cleaning the entire educational system of fascist and reactionary garbage.  The 
support of a truthful, democratic, progressive, and free spirit in all schools and 
educational establishments.  The systematic clarification of the barbaric nature of 
Nazi racial theory, of the mendacity of the “Doctrine of Living Space,” of the 
catastrophic consequences of Hitler’s policies for the German people.  The 
freedom of scholarly research and artistic design.349 
  
Meanwhile, the SED, as a wholly new political party, had both the freedom to articulate an 
independent policy without reference to what had come before as well as the necessity to stake 
out an explicit educational vision.  It did this in the 1946 “Principles and Objectives of the 
Socialist Unity Party of Germany.”  It called for a wholesale reform of the entire educational 
system and the foundation of an Einheitsschule where students could be educated in the “spirit of 
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a progressive democracy and of friendship with other peoples and an intrinsic humanity.350” It 
also demanded a full separation of the church from state and schools as well as a general cultural 
renewal of Germany.  
 While it was not a political party or movement in its own right, the work and goals of the 
Popular Front Committee in Buchenwald also bear mention.  A large number of the inmates at 
the Buchenwald concentration camp were political prisoners, or those from other prisoner 
categories who were politically sensitive.  One of the unplanned side effects of concentrating so 
many active opponents of national socialism in one place was that they began to clandestinely 
organize politically before the war ended.  They formed organizations along pre-war party lines 
and by 1944 had succeeded in forming a Popular Front Committee that planned, among other 
things, for the initial steps to be taken to reestablish a non-Nazi German government after the 
war.351  This was especially important for Thuringia, as Buchenwald was located in the hills 
outside of Weimar and many of these politically active inmates formed the core of the 
Thuringian state government immediately after liberation.  Walter Wolf, for example, was a 
Communist Party representative on the Popular Front Committee and the first Minister of 
Education in post-war Thuringia.  The other KPD representative, Johannes Brumme, would go 
on to serve under him within the Education ministry in the first years after the war.  Hermann 
Brill was one of the SPD representatives - and chairman - of the committee and briefly served as 
President of the Thuringian state government before being forced out by the Soviets.  While the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Popular Front Committee itself did not constitute a political party, it became highly symbolic and 
influential as an early antifascist movement within a state that was trying to reestablish itself 
along antifascist principles.   
 Shortly after liberation the Education Commission of the Popular Front Committee 
released a manifesto outlining recommended school policies for reforming Thuringian education.  
The main recommendations that they made were the immediate purging of Nazi educators and 
administrators, the replacement of religious instruction with classes in general life skills 
(Lebenskunde), the transfer of all teacher training to the university, the establishment of both 
parents councils and student governments, and a temporary halt to all instruction until the most 
pressing reforms could be made.352  
 Grand political statements and sweeping proclamations of belief and intent do not result 
in much concrete change without men and women in place who are willing to act on their behalf.  
Erwin Stein’s ongoing activism within the CDU in Hesse and his efforts to further the agendas of 
that organization and its associated organs is a clear example of an administrator using his 
position to forward the interests of a favored political party.  This support was extended not only 
to the party, but to its various sub-organs and affiliated organizations.  One of these was the 
Junge Union, the CDU’s youth branch.  It was a very conservative organization, especially 
regarding educational issues.  Their broadest educational goals mirrored that of the CDU as a 
whole, however they voiced their support for both private schools and religious education in an 
even more direct manner.  They argued that “the primacy of the rights of parents with regards to 
the education of their children is a natural and therefore God-given right” and that the ability of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
352 Hans Brumme, “Über die Tätigkeit der Erziehungskommission des illegalen 
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parents to choose to give their children a parochial or private education flowed directly from this 
right.353 They also strongly advocated religion as a required subject in all schools at all levels of 
instruction, and for all children and pressed for a single educational system across the entire 
nation in order to prevent a splintering of German culture along regional lines.354 Much like Stein 
himself they strongly emphasized the need for moral education regardless of religious affiliation 
and saw a unified public school system as a way to ensure equal access to it regardless of 
personal circumstances.  These priorities were highly compatible with the needs of the American 
occupation authorities and in addition advocated a view of national spiritual restoration that 
came very near to Stein’s own.  Such a strong overlap of beliefs and priorities explains the high 
degree of support that they received from him.  Not all student organizations were so lucky to 
receive the patronage of the Minister of Culture and Education.    
 1949 Stein became embroiled in a battle with a number of student run newspapers in 
Hessian schools.  Throughout his tenure in the Ministry of Culture, Stein supported student 
government as a key means for educating German youth towards future participation in a 
functioning democracy.  He was highly supportive of encouraging the settlement of petty 
classroom issues through debate, voting, and other democratic practices and even supported the 
establishment of local student councils.  Staffed by elected members of the student body, 
student-run newspapers were intended to both familiarize students with democratic practices and 
help organize useful aspects of student life to the benefit of both students and teachers.355   !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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 Unfortunately, from the point of view of Stein at least, these bodies quickly came to take 
themselves more seriously than had been intended, and attempted to organize beyond the level of 
individual schools and play an active role in politics outside of the school.  A few of them 
published articles and editorials critical of both the school administration and his leadership of 
the educational ministry, and his office responded by attempting to have their publication shut 
down.  What followed was a protracted fight between some student bodies and the Ministry of 
Education. It eventually grew to encompass not just the original questions of student publications 
and editorial freedom, but broader issues of student self-governance and the relationship and 
power dynamic between those bodies and the Educational Ministry.  At one point Stein 
attempted to intervene directly with his contacts within the Educational Division of the US 
Military’s occupation government, only to be admonished that that was not how one dealt with 
politically troublesome activism in a democratic environment.356   As part of this confrontation 
the Hessian branch of the KPD attempted to intervene on behalf of the students within the 
Landtag.357 
 In response to this, Stein reported the KPD directly to the occupation authorities for 
attempting to undermine both the peaceful occupation of Germany and the reconstruction of the 
educational system through unhelpful political activism and agitation within the schools.  While 
it can be argued that the KPD likely had political motives of its own for championing the 
students’ cause beyond a sincere belief in editorial freedoms and the value of student self-
governance, it is equally telling that Stein sent copies of his denunciation to the CDU party whip !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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and the chief editor of a regional CDU publication.358 Regardless of the particulars of how the 
KPD pressure affected his personal battle with the student papers, it seems clear that he took the 
opportunity to retaliate against the KPD in a way that is only explainable through his party 
loyalties to the CDU.         
 Not only direct action could be explained by party loyalties and personal views, but 
inaction and the failure to respond to events also had clear political motivations.  One striking 
example of this occurred when a teacher’s academy in Thuringia chose “The Party Program of 
the LDP” as the theme for an evening lecture.  The organizers of the lecture accepted at face 
value the notion that the Thuringian government was a united front consisting of all of the 
recognized anti-fascist parties and as such it was necessary for their students to learn the basic 
principles and political ideologies underpinning all of them.  The principal of the school, also the 
local school inspector, arranged to have Karl Mehnert, a lawyer from Altenburg give the lecture. 
Mehnert began his lecture with a clarification of the terms “democracy” and “democrat” and 
what they meant for a member of the LDP - which he supported - as opposed to the KPD and 
SED which were rapidly dominating the region.  In the course of a meandering speech on 
politics, parties, and political theory he came to the question of the professional civil service and 
quoted an expert from a south German newspaper that he had brought with him.  In this excerpt a 
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Mr. Häberlin359 made the unfortunate demand “it should never again be allowed that a 
washerwoman becomes a minister of culture.360” 
 This curious appeal was a reference to Minna Faßhauer, the People’s Commissar for 
Education in the short-lived post-World War 1 Socialist Republic of Braunschweig.  Faßhauer 
was notable not only as the first female minister of any modern German government, but within 
educational circles she was also fairly well known for attempting to establish one of the first true 
Einheitsschulen in her small republic.361  She was a staunch member of the German Communist 
Party and had, in fact, worked as both a maid and a washer woman.  Such a negative invocation 
of her name such as this, relatively soon after the collapse of the Third Reich and as people were 
attempting to make radical reforms and changes in much the same way as revolutionaries such as 
Faßhauer had after World War 1, would have been incendiary in the extreme.  The fact that she 
had actually implemented the Einheitsschule model that was now being vigorously pursued by 
the SED added a particularly biting critique of current policy to any negative mention of her or 
her legacy.  It would have likely been interpreted as both a slander against communist and 
socialist governments and - by those with an educational agenda - as an attack against the 
Einheitsschule that formed such a key component of the educational reforms being pushed by 
both the Soviet occupiers and the SED. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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 As if this was not enough to cause a controversy, during the question and answer period 
that followed Mehnert was once again confronted by the theme of differing definitions of 
“democracy.”  Matters came to a head when a student asked him directly “if he recognized the 
democracy of the Soviet Union as a democracy.”  Mehnert clarified that since the Soviet Union 
was a single party state that he did not believe it to be democratic in the sense that he was using 
the word.362 
 Another questioner stated that society must enter into a period of the dictatorship of the 
proletariat that the middle classes will not willfully cross into and asked what his stance was 
about the subject of class conflict and the dictatorship of the proletariat.  Following such an 
obviously leading question with such blatant political overtones Mehnert answered “By the 
formulation of your question I recognize you as a follower of the Marxist worldview.  This 
evening I have clearly expressed to you my views as a Democrat.  From this your question has 
already been answered.  If you want to hear it explicitly then I tell you that as a Democrat I 
repudiate class warfare and the dictatorship of the proletariat.363”     
 At this the room erupted and order had to be restored by the head of the district office, 
who was in attendance.  He admonished the room, “You mistake this teacher’s academy for a 
political rally.  Today was for learning the program of the LDP as an antifascist party.  If 
something is unclear, you may have it clarified.  You have [the opportunity] here to acquire 
knowledge in a scholarly manner.  I request that you do so in a way worthy of future teachers.  I 
am filled with bitterness that methods were used that we rejected and combatted under the 
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Nazis.”  Following this only a couple more questions were posed and then the assembly was 
dismissed.364   
 It did not take long for the fallout from this incident to present itself.  The next day the 
principal was informed by the local SED party secretary that Major Kowner, the Soviet 
educational officer for the region, was aware of the incident and very unhappy about it.  A few 
days later he was pulled out of a regional conference of school principals and brought before the 
Soviet regional commander, where he was quickly joined by the local SED party chairman and 
Mehnert.  Mehnert was rebuked for “poisoning the students” and speaking against the interests 
of the Soviet Union.  The principal was charged with organizing an assembly without first 
receiving the permission of the occupation authorities or clearing its content with them 
beforehand.  Despite his protests that it was an educational exercise and therefore beyond their 
purview, he was dismissed from his position.365    
 Wolf, who in other instances had a demonstrated willingness to intercede to stop petty 
injustices or mitigate the severity of punishments, did nothing.  He bore no political allegiance to 
the men who were being driven out, and those who were replacing them were well known as 
SED party members in good standing.  What is more, the incident had become an item of interest 
to the Soviet military authorities.  Whether through a loyalty born out of his years as a KPD 
activist before the war or from his experiences at Buchenwald and gratefulness for the role that 
the Red Army played in defeating Hitler’s Reich, Wolf cultivated good relations with the local 
occupation forces.  Perhaps he did not want to spend that hard-earned capital on men whom he 




Perhaps he saw in the allusion to Braunschweig an attack on the Einheitsschule that he was 
attempting to build.  Whatever the reason he did not intercede, and the blatantly political ruling 
of the Soviet regional commander stood without challenge.    
 
Obligations to fellow Germans 
 
 Finally, there was also the issue of the specific loyalty that the administrators felt to their 
fellow Germans, as opposed to that which they owed to the occupation authorities who, 
ultimately, were responsible for their holding their positions.  While it would be unwise to read 
too much into this co-national solidarity and see the smoldering remains of German nationalism 
or any kinds of Völkisch ideology it would be equally unrealistic to expect anyone to be 
completely blind to the needs and suffering of their fellow countrymen.  Even if it is also more 
difficult to read specific policy goals or challenges into this responsiveness to the needs of other 
Germans, that sensitivity alone was in many ways a policy decision and worthy of consideration 
as such.  
 One example of this is the official visit to the USSR that was orchestrated for a group of 
9 women in the fall of 1948. The women selected for this tour were all members of the German 
League of Democratic Women (DFD), and included Dr. Marie Torhorst, the woman who 
succeeded Walter Wolf as Thuringian Minister of Education in 1947.366  The trip was designed 
to showcase life in the USSR for the citizens of the Soviet occupation zone and highlight the 
ways that various aspects of Soviet civil society could benefit Germans.  The activities that the 
women were involved in included visiting major landmarks and receiving general tours of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Moscow, Leningrad, and Stalingrad; visiting with Georgian collective farmers; visits with 
educated women in Moscow, many of whom were university trained professionals, and a visit to 
POW camp Number 7435 near Moscow.367 
 While they were not conducted for the same reasons as Torhorst’s trips to the USSR, 
there was a comperable connection between the western occupation zones and the English-
speaking West.  In the immediate aftermath of the war a number of exchange programs were 
established to send German students to the United States and England in order to foster closer 
trans-Atlantic cultural connections as well as to introduce them to Anglo-American society and 
give them first hand experience with daily life in a modern, healthily functioning democracy.  In 
contrast to Torhorst’s briefer tours these were less structured, longer in duration, and focused 
primarily on younger, late-secondary or university-aged men.  At least one such program, The 
German Teacher Trainee Program, targeted young teachers specifically in the hopes that 
exposing them to the daily realities of American democracy and experiencing first hand how 
American schools functioned would inspire them to introduce similar techniques and practices in 
their own classrooms at a grass roots level.  Such programs were fairly successful, and can 
partially be seen as a response to the perceived resistance to rapid, radical change seen in the 
administrative corps; men like Erwin Stein might drag their feet and balk at major structural 
reforms but they could also be rendered moot within a generation by younger teachers with a 
personal investment in American-style education and personal affinities for democratically 
organized classrooms.368 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
367 “DFD - Delegation in die Sowjetunion,” Nachlass Torhorst, Folio 13, BBF-DIPF   
368 For more on the German Teacher Trainee Program and other similar exchange programs see 
Puaca, Learning Democracy :69-75.  Puaca’s work as a whole makes a strong argument for the 
democratization of West German education during the Cold War via grassroots programs such as 
these that began the reforms at the classroom level.     
! 248!
 The Soviet-organized tours, in contrast, were much more heavily orchestrated and 
designed to showcase an idealized Russia for a broader, non-participatory audience.  Both the 
Soviet authorities and the local newspapers broadly publicized the trip both before and after the 
women visited.  While it was clearly intended to be a simple goodwill tour to produce some 
friendly propaganda for the Soviet occupiers, it generated a significant response, especially 
among German women and the organizations that either targeted them or were run for and by 
them.  The kinds of questions that this tour spawned significantly transgressed the boundaries of 
what the Soviet authorities probably intended to convey.  Rather than focusing on the core, 
presented content of the healthy, cheerful lives of Soviet women and families many of the 
questions addressed far more sensitive issues and concerns about the changes that were taking 
place as the Soviet sector began its transformation from an occupied capitalist state to a quasi-
independent socialist one.  The simple act of considering, pursuing, and answering those kinds of 
questions was a political statement under those circumstances.  This was doubly so for someone 
in a position as relatively high within regional government as Torhorst’s was.   
 A large number of the requests and questions for which a record remains came from 
members of the DFD. That organization forwarded along requests and questions that they 
received to the women who were participating in the trip, leaving the typical paperwork trail of 
bureaucratic correspondence.  Other women wrote individually.  Dr. Torhorst’s collected 
personal papers are full of such correspondence.  Some were properly addressed letters, written 
in the best formal script and following all traditional conventions of correspondence.  Others 
were quick notes on scraps of paper in Torhorst’s own hand, presumably dashed down while 
meeting face to face with concerned citizens.  These in particular bear witness not only to the 
concerns of the women that Torhorst spoke with, but also the ongoing material shortages within 
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the ministry itself.  For example, one set of notes from such a meeting was made on the back of 
half of a blank certificate of completion for a school administration licensing exam.  Yet others 
were typewritten summaries of concerns compiled by various women’s associations and 
submitted as a group over whatever passed for official letterhead for that group amidst the 
deprivations of the first years of peace.  She gathered organized these into a series of notecards 
that she brought with her.  Torhorst at least seems to have taken very seriously a responsibility to 
serve as a rare source of news from inside the Soviet Union, especially the sort of information 
that interested the women who contacted her. 
 By far the most common requests for information involved the fate of loved ones who 
never returned from the war.  A typical communication from the League of Democratic Women  
to Torhotst in 1947, when she first became Minister of Education in Thuringia, complained that 
“thousands of women are moved by the question: ‘When will our prisoners of war finally come 
home from Russia?’”369  They noted that at the beginning of that year they had been promised 
that it would be in 1948 at the latest.  Of particular concern to them was the obvious discrepancy 
between what they had been assured of regarding the conditions under which the prisoners lived 
and what was being reported by the individual men who trickled home every day.  Another asked 
simply, “why have our prisoners of war not yet returned?370”   
 Of those who sought details about POWs or conditions in the POW camps, one particular 
sore spot was the general lack of communication.  The Frauenbund noted that as early as 1946 
they had been assured, and promises published in every German newspaper in the SBZ, that all 
of the prisoners in Russia were allowed to write letters home.  Yet time and again returning !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!




POWs reported that they had neither received nor been allowed to send mail for 4 or 5 years, and 
sometimes longer depending on when they had been captured.371  Some of the individual letters 
that Torhorst received about this issue were more politely circumspect, perhaps out of 
consideration for or fear of the opinions regarding socialism and Soviet rule that could be 
assumed of someone who was selected for such a high office under the occupation.  One woman 
asked if it was true that some POW camps were under a permanent correspondence blackout or if 
it was possible that “as in so many other examples, these tales are only mean-spirited 
propaganda.372”     
 The other major issue that they wanted addressed was the question of confirming the final 
fate of POWs and missing soldiers and, where possible, the final resting place of those killed in 
action.   This was especially problematic for them, as there was no formal diplomatic end to the 
state of war between the Allied Powers and Germany, despite the war itself having long since 
been concluded.  According to German law those who were missing in action could only be 
legally given up as dead if they were still unaccounted for two years after a peace treaty was 
signed.  Without direct confirmation of the fate of their men or an official declaration that the 
war was over, these women were caught in a legal limbo that significantly hindered their ability 
to move on with their lives.  This stands completely aside from the simple mental anguish of not 
knowing whether their loved ones had perished or whether they could still be in a camp 
somewhere.  As the letter poignantly concluded, “Is this not a crime against humanity as well, 
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[committed] against us women?  Are we widows or are we wives????????????????[sic]373”   The 
sheer weight of question marks with which the correspondence ended underscored the continuing 
anguish and confusion that these matters inflicted.   
 Even for those who knew for certain that their loved ones lay in foreign soil, questions 
remained.  One letter from a Thuringian woman asked if Torhorst had the opportunity to visit 
and German war graveyards in the USSR and whether they were being properly cared for.  As 
with most other specifics about conditions inside the Soviet Union, the correspondent noted that 
no specific news had been released.374  The near complete information blackout from the east 
seems to have been just as disturbing for many as confirmation of their worst fears would have 
been.  It also underscores a continuing ignorance about life and the conditions of living in the 
Soviet Union one exacerbated by the USSR’s efforts to emphasize its post-war strength and 
successes due to international political considerations.  Given the physical devastation and dire 
living conditions still prevalent in many areas of the USSR where heavy fighting had occurred - 
the same areas most likely to feature German cemeteries - it seems strikingly naïve to inquire 
whether the final resting places of German war dead were being properly and respectfully 
tended.  The fact that well-tended military graveyards and monuments were being erected for 
Soviet dead in Germany may give some insight into this expectation, but the presence of the Red 
Army goes a long way towards explaining that.  Germany’s fallen had no such on-scene 
advocate in Russia.     
 While visiting prisoner camps Torhorst recorded the names and pre-capture home 
addresses of all the men she spoke to or could obtain directly verifiable information about, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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presumably to get the news to any surviving relatives as best as possible.  In most cases she 
simply gathered personal information in order to create a record that these men were still alive 
and in Russia.  In others she seems to have at least made an attempt at being a very limited 
means of communication for the prisoners, as with the note attached to the entry for a young 
POW from Erfurt stating that he “sends his father the best birthday wishes.”375 
 It should also be noted that these visits were also important to the men who were lucky 
enough to receive them and did much to boost spirits that had been sorely tried by years in the 
POW camps. An example of this was a note forwarded to Dr. Torhorst by the DFD.  The DFD 
organized a series of transit camps for returning POWs.  The POWs returning from Russia 
frequently had nothing but the clothes that they had left the camps in and many had trouble 
reintegrating into German society.  The camps helped to ease this transition by providing them 
temporary shelter, food, new clothing, and contact information for essential state services.   One 
such returning soldier passing through a DFD transit camp asked them to send his thanks to 
Torhorst for her visit to his POW camp outside Moscow and to express how much her visit 
meant to him and all of the soldiers held there.376   
 Other questions that she received involved what Soviet-style socialism would mean for 
them and their children in their daily lives if it were adopted in Germany. There were particular 
concerns over the work requirements in the Soviet Union and the fact that women, as well as 
men, were expected to be productive workers.  While many women in Germany no doubt 
relished the professional opportunities that theoretically gender-neutral socialism offered, others 
had their doubts.  Some seem to have been actively fearful of or opposed to the idea of women !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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working outside of the traditional household roles.  One particular issue of concern was whether 
the work requirements were adjusted to reflect the family status of the women.  Did women have 
to work if they had children?  Could women be freed from work requirements even if they had 
no children?  How many weeks did women have to work?  Did the family life of the men and 
children in the family not suffer as a result of women having to work?  Did the necessity of 
placing children into daycare or Kindergardens alienate them from their mothers?377           
 Other questions focused on the quality of the training that women could expect in a 
socialist society, and the precise kinds of jobs that they would be required to take.  One, for 
example, asked about the length of studies for a physician, noting that in Germany “it is often 
claimed that a doctor in the Soviet Union has no more knowledge than a nurse in Germany.378”  
Another bluntly asked, “Are there women in responsible positions or just housewives?379” 
Another asked if women in the USSR freely volunteered for positions in traditionally male 
professions.  Of particular concern was whether or not there existed workplace safety 
commissions to ensure that women’s health did not suffer through such employment.380   
 Not all of the questions she received were about serious matters of missing family or 
concerns about what socialism might mean for life inside of Germany.  Some of it stemmed from 
a simple curiosity about the reality of life in the USSR as opposed to what they had been 
previously presented in wartime propaganda.  For example, one person asked what the 
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conditions were like for farmers on collective farms, and if it was true that they all lived in mud 
huts.381    
 While there Torhorst also took specific notes about matters and institutions that were of 
personal or professional interest to her.  In particular she paid special attention to how the Soviet 
authorities had re-established education in areas that experienced heavy fighting.  While this did 
not include any notes on pedagogical changes that may have been occurring within Soviet 
education at that time, they were very specific on the similar devastation suffered by some Soviet 
cities during the war and the ways that they were working to overcome it.  In her visit to 
Leningrad, for example, she noted that much as in Germany it began with the resumption of 
basic classroom services as soon as possible after the fighting ended and the subsequent 
prioritization of developing facilities, either through re-purposing undamaged buildings or new 
construction, and gathering basic materials and surviving books for instruction.382  She also 
visited schools and classrooms to observe details of teaching methods and over-all classroom 
conditions and met with leaders of the local parents’ committees to discuss how they felt about 
the schools and their children’s progress in them.383   
 Torhorst’s efforts to inform members of the German public about what she saw and 
experienced continued long after she returned.   She also met with school children to answer 
their questions about life in Russia.  Similar to the questions that she recorded from adults, many 
of these were concerned with the living conditions of the POWs who remained in Russia or with 
specific aspects of daily life under a socialist regime and what the quality of that life was like.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Were there, for example, electric lights in Russian cities and towns and did they have ration 
cards?  Did Russian theaters feature dramas and concerts from German artists?  How did camp 
guards treat POWs and when would they be allowed to return?  Others were much clearly the 
result of youthful curiosity and priorities:  Did Russian children learn German?  Were there 
sports in Russia?  Had she visited Lenin’s mausoleum?384   
 How typical the conditions and classrooms that she observed were and how genuine the 
conversations that she recorded were is, of course, open to interpretation.  This was not a 
privately organized visit to a free and open society, but an officially orchestrated tour of hand-
selected sites within Stalinist Russia.  With that in mind, however, that simple fact that she took 
the opportunity to gain some first-hand knowledge of conditions inside the USSR and that she 
made a point of disseminating that information to the individual citizens who reached out to her 
office or to her personally is equally important.  The Soviets certainly had their own agenda and 
doubtlessly crafted her trip to present a carefully structured view of their society and the people 
in it.  The various ways that she utilized this opportunity to collect information specifically of 
interest to German citizens - and especially effort expended to establish the living conditions 
and, where possible, the names and identities of those still held captive - shows a remarkable 
responsiveness to the needs of her fellow countrymen.  There was no pedagogical purpose 
behind recording the names of the POWs she met, nor did it somehow affect her relationship 
with the occupation forces or further the agenda of political organizations that she supported.  
What it stands as, however, is a striking example of someone in a position to intermediate 
between the Soviet military and the German people using that agency to intercede on the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
384 “Diskussionsfragen der oberen Klassen und Berufsschule am 24.11.48 an Frau Minister  Dr. 
Torhorst,” Nachlass Torhorst, Folio 14, BBF-DIPF 
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civilians’ behalf, in this case to expand upon the very limited information available about what 




 Due in part to the political self-sorting that occurred between the Western and Soviet 
zones in the immediate aftermath of World War 2, a broad pattern emerged regarding whether 
local civil government tended to cooperate with or resist the post-war reforms of the occupation 
powers.  The administrative agency enjoyed by civil servants such as educational administrators 
was generally used in the Soviet Sector to support the needs and goals of the occupation, while in 
the west it was also used in some circumstances to undermine or delay reform.  This was 
naturally not true at all times in all places  - there are examples of administrators working with 
the Americans to make unpopular reforms just as there are examples of their opposite numbers in 
the SBZ working against the Soviets - but stands as a general trend.  The political legacy of the 
Weimar Republic is largely responsible for this pattern.  If the political struggles of the 20s and 
30s are viewed as a three-way struggle between fascist and communist extremes and a more 
moderate center, and if the events of the early 1940s largely removed fascism as a viable 
political force, then the initial political landscape after the war would be determined by the 
relationship between the old center - now liberal democrats -  and the communists.  Those with a 
strong enough affinity to pre-war communism to be drawn to life under the Russians would 
move eastward, while those who felt a strong opposition to communist or socialist ideologies 
would probably prefer one of the western occupation regimes.   
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 The immediate result of this is that the Germans with clear anti-Nazi credentials that the 
Soviets had to choose from were likely seeing themselves as politically allied with the beliefs, 
interests, policies, and goals of the USSR.  Those in the American Occupation Zone, however, 
did not have any such built-in loyalty to or sympathy for a common belief, were more likely to 
disagree with some of the basic premises and goals of the American occupation, and were more 
likely to act on this disagreement and use the power inherent in their positions to delay, resist, or 








CHAPTER!7:!ADMINISTRATORS!AS!POLITICAL!TARGETS!!! It!is!a!well<known!fact!that!primary!school!teachers!lean!strongly!to!the!left.!!They!will!surely!be!less!likely!to!follow!this!tendency!when!they!know!that!the!people!who!are!responsible!for!their!advancement!and!assessment!are!members!of!the!CDU.!! ! ! <!The!head!chairman!of!the!CDU!for!the!!! ! ! district!of!Oberlahn!in!Hesse,!1945385!
!The!Party,!the!Party,!it!is!always!right!/!And,!comrades,!may!it!ever!be!so!!!! ! ! <Party!anthem!of!the!SED!!! After!more!than!a!decade!of!single!party!dictatorship!under!the!Nazis,!the!resumption!of!multi<party!political!life!happened!surprisingly!quickly!under!the!occupation.!!Many!of!the!parties!were!the!reconstituted!ghosts!of!political!movements!that!had!been!disbanded!following!the!NSDAP’s!seizure!of!power.!!Others!were!new!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
385 “Margarate Pfeifer, Kreisvorsitzende der Schristl. Demokr. Union, Kreisverband Oberlahn an 




386 For a good description of how the SED worked alongside the occupation government in the 
SBZ, see Jan Foitzik, Sowjetische Militäradministration in Deutschland (SMAD) 1945-1949: 
Struktur und Funktion. (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1999):  372-384; for a parallel examination of  
how the political parties in Hesse aided in denazification see Armin Schuster, Die 
Entnazifizierung in Hessen, 1945-1954: Vergangenheitspolitik in der Nachkriegszeit, 












387 For a view of how educational policy became a political football in another era, see Marjorie 
Lamberti, The Politics of Education: Teachers and School Reform in Weimar Germany. (New 
York: Berghahn Books, 2002).    
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According!to!the!article!the!children!were!underperforming!so!badly!that!an!average!of!20!mistakes!per!pupil!were!recorded!in!a!basic!dictation!exercise.!!!! ‘H.!W.’!countered!that!this!was!not!news!worthy.!!He!identified!himself!as!an!8th!grader!in!Erfurt!and!a!member!of!a!class!within!which,!as!part!of!the!ongoing!restructuring!of!the!school!system,!children!from!the!Volksschule!and!Oberschule!had!recently!been!combined.!!He!claimed!that!in!an!equally!simple!dictation!exam!taken!by!his!class,!only!2!and!a!half!pages!in!length,!76!errors!had!been!recorded.!!His!letter!was!grammatically!vague,!leaving!it!unclear!whether!that!was!an!average!of!all!the!pupils!or!the!unenviable!score!of!a!single!child.!!He!condescendingly!concluded,!“It!may!be!that!the!Volksschüler!are!at!the!moment!not!made!of!the!right!stuff!for!the!Oberschule!that!they!were!transferred!to.388”!!!! This!short!letter,!apparently!written!by!a!child,!immediately!created!a!scandal!that!would!eventually!involve!not!only!the!local!teaching!community!but!occupation!authorities!on!both!the!local!and!regional!levels,!and!the!school!administration!all!the!way!up!to!the!Thuringian!Minister!of!Education.!!The!Ministry!quickly!began!an!investigation,!beginning!with!an!attempt!to!discover!who!the!author!was,!if!he!was!really!a!young!pupil!in!a!local!school,!and!the!motivations!behind!the!letter.389!! The!restructuring!of!the!Thuringian!school!system!into!the!single!track!Einheitsschule!model!at!that!time!was!ongoing!and!politically!contentious.!!It!was!a!banner!issue!not!only!for!the!Soviet!occupation!authorities!and!the!German!civil!administration,!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
388 “47 Fehler,” Abendpost: Das Blatt für Politik, Kultur und Wirtschaft, 1 March, 1947, LT-
MfV, Nr. 22, THStAW. 
389 “Der Kreisbildungsamt der Stadt Erfurt an das Ministerium für Volksbildung, Weimar Betr: 
Zeitungsnotiz “76 Fehler” in der Abendpost,” LT-MfV, Nr. 22, THStAW. 
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but!one!that!was!being!championed!by!the!relatively!young!and!ever!more!influential!SED.!!It!was!a!set<piece!of!institutional!reform!in!the!SBZ,!a!relatively!early!example!of!the!kinds!of!sweeping!political!and!institutional!changes!that!would!eventually!form!the!underpinnings!for!the!East!German!state.!!The!’76!Mistakes’!article!was!perceived!not!just!as!a!criticism!of!the!performance!of!a!single!school,!but!an!attack!on!the!ways!in!which!the!restructuring!of!the!entire!educational!system!was!being!carried!out,!and!therefore!an!assault!on!the!broader!coalition!of!state!and!political!interests!that!were!heavily!invested!in!it.!!The!issue!brought!into!question!not!only!the!political!motivations!of!the!author!of!the!letter,!but!of!the!paper!that!published!it.!!A!handwritten!note!attached!to!the!initial!correspondence!about!the!issue!noted!that,!“Anyone!who!advocates!democratic!school!reform!and!has!recognized!its!need!for!the!general!democratization!of!Germany!deplores!that!the!Abendpost!once!again!let!itself!be!misused!by!the!reactionary!enemies!of!school!reform.390”!! The!Ministry!of!Education!immediately!launched!an!investigation.!!During!its!course!it!emerged!that!the!author!of!the!letter!was!indeed!a!pupil!in!one!of!the!local!schools!named!Heinrich!Werner.391!!As!was!typical!of!many!children!in!the!area!he!was!a!refugee,!originally!from!Düsseldorf,!a!city!that!was!now!in!the!Western!Zone.!!His!mother!was!a!half<Jewish!widow!and!had!moved!to!Thuringia!during!the!war!in!an!attempt!to!escape!the!harassment!and!persecution!that!she!suffered!from!neighbors!and!local!authorities.!!Heinrich!had!taken!the!original!article!about!the!performance!of!pupils!in!Frankfurt!as!an!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
390 “Artikel im Rund-[illegible],” Author unknown, March 1947, LT-MfV, Nr. 22, THStAW  
391 Due to German privacy laws the name of this individual has been changed.  This is the only 





392 “Betr: Feststellungen zur Notiz in der Abendpost vom 1. März 1947 „76 Fehler,“” 5 March 
1947, LT-MfV, Nr. 22, THStAW 
393 “Brief von Volkmer, Studienrat, Klassenleiter d.8.Kl. V. 21 an Kramer, Direktor der 
‚Abendpost,’“ 3 March, 1947, LT-MfV, Nr. 22, THStAW 
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being!used!as!“a!tool!of!reactionaries!opposed!to!our!new!school!system.394”!!Further!interviews!with!him!satisfied!the!local!school!inspector!that!he!had!acted!alone,!without!prompting!from!any!of!the!adults!in!his!life!or!from!any!other!outside!influence.!!The!inspector!noted!that!Heinrich!was!very!intelligent!and!precocious!for!his!age.!!He!recorded!that!both!he!and!the!child’s!mother!had!made!it!clear!to!Heinrich!that!children!should!not!do!such!things!without!the!aid!of!an!adult,!as!they!couldn’t!always!foresee!the!consequences!of!their!actions!or!understand!“the!ways!that!articles!they!write!might!sow!discord.395”!!! Once!the!educational!ministry!was!satisfied!that!the!incident!was!indeed!the!result!of!a!single!student’s!mischief,!the!furor!over!the!’76!Mistakes’!rapidly!faded!away.!!With!apparently!no!need!to!worry!about!a!broader!scheme!to!attack!the!reforms!that!played!such!a!crucial!role!in!their!vision!of!a!new!German!society,!the!SED!directed!its!attention!elsewhere.!!Without!pressure!from!them!the!Ministry!rapidly!wrapped!up!the!investigation,!and!Heinrich!was!never!punished!or!penalized!for!his!actions!beyond!whatever!unrecorded!chastisement!he!may!have!faced!from!his!mother.!!The!Ministry,!while!noting!the!ongoing!classroom!difficulties!represented!by!the!large!numbers!of!refugee!children!like!Heinrich,!was!satisfied!that!the!initially!shocking!test!performance!was!an!outlier!rather!than!the!symptom!of!a!structural!problem!and!made!no!suggestions!for!alterations!on!their!current!plans!for!reform!and!restructuring.!!Despite!an!ominous!conclusion!that!“the!one!most!to!blame!is!the!newspaper!that!published!such!alarming!news!from!such!an!unproven!source!.!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
394 “Ministerium für Volksbildung an den Leiter des Kreisbildungsamtes Erfurt,” 7 March, 1947, 
LT-MfV, Nr. 22, THStAW  
395 “Der Kreisbildungsamt der Stadt Erfurt, An das Ministerium für Volksbildung Betreff: 







397 For an in-depth examination of the reconstitution of German self-government under Soviet 
rule, see Foitzik, Sowjetische Militäradministration in Deutschland (SMAD) 1945-1949: 331-
347.  See James F. Tent, Mission on the Rhine: Reeducation and denazification in American-
occupied Germany, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1982): 50-57 for a brief 






398 “Zentrumspartei, Dillenburg an den Herrn Landrat des Dillkreises Antrag betr. Berufung des 
Herrn Dr. MARX, Dillenburg, zum Schulrat des Dillkreises.” Abt 652, Nr. 520, HHStAW 
399 See the “Aufruf des ZK der KPD vom 11. Juni 1945” in Revolutionäre deutsche 
Parteiprogramme: vom Kommunistischen Manifest zum Programm des Sozialismus, Lothar 
Berthold and Ernst Diehl, eds., Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1967 for the earliest articulation of any 
KPD educational policy.   
400 “Demokratische Fraktion der vereinten Nazigegner an den Herrn Landrat des Dillkreises,” 5. 




401 “Bericht über die Schulleiterkreiskonferenz am 14.1.1946 in Rathaussaal Altenburg.” LT-






402 “Lebenslauf” Abt. 1178, Nr. 154, HHStAW   
403 “Beurlaubung bzw Versetzung eines Schulrats wegen „ungebührlichen Verhaltens“ 
gegenüber Lehramtskandidatinnen,” Abt. 1178, Nr. 154, HHStAW 




405 “Ermittlungsverfahren betreffend die gegen Herrn Heinrich Laake aus seiner Tätigkeit im 




406 “Landessekretariat der CDU an Herrn Kultusminister Dr. Erwin Stein,” 3. November, 1948, 
Abt. 1178, Nr. 154, HHStAW. 




408 “CDU Fraktion der Christlich-Demokratischen Union im Hessischen Landat an Herrn 
Minister Dr. Stein,” 15. January 1948, Abt. 1178, Nr. 154, HHStAW  
409 “Walter George, Bürgermeister Hofgeismar an Herrn Minister Dr. Hilpert” 20. November, 





410 “Minister E. Stein an Herrn Regierungspräsident Dr. Hoch,” 28. June 1948, Abt. 1178, Nr. 
154, HHStAW  
411 Ibid. 
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413 “SPD - Sozialdemokratsiche Partei Deutschlands Kreis Hofgeismar an den Herrn Minister für 




414 “Minister E. Stein an Herrn Regierungspräsident Dr. Hoch,” 28. June 1948, Abt. 1178, Nr. 
154, HHStAW 
415 “Karl Dönsch, Lehrer u. Vorsitzender des Kreislehrervereins im Namen [9 signatories]. . .”, 
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not!political!in!the!slightest!beyond!its!capacity!for!embarrassment!and!scandal!was!by!this!point!a!secondary!concern!at!best.!!! Stein!was!of!the!opinion!that!Laake!should!be!returned!to!his!position!as!a!school!inspector,!but!also!indicated!to!Hoch!that!he!would!be!appointing!him!to!a!different!position!of!roughly!equal!responsibility!and!authority!in!the!Hessian!educational!system!after!an!appropriate!amount!of!time.!!This!can!be!read!two!ways.!!First,!it!was!above!all!else!a!commitment!to!stand!behind!Laake,!whether!through!a!cold!assessment!of!his!political!utility!or!a!genuine!belief!in!his!innocence!regarding!the!sexual!harassment!charges.!!At!the!same!time!it!also!indicated!some!sensitivity!to!the!fact!that!Laake’s!issue!had!become!both!a!political!flashpoint!and!a!professional!scandal!and!that!it!would!benefit!everyone!if!he!were!quietly!moved!somewhere!that!his!presence!would!be!less!disruptive.!!In!making!his!case!for!these!measures!Stein!emphasized!Laake’s!professional!competency!and!used!that!as!the!rationale!for!retaining!him.!!In!his!reply!to!the!SPD!and!the!SPD<affiliated!president!of!the!Hessian!government!he!wrote,!“You!will!concede!to!me!that!a!school!and!cultural!policy!that!is!in!the!interest!of!the!whole!nation!and!not!only!a!part!of!the!population!or!a!party!cannot!be!operated!in!this!way.!!It!seems!necessary!to!me!<!and!I!must!emphasize!this!over!and!over!again!<!that!the!professional!and!political!suitability!of!officials!must!come!before!party!considerations.!416”!!It!must!be!understood!that!when!Stein!wrote!of!political!suitability!he!was!referring!to!it!within!the!context!of!denazification!and!the!necessary!anti<fascist!credentials!of!government!employees.!!He!consistently!referred!to!more!contemporary!competition!between!the!post<war!political!organizations!as!party!affairs.!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!





417 For a brief, but useful, description of the jockeying for post-war position between the political 
parties and the short-term politicization of anti-fascism that resulted, see Wolf-Arno Kropat, 
Hessen in der Stunde Null: 1945-1947: Politik, Wirtschaft, und Bildungswesen, (Wiesbaden: 
Selbstverlag der Historischen Kommission für Nassau, 1979): 7-9, 71-81 








420 “Landesdirektor Wolf an Herrn Erich Knippel,” LT-MfV, Nr. 22, THStAW   
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423 “Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands Kreisvorstand Altenburg Pol. Sekretär an das  




424 “Landesdirektor Wolf an Herrn Erich Knippel,” LT-MfV, Nr. 22, THStAW  - a note on 
translation:  in the original he is specifically said to have the nickname ‘Hexe’ rather than 
‘Zauberer’ or any more masculine forms, despite the resulting grammatical difficulties.  
Presumably witches are more well known for their physical deformities than wizards, warlocks, 
or any more typically masculine elderly and physically disabled wielders of magic.   
425 “An das Ministerium des Innern Haubtabtl. Personal und Schulung” 22. March, 1950 
Personal Akten Nr. 14882 - Knippel, THStAW 





427 “An das Ministerium des Innern Haubtabtl. Personal und Schulung” 22. March, 1950 
Personal Akten Nr. 14882 - Knippel, THStAW 
428 For more on the early political history of the German political parties in the Soviet Zone, see 
Siegfried Suckut, Blockpolitik in der SBZ/DDR 1945-1949 : die Sitzungsprotokolle des zentralen 


















430 “auf Erlaß v. 24. April 1946” Letter from Regierungsprädient Darmstadt Abteilung V, 
Erziehungswesen to Herrn Minister für Kultus und Unterricht, 5. August 1946, Abt 504, Nr. 848, 
HHStAW 
431 “Margarate Pfeifer, Kreisvorsitzende der Schristl. Demokr. Union, Kreisverband Oberlahn an 
den Herrn Kultusminister Dr. E. Stein,” 4.9.1948, Abt. 1178 Nr. 138, HHStAW  
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and!the!city!or!town!that!they!worked!in.!!This!information!was!compiled!by!region!and!then!sorted!by!city!so!that,!at!a!glance,!the!makeup!of!the!officers!within!any!particular!geographical!area!could!be!established.!!Additionally,!on!the!reverse!side!there!was!an!additional!table!summarizing!the!data!handwritten!in!pencil.!!While!the!identity!of!the!person!who!organized!that!table!can!not!be!confirmed!with!certainty,!the!handwriting!looks!very!similar!to!examples!known!to!have!come!from!Minister!of!Education!Erwin!Stein,!and!it!was!located!in!a!file!that!contained!a!significant!amount!of!correspondence!from!and!to!his!office.!432!!!! The!political!situation!in!Hesse!at!this!time!was!fairly!volatile.!!In!the!years!after!the!war!a!grand!coalition!government!was!formed!between!the!two!largest!parties!that!emerged!from!the!first!post<Nazi!elections,!the!SPD!and!the!CDU!with!the!SPD<affiliated!Christian!Stock!leading!as!minister<president.!!The!results!for!the!four!major!parties!of!the!first!votes!in!1946!were:!!42.7%!SPD,!30.9%!CDU,!15.7%!FDP,!10.7%!KPD.433!!!There!were!numerous!statements,!particularly!early!on,!regarding!the!ways!that!the!four!major!parties!would!work!together!in!a!unity!government!to!ensure!that!Hesse,!and!Germany!as!a!whole,!got!back!on!its!feet!after!the!war.!!The!reality!that!quickly!emerged,!however,!was!that!the!FDP!felt!itself!increasingly!marginalized!and!the!KDP!was!excluded!wherever!possible.434!!!! This!political!situation!is!reflected!in!the!figures!reported!for!the!political!affiliations!of!the!school!inspectors.!!Out!of!48!total,!19!were!SPD,!11!CDU,!3!FDP,!and!15!“without!party.”!!Of!those!who!were!listed!as!not!being!affiliated!with!a!party!4!were!noted!to!be!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
432 No Title, Wiesbaden 24. March 1949, Abt. 1178, Nr. 81, HHStAW   
433 “hessisch Landtagswahlen 1946” cited in Kropat, Hessen in der Stunde Null: 92   
434 Ibid: 70-80 
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catholic.435!!If!they!are!added!to!the!CDU!totals!you!get!the!following!percentages:!!SPD:!40%,!31%!CDU,!6%!FDP.!!While!not!perfect,!these!figures!roughly!match!the!proportions!that!the!general!population!voted!in!in!the!1946!election,!with!one!major!and!one!more!minor!exception:!!The!major!issue!is!that!KPD!is!completely!unrepresented.!!Given!the!political!climate!at!the!end!of!the!1940s!this!is!not!particularly!surprising,!but!it!does!strongly!indicate!that!political!considerations!as!well!as!professional!credentials!played!a!role!in!the!distribution!of!offices!within!the!Educational!Ministry.!!Furthermore,!the!FDP!is!significantly!under<represented!compared!to!what!one!would!expect!if!it!was!a!straight!forward!allocation!of!positions!according!to!the!merits!of!the!ballot!box.!!!This!lines!up!fairly!well!with!what!one!would!expect!from!a!two<party!coalition!made!up!of!the!largest!parties!in!the!state.!!As!long!as!the!coalition!remained!stable!it!made!sense!to!jointly!disperse!the!school!inspector!positions!between!themselves!while!marginalizing!non<partner!parties.!!!! There!are!also!indications!within!other!correspondence!that!the!distribution!of!offices!was!jointly!agreed!upon!by!senior!officials!in!the!SPD!and!CDU!earlier!on!in!the!occupation,!but!that!this!relationship!fell!apart!as!the!next!election!approached.!!In!late!1947,!for!example,!Minister!Stein!noted!in!a!letter!to!a!ministerial!undersecretary!regarding!the!disposition!of!a!number!of!administrative!posts!that!“The!filling!of!this!post!should!be!agreed!upon!between!the!SPD!and!CDU.!!Just!to!be!safe!the!Regierungspräsident!in!Kassel!should!be!consulted!and!his!opinion!sought.436“!!Only!a!year!later!matters!had!deteriorated!to!the!point!that!Stein’s!fellow!Christian!Democrats!were!writing!to!exhort!him!to!“promote!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
435 No Title, Wiesbaden 24. March 1949, Abt. 1178, Nr. 81, HHStAW   
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CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION  
 
There are some men whose only mission among others is to act as 
intermediaries; one crosses them like bridges and keeps going. 
   - Gustave Flaubert, Sentimental Education,  
   1891439 
 
The hope for schools and education always grow after a low point.  
After the 30 Years War emerged a Comenius, after the Napoleonic 
Wars a Pestalozzi, after the collapse of 1918 there were all manner 
of new school laws.  But at no other time was the pedagogical 
mission so great as today.  
   -Karl Trinks, 1946440 
 
 In the summer of 1946 a pedagogical conference in Weimar discussed how to move 
forward with rebuilding the educational system in Thuringia.  Its purpose was to produce a 
manifesto so as to “open a broader discussion in the Thuringian schools with the goal of raising !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
439 Gustauve Flaubert, Sentimental Education: The story of a young man, Dora Knowles Ranous, 
ed., (New York: Bretano’s, 1922): 317 
440 Karl Trinks, Schulreform (Weimar: Thüringische Vertragsanstalt, 1946), TRINKS 105, BBF-
DIPF 
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the quality of methodology.441” The author of the manifesto’s introduction was not provided, 
however as chairman of the committee that produced it Dr. Walter Wolf, the minister of 
education for the state, was most likely heavily involved.  The manifesto observed that in the 
Weimar Republic progressive educational methods were unhesitatingly applied by a large 
portion of the German teaching profession. But “on the one hand old, regressive methods were 
not rooted out energetically enough, and on the other hand methods were disseminated that . . . 
were undemocratic.”  It was this situation, the manifesto contended, that had prepared the 
groundwork for the complete disgrace of every teaching methodology under the Nazis.  
“Building the instruction on the Führerprinzip, the schools sank back into florid, hollow phrases 
and empty verbiage [Wortkram], in dreary military drill and sinister force, terror, and beating.  
At the end of the Third Reich we stood methodologically before a void.442” 
 This was, in essence, the basic problem that all German educators faced by the middle of 
1946.  Throughout most of the country the worst of the immediate physical barriers to renewed 
education had been overcome.  School buildings were either repaired enough or relocated, 
teaching materials had been hastily adapted from whatever sources were available, the teaching 
staffs of the schools had been purged of the most vocal Nazi party members, and the children 
themselves were generally fit enough to allow at least a limited return to daily classroom 
instruction.  What remained was the much harder work of deciding how to move forward and 
constructively build upon the legacy of Nazism.   
 In the areas under Soviet occupation that would one day become the German Democratic 
Republic that answer lay largely in the creation of a single track educational system with a !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
441 “Methodisches Manifest,” Nachlass Sothmann, Folio 1, BBF-DIPF 
442 Ibid. 
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polytechnical emphasis that was, for the most part, unlike anything that had been attempted on 
such a scale in Germany before.  It represented a complete break with not only the National 
Socialist nightmare of the previous decade, but with a longer educational tradition that many 
blamed for having laid the groundwork for it. If the finest minds that were trained under Weimar 
and the Kaiserreich proved just as susceptible as any others to the allure of militarism, racism, 
and leader-worship, then why bother trying to revive those educational traditions?  Better to 
begin anew, in a state founded on anti-fascist ideals and dedicated to socialist equality.443 
 In the areas under control of the Western Allies that eventually became the Federal 
Republic of Germany the schools that emerged were much more recognizable descendants of the 
educational systems that were already in place before the occupation.  Denazification was carried 
out, new curricula put in place, and the worst excesses of tracked education reformed, but the 
structure of the institutions themselves remained recognizably intact.  Even so, the rebuilt 
schools in the west were much more open to children from all walks of life than their Imperial 
German forbearers and, while there were still distinct pathways leading to specific academic 
outcomes, there was much more ability for students to cross over between them.444 
 What explains this divergence in German education during the Cold War?  It cannot only 
be credited to the differing ideologies of the military occupations that directly controlled these 
regions after World War 2.  Vague as the earliest statements on educational reform under the 
Allied Control Commission were, they provided a consistent baseline that each side had to work !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
443 For an overview of Russian policy in the SBZ, see Norman M. Naimark, The Russians in 
Germany: A history of the Soviet zone of occupation, 1945-1949 (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 
1995). 
444 For an overview of the democratization of German education in the American sectors, see 
Brain M Puaca’s Learning Democracy: education reform in West Germany, 1945-1965 (New 
York: Berghahn Books, 2009) 
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from, and the earliest American proposals were just as critical of the pernicious aspects of long-
term tracking as their Soviet colleagues.   
 A large part of the answer to that question lies in the reestablishment of the German civil 
service early on in the occupation period.  Seen at the time as a necessary measure to streamline 
administration and ensure a minimum level of local compliance with Allied directives, the 
presence of local administrators introduced a German voice to the issue of educational 
reconstruction.  It was these administrators who were the critical element in deciding how the 
schools that they oversaw would develop.  In the Soviet Zone a shared vision for a new, better 
type of German society led them to support the Soviets and their German socialist and 
communist allies.  Part of that larger plan for societal renewal was a fundamentally different type 
of educational system.  In the Western Zones, including American-occupied Hesse, a different 
historical understanding of National Socialism led to efforts that were more focused on reform 
than reconstruction and an emphasis on establishing representative government as quickly as 
possible.  This provided the framework needed by local administrators who wanted to find a 
positive basis for a non-Nazi future in Germany’s past to stall the most aggressive reforms and 
push back against the occupation forces in favor of a reformed school system, but one that was 
still recognizably German.     
 
The importance of intermediaries 
 
 Educational administrators in Germany were largely able to accomplish this because of 
their status as transactional intermediaries.  Intermediaries were important because they provided 
a needed bridge for communication between the occupation forces and the general population.  
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They could also function as selective intensifiers, working to forward some agendas or goals 
while working to block others.  It is this aspect that gave them a previously unrecognized amount 
of agency in the reconstruction of German education as they chose to either cooperate with or 
push back against the proposed reforms of the occupation powers based on their own interests, 
goals, and beliefs.  The power inherent in this agency and the inherently political nature of 
educational reform in turn made them both active participants in and the targets of the emerging 
post-war political parties as post-war German political life slowly emerged from its singular 
focus on antifascism.   
 In order to understand the differences that emerged between East and West German 
education during the cold war it is necessary to consider the specific historical contexts that each 
occupation zone had to operate within.  German, American, and Russian education had a shared 
history stretching back into the 19th century.  Both American and Russian educational experts 
had a strong respect for German education that dated back to the struggles of their own countries 
to modernize their educational systems and the internationally recognized accomplishments of 
German educators and pedagogues during that period.  They also shared assumption of the 
power of education as a nation building and social engineering tool.  This view stemmed from a 
shared effort to use domestic educational policy to shape their own countries and steer their 
development in desired directions.   
 Wartime planning for the occupation period was hampered by the physical distance 
between the USSR and the US, difficulties in communication rising out of the war itself, as well 
as organizational difficulties within each country.  The immediate needs of the war also 
discouraged long-term planning about issues that might be ideologically or politically 
contentious - such as the future organization of central Europe - until the waning days of the 
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conflict.  In the US these organizational problems manifested itself mostly in the form of inter-
departmental rivalries between the Department of State and the Department of War, as well as a 
generally weak sense of direction or priority for the post-war period coming from the executive 
branch.445  In the case of the USSR the existentialist nature of the conflict combined with Stalin’s 
mercurial leadership style led to a similar concentration on the immediate goal of militarily 
defeating Nazi Germany.446  Once ultimate victory became inevitable early plans began to be 
sketched out.  However events outran the ability of military planners to articulate a specific 
vision for the future of the German state, much less German education.   
 Both the Americans and the Soviets recognized the need to include Germans in any plan 
for post-war educational reconstruction, if only to legitimize their efforts at reconstruction and 
reform in the eyes of the German public.  For this reason German educators living in exile, many 
of them among those who fled initial Nazi suppression in 1933, played a limited but still 
significant role in articulating a vision of what post-National Socialist schools in Germany could 
look like.  The lack of a shared wartime experience still raised questions of credibility.  As 
events unfolded it became clear that many domestic victims of Nazi repression had both the 
political and cultural legitimacy to take on early leadership positions.  In some extraordinary 
instances they literally walked out of concentration camps and into the ministerial offices of 
nearby towns.   
 In the mean time, the early advances into the German periphery in late 1944 and the total 
military collapse in the spring of 1945 revealed to Allied planners the extent of the job ahead of 
them.  They were faced not only with the need to ideologically purify and pedagogically !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
445 James F. Tent, Mission on the Rhine: Reeducation and denazification in American-occupied 
Germany, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1982): 13-30 
446 Naimark, The Russians in Germany: 9-20 
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restructure an educational system that had been converted by the Nazis into an effective means 
of communicating their own ideology to the next generation, but with the reality of the incredible 
physical hardships that they would need to labor under.  Five years of aerial bombardment and 
the final stages of intense urban fighting had heavily damaged many of Germany’s cities and 
towns.  Schools were just as likely as any other building type to have sustained damage, and their 
status as government property gave them higher than average exposure to the risk of seizure for 
use by the occupation authorities.  This disastrous situation was further complicated by the 
refugee crisis that gripped Central Europe as the war ended.  The net result was that even when 
suitable accommodations could be found for re-opening a school, the children who could make it 
were frequently traumatized, malnourished, under-clothed, and frequently facing home lives that 
were not conducive to education.  
 The first steps that were to be taken in reforming German education in the post-war era 
and the general framework that the occupation forces were to work within were agreed upon at 
the Potsdam Conference following Germany’s military surrender. Soviet and western planners 
had a number of shared assumptions and priorities about post war German education.   They 
agreed, for example, that it required an extensive purging of both course content and personnel in 
order to ‘denazify’ the system as a whole, that whatever system emerged needed to be 
‘democratically’ integrated into society - however one chose to define that term -, and that the 
new school system must be far more inclusive and serve as a means for social mobility rather 
than an exclusive bastion of social privilege. 447  However, their fundamentally different 
historical understandings of National Socialism and its origins left them in deep disagreement !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
447 “Potsdam Agreement: Protocol of the Proceedings, August 1, 1945” in A Decade of American 
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about the specifics of what kind of educational systems should be allowed to return.  In general, 
the Western Allies were much more in favor of reforming German education as it had existed 
pre-1933, while the Soviets were favored an approach that would completely rebuild German 
education along more egalitarian lines.   
 The circumstances of military occupation thrust some German educational administrators 
into the role of “transactional intermediaries.” This rigorously denazified and politically vetted 
cohort of administrators had access to and working relationships with the occupation forces 
necessary to serve as valuable ‘go-betweens’ between the military governments and the German 
population as a whole. Frequently they were selected because of pre-existing international 
connections or political ideologies that had placed them at odds with the National Socialist state 
but which now facilitated, both linguistically and culturally, their work as intermediaries.448 
 In their function as intermediaries, school administrators were in the unenviable position 
of facing pressure from both the occupation authorities who were primarily concerned with 
reforming the German educational system along anti-militarist, anti-fascist principles at any cost, 
and a German public that was at best ambivalent about such changes and more concerned with 
the immediate costs to themselves and their children.  In addition they served as valuable go-
betweens within the German teaching profession itself.  As the structure of German education 
was reformed various professional boundaries and structures needed to be reformed as well, and 
this created significant friction within the educational community.  Educational administrators 
had to mediate these conflicts in order to prevent them from escalating into the kinds of crises 
that drew often unwanted attention from the military authorities.       !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
448 For a general introduction to the concept of transactional intermediaries see, Alida C. Metcalf, 
Go-betweens and the Colonization of Brazil: 1500-1600, Austin: University of Texas Press, 2005 
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 This intermediary role placed German educational administrators in a position where they 
had a very significant amount of agency.  As intermediaries they could lend their support 
unevenly to one side or the other, in effect acting as a third voice on contentious issues.  This 
power could, for example, be used to push reform efforts over populations that had no particular 
desire to change educational systems that they had known for generations, or it could be used to 
help delay the implementation of certain reforms until elections put the military government in a 
much less powerful position relative to the German population.   
 Educational administrators in the east tended to support the goals of the occupation 
authorities to found an entirely new German school system and advanced them over the concerns 
of the local population.  In the west this tendency was reversed, with administrators fighting a 
rear-guard action to delay the implementation of the most radical reforms and generally 
encouraging the reconstruction of the pre-war educational system within democratic guidelines 
rather than the creation of something entirely new.  This was due to a combination of factors, 
including political self-selection as those with personal ideologies that favored the Soviets settled 
in the east and those opposed to that worldview settled in the west, membership in and 
responsibilities to the various political parties that were beginning to re-emerge as civic life 
resumed, and any sense of obligation that they felt towards their fellow countrymen.   
 The political power that was inherent in these intermediary functions did not go 
unnoticed by the political parties active at this time.  Whether operating within the context of the 
early reemergence of multi-party representative politics in Hesse,449 or the Soviet-assisted 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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domination of the East German political scene by the SED,450 the power that these administrative 
positions wielded drew the attention of politicians and political parties.  This was compounded 
by the fact that educational issues were of paramount concern for a number of them, particularly 
in the East where the SED was counting very heavily on the success of the Einheitsschule as part 
of its broader package of reforms for German society.  
 Political parties attempted to influence educational administrators in a number of ways.  
These included the double carrot and stick of overt political protection and pressure.  Where 
possible they used relationships with higher ranking educational administrators to ensure that 
political affiliation became a consideration in the hiring, retention, and geographical disposition 
of candidates for office.  They also used their influence to protect threatened administrators that 
were allied with them and to attack those who were not.  In its most extreme form, this political 
influence could be made to construct institutional redoubts within the non-elected administrative 
layers of the government to protect them against the changing weather of parliamentary politics, 
or as institutional launching pads for initiatives that would otherwise prove unpopular with the 
general public. 
 As 1949 drew to a close and the two post-war German nations became internationally 
realized - if not always recognized - entities, the educational frameworks that they inherited from 
the occupation zones that they replaced were strikingly different.  In the West major reforms had 
taken place, yet ‘reform’ was still the operative word.  Delay, negotiation, and general resistance 
to change both on the part of the citizenry and the educational administration led to a school 
system that while much more accessible and open than its Imperial antecedents was still a 
recognizable descendent, the most recent iteration of an educational legacy that could be traced !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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back to the era of Frederick the Great.  The traditional tripartite division of the major educational 
pathways remained, and although it was much more accessible than before there remained 
inequalities that reformers would fight against for decades to come. 
 In the East, nearly the opposite had taken place.  Spurred by a military occupation 
authority that was actively enabling the domination of the local political scene by a single party 
and overseen by administrators who shared their vision of a completely renewed German society, 
the educational system was in the process of being rebuilt from the ground up as a single 
educational pathway for the majority of the GDR’s children, a unified educational pathway that 
would theoretically grant every child an equal opportunity within the same educational system.  
The groundwork for this new system was laid down in mid-1946 with the Law for the 
Democratization of the German Schools, and had been actively supported by an administrative 
cohort that agreed with its aims, both ideologically and pedagogically.  The transformation was 
not complete in 1949. It would take until the mid-50s to completely transition over to the new 
model, however the wheels had been set in motion.451  Tragically, for all of the progressive 
reforms made in East German education, it was this school system rather than the comparatively 
un-reformed West that became a tool for propping up a second German dictatorship.          
 
The importance of administrators 
 
 Now, as then, intermediaries are all around us; we use them every day and usually take 
little notice of them.  For the most part, historians share this blind spot.  When they are spoken of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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at all the tendency is to concentrate upon their function, upon the groups or people or institutions 
that they connect and the results of this connection for those who can now interact with one 
another.  What is missed in this approach is that people are not, in fact, bridges and unlike the 
architecture that they are often compared to, their position as intermediaries grants them a 
significant amount of agency.  This study contributes to our understanding of a unique period in 
German history by not only recognizing those intermediaries, but attempting to trace what 
influenced their behavior in that role and how this in turn affected the reconstruction process in 
Hesse and Thuringia and the subsequently radically different approaches to education adopted in 
East and West Germany for the duration of the Cold War. 
 It also corrects the current literature on denazification, at least as it pertains to German 
schools.  Far too often it is represented as something that failed in the West, especially by those 
scholars who either participated in or wrote in support of the student movements of the 1960s 
that helped to shine a light on the numerous instances where educators and officials with 
unsavory personal histories had been allowed to resume important functions in public life.452  
Traditionally it has also been asserted that East German denazification was substantially better, 
presumably because of an inherent antipathy to re-employing Nazis based on the founding anti-
fascist principles of the German Democratic Republic.  More recent scholarship has shown this 
to be problematic at best, and indicates that German teachers specifically were re-hired at 
roughly the same rates as their western counterparts and due to approximately the same set of 
reasons: the extremely large number of teaching professionals needed after the war and the 
comparatively poor performance of the “New Teachers” (Neulehrer) who were rushed through !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
452 for an example of this literature and the case that it makes against West-German reform see 
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expedited training programs to fill the immediate manpower shortages caused by 
denazification.453   
 This work, however, suggests that a narrow framework of ‘success’ and ‘failure’ is far 
too narrow to understand as complex and fraught a topic as the political cleansing and spiritual 
revival of an educational system, much less an entire government or nation.  A far more nuanced 
approach is required, and one that evaluates the results of the process within the context of what 
the contemporary needs were.  Among  educational administrators there was at the very least a 
short term success in denazification.  This may be due in part to the number of positions that had 
to be filled, which was orders of magnitude smaller than the total number of teaching positions 
that had been vacated.  It should also be noted that even though the rigors of early denazification 
may have been relaxed in the 1950s, during the period covered here they very much remained in 
force.  This is significant, as it was during this period that much critical political and cultural 
development occurred in both sides of occupied Germany.  Denazification, in short, did not need 
to be a long-term success in order for it to succeed at its ultimate goal of fostering a healthy post-
war German society that could resist any revanchist temptations.  By effectively removing - even 
if only for a couple of years - those with tainted political histories it created the space to re-found 
German political and civic life along antifascist principles strong enough to withstand the later 
re-employment of those troublesome individuals.       
 Ultimately, it is hoped that the greatest contribution of this work may lie in a greater 
appreciation for how contingent the success or failure of military occupations and nation 
building projects are on local factors and the complex interplay of specific contexts.  The U.S. 
Army and Soviet Red Army that defeated the Nazis paid far too little attention to the details of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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what Central Europe would look like in the post-war period.  Many of the measures that were 
undertaken and much of what was accomplished was done through ad hoc mechanisms that were 
at best temporary solutions to problems that had political, social, and cultural antecedents that 
stretched back centuries.   
 The struggles to rebuild the German school system highlight this.  It was only through the 
participation of the Germans themselves that the scholastic legacies of National Socialism could 
be laid to rest, and much of the future path of German education was dependent upon the 
decisions and proclivities of a relative handful of men and women in administrative positions.  
Yet Germany was, with hindsight, generally considered a ‘good occupation.’  There was no 
militaristic recidivism, no broadly supported rebirth of populist fascism, no great Central 
European threat to international security in the 20th century.   
 None of this would have been possible were Germany not a modern, developed nation 
capable of producing its own educated, administrative class after the military defeat of 1945.  
Military intervention is a powerful tool in foreign diplomacy, however it is not enough to tear 
down one regime and replace it with another.  No amount of infrastructure building and no 
number of purple-stained fingers will sustain the creation of a successful government if it lacks a 
native civil administration that can skillfully and professionally oversee the renewal of public life 
in a constructive manner.  In the case of the German school system that pool of skilled personnel 
was not only available, but eager to contribute to what they saw as a unique opportunity to 
reshape many of the underlying assumptions and goals of German education.  This can not be 
said of many other countries that have suffered the indignity of ‘nation building’ at gunpoint in 
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